HomeMy WebLinkAboutChemical Warfare Dangers 1960 SCIENCE NEWS LETTER for April l6, 1960 243
0.1111111111! 1
bination with nuclear weapons, could wreak
• untold havoc on an unprepared nation.
Chemical Warfare Dan So viet tl u anb iol og uts, he mod, t«I_
ducted biological tests in an isolated Ca
tion over a long period of time, Medical
At the American Chemical Society meeting it was re- and technical reports indicate that the Rus-
sians are well versed in biological warfare.
ported that nerve gases would be most lethal in chemical war - The officials of DOSAAF, a Soviet pro-
fare. U. S. scientists have worked on new detection methods. gram for the militant education of civilians,
claim that 85°/ of the population has coin-
pkted ho a l0-hour anti -air defense course.
• THE LATEST chemical or biological war- 30% of the people in a 100 - square -mile The present aim of the organization is to
fare agents, carried in a single bomber, area. The area could be dangerous for as tram every citizen in defense against diem-
could kill more people than an H -bomb. At long as 36 hours. ical, biological and radiological attack.
this moment the U.S. population has vir- Biological agents (450 pounds) could kill The Soviet Union has the physical fadli-
tually no means of protecting itself in the 75% of the people in a 34,000- square -mile ties and the know how to make a success -
initial stages of the attack. area. The residual effects wind last up to ful chemical or biological attack, he stated.
At a meeting of the American Chemical eight days and once an epidemic. was Dr. Alan W. Donaldson of the Public
Society in Cleveland, Ohio, Dr. William H. started, it could spread to a much larger Health Service, Atlanta, Ga., reported
Stxnmerson of the U.S. Army Chemical area. that U.S. scientists have been working on
Corps reported that nerve gases are the Dr. LeRoy D. Fothergill of the U.S. Army new detection methods. The new fluorescein
most kthal agent that could be used in Biological Warfare Laboratory, Ft. Detrick, antibody technique is proving fairly success -
chemical warfare. These gases kill in Md., reported that diseases such as typhoid, ful in identifying many biological agents.
minutes by overstimulating the nervous cholera, anthrax, and rabies could be di;- Civilian protective masks have been de-
system. Some are so powerful that an persed by dropping aerosol bombs. The veloped but they are not generally available
aspirin -sized amount of the dried powder organisms could also be put into water, to the public, said George D. Rich of
can kill 350 animals. There is no detectable food and drug supplies, or they could he Washington.
odor or color; the victim inhales the gas dormant in the soil. On the other hand, the Russians have gas
and dies before anything can be done to Gen. Marshall Stubbs, the Army's Chief masks and shelters in many of their public
save him. Chemical (ricer, noted that chemical and buildings.
A bomber load of these gases could kill biological agents, used together or in com- scieme lbws t.tt.,, A IA H60
Relative Effects of CBR Weapons. Table prepared by the ACS Committee on Civil Defense
Basic Assumption: For the purposes of this table one B-52 bomber (or its equivalent) is considered capable of carrying either one 20-
megaton thermonuclear bomb or enough chemical warfare or biological warfare agents to create the comparable results shown
in this table.
T _ Nuclear Agents Chemical Agents Biological Agents
Immediate effective area More than 36 square miles 100 square miles 34,000 square miles at the very
(A & B rings) least and with only 450 lbs. of
agent
Human lethality (or morbidity) 98% (Lethality--A ring) 30% (not necessarily lethal) 25%-75% (morbidity, not neces-
in immediate area (unprotected) _ sarily lethal)
Residual effect Six months fallout with an addi- 3 -36 hours (nearly same area) Up to 8 days or more (possible
tional 1,000 square miles of area epidemic spread to other areas)
Time for immediate effect Seconds 71/4 seconds to 34) min. A few minutes to 14 days
Real property damage, imme- Destroyed (nearly 36 sq. miles) Undamaged Undamaged
• diate area
Variation in effect Little Wide —need not kill, only in- Wide—need not kill, only in-
__ capacitate _ capacitate
• Time an aggressor is able to 3-6 months Immediate Immediate
safely invade area after attack
Human protection that could be Evacuation ( ?) Civilian mask, CD -V_805 Civilian mask, CD -V -805
available Shelters Shelters with filters Immunization
Civilian mask (fallout) Shelters with filters
Current defense for U.S. popu- Some, but can be greatly MI- Nearly nonexistent Nearly nonexistent
lation (physical devices) proved
Cost of protection Shelters (150 - $800 /person) Mask $2.5048.00 Mask — x,2.50 -8.00
Filters in shelters Filters in shelters
($I 5420 /person) ($15-$20/person) •
_ immunization ( ?)
Covert application Little Some Great
Detection and identification Simple Complex but fairly effective and Difficult, complex, slow
rapid
Medical countermeasures Little Good if immediate Some, much more needed. High
health and sanitation standards
help.
Would attack trigger retaliation? Yes Yes Doubtful If cwart, slow at most
Capital equipment costs to pro- Very expensive Somewhat expensive pplication duce impassive . -
agents