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Home My WebLink AboutVE Day Battlefield Tour -..:.. JP>'" I~ ~' I Ie Overall situation in September 1944 <r~ By the Fall of 1944, Hitler found himself with his back against the wall. The Allies were approaching the borders of the Third Reich from all directions and the situation was a disaster. On the east front, the defection of Romania had cost the Heeresgruppe Sud (Army Group South) 18 of its divisions and the Soviet steamroller had crushed the Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) and was slowly pushing the Germans out of USSR. In the south, Allied successes in North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy, had forced the Germans to retreat constantly and they finally stabilized the front with great difficulty in northern Italy. The western Allies had opened a second theatre of operation in June 1944 with the successful D Day landing in Normandy. One month later, the American Third Army breached the front at Avranches and spread throughout France. Despite bitter counterattacks the western front collapsed and by the end of August had totally disappeared, the Germans were massively defeated. German POW's, France, Summer 1944. The idea of a powerful counter attack was Hitler's brain child as early as August of 1944. German cities and vital industries . were systematically leveled to~the ground by the Allied Air Force. Manpow~:r. was exhausted, economy was dying and supplies were badly needed. The situation was desperate and Hitler was absolutely convinced that time has arrived for al.-major counter offensive. pealing first with the idea ~f mounting it on the East front, he was of the opinion that a counter attack on a so large front would lead to the best to the destruction of twenty Russian divisions, limited territorial gains and very little effect on the overall situation in the East. The Italian front was declared unsuitable for such a large scale attack. Thus the question was to know whether or not the western front would provide the needed guaranties of success. Mter the breakthrough in Avranches, the Allies have liberated France and almost totally Belgium with a minimum of troops involved. They have a total superiority in the air, a fantastic degree of mechanization and a constant flow of supplies. On the other hand, the Germans are still holding important positions in the Atlantic and Channel ports, forcing the Allied to truck most of their supplies from artificial ports in Normandy. In Belgium, the port of Antwerp on the Schelde estuary is firmly blocked by the Germans. Patton's third Army had come almost to a stop because of the lack of supplies caused by the very long distances from the ports. Hitler knew that such a counter offensive entailed enormous risks but if he could regain the initiative, it would have a significant impact on the German population, on the troops but also on his leadership abilities. The attack formations could only be formed by weakening the different fronts, new Volksgrenadier units in formation would be added but re-equiping new and old units as well as the reconstruction 9f destroyed Panzer units will absorb a large part of the war production. It was a daring gamble but he had no other, option. As a perceptive politician, Hitler felt that both members of the British-American coalition had different aims and priorities and he knew his best chance lay in exploiting his suspicion that the Western Allies coalition would crumble if placed under pressure. -1- II. The plan Hitler's plan was to. launch three Armies from the Ardennes and drive west to the Meuse river and continue on ,to Antwe~ The attack would ~:Rlit t~ British and American Armies in two/and isolate Montgomery's forces in the n~He knew that the Allies had declared a policy of unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and he was convinced, if he was successful, to force the coalition to sue for a separate peace. With the western front stabilized, he could then concentrate his forces ag~nst the Soviets. On September 16, 1944, at a routine situation conference held at the Filhrerhauptquartier (Hitler's HQ) in East Prussia, Hitler informed the key leaders of the O.K.W. (supreme HQ of the army) of his decision. Several conferences will be held in September and October where Senior Officers of the 0 KW will try, to scale down Hitler's ambitions but this was a waste of time. ~ ROTTERDAM " 't.BREDA S''<<(-...,) r. "-'L ,,/ ANTW ../'. Three Armies, the 5th Panz~LA:a:ny, the 6th Panzer Army and ffie 7lh Army would be rebuilt and reequipped to breach the-"'" American lines in the Ardennes on an 80 mile front, The iii; Army in the south, through Luxemburg, to protect the left flank of the counter attack. The 5th Panzer Army in the centre and the main thrust was given to the 6th Panzer Army- in the north. Hitler had ~ . -'lI sc,!!e.dul~d his attack for late.-N.ovember ~r .:.-arly..lle,g:mber, when the weather is at its worst. Snow, fog and mist, characteristic of {fiat period of the year in the Ardennes, would shield his forces from the Allied Air Force and if the Panzers could exploit the breakthrough, Hitler believed his success was certain. Despite his assurance in the victory, his Senior Officers left the conference quite.skeptical:-Even SS Oberstgruppenfi1hrer Sepp Dietrich, Commanding General of the 6th Panzer Army arid one of Hitler.!smost trusted officers vi~ed t11ePfan with suspicion. . DORTMUND .. BRU e MONS , . ) ,./-. ....-6HARt: "J ( L. ./( - ') CHARLEVIlLE '-.... . . . '. SEDAN \..\.~..-"'".__. LONGWY. "1../ ,.-....; REfMS . France METZ . SAARBRUCKEN .................~ '''-..-., -2- III. The North shoulder In November of 1944, the Allies of the West had to admit that the defeat of Ger.many would- be a lot more difficult than previously expected. Over extended lines of communication and supply had forced them to slow down their triumphant drive through France, Belgium and Luxemburg..The defeat encountered in Holland with operation "Market Garden" and the bloody nightmare of the Hiirtgen forest forced them to halt since the rugged terra1n of the Ardennes, especially during the winter was unfavorable for_troop movements. Despite the fact that tWO German offensives had be~n launched tflrough this..area earlier in the century, the US Army considered the ~dennes ~~iet sector where depleted veteran units.fo.unda n~etleQi-es!.. a:rt:I wliere greenJJniis~could;gElin expen~nce... Tile ferrain was rugged and unsmtable for a German attack and thus the lines were thin and over extended. A perfect place to dig comfortable dugouts and spend the winter. Heavily forested in some areas and sparse in others, the Ardennes forms a large triangle extending north to Monschau, Germany, south to northern Luxemburg and west to the Meuse river valley. The Ardennes forest is magnificent, serene and enigmatic. Beautiful scenery, spring water health spas, gently rolling hills in the south have made of this area a prized tourist attraction. The Ardennes are cut by numerous streams and fi$.J" ,/;j-. ~,.i; ..JA'i Zit (,;J.I I... ..f! /S(;. ()()() {~~'1'!t ....~~:?il'(? .ll.":; rivers who have cut deep ravines at some locations. This topography of course makes the task easier for defenders since bridges and roads are key poinis easy to protect. On the other hand it's a lot more difficult for the attackers, mechanized movements are only possible on the roads and the deep forest channels troops and armored units on narrow accesses. The road net in this sector, though in poor condition, passes through several major junctions like Monschau, Losheimergraben, Eupen or Malmedy. There is also a natural gap in the forest, known- as the Losheim Gap. The gap is named for the towiltrrat marked its northern limit, Losheim, a small hamlet in Gernlany, just across from the Belgian border. The gap was famous for two previous German_offensives. The first at the beginning ofWWI, in 1914, when the armies of the Kaiser went through the pass and straight to the Meuse and the second at the beginning of WWII, in 1940, when Hitler started his Blitzkrieg to the west. November came and went without Hitler's needed weather conditions. The start date was postponed until mid December" when german meteorologists predicted a long period of fog and haze. When Hitler set the final date for Saturday 16 December, he could ,not have known how ~uccessful he had been in duping the Allied Intelligence and how his counteroffensive would be a complete tactical and strategic surprise. ( iftNJbsi<4~/:J'qkr Ai,,!," :'>lidd {ddufi9e.,mr Ekrsal? Der 3. fz. (/.r't:?/}. nill. 1m l't7/l/17f'?/ lYer Ii bscbi'rm':"'''5JS./rtw f MO.'7sdll'lU' E;;',l,lJ8n' fi'rp'/er.J.lull;"'/I, German map showing the different objectives of the 6. Panzer Annee and the I.SS Panzerkorps -3- IV. The 6th Panzer Army ~ 55 OberslgruppenfDhrer Dietrich 6. Panzer Armee ~XVII LXVII Armeekorps Generalleutnant HitzfekJ p ~ss ~ss I. SS Panzerkorps 55 GruppenfOhter ~rieu II. S5 Panzerkorps ss Obergruppentuhrer Bittr1ch ~ p ~ I m,v:::_", I 112 V~~( I Obersl WlebIg Generalmajor Engel k ~ k I 712, V==--I OberSt Ko&mala !326.V=:--1 Oberst KasclYler . 5S OberlOhrer Mahnke The main effort of the entire German counter offensive rested firmly on the shoulders of SS Oberstgruppenfi1hrer Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the 6th Panzer 'Army. Sepp Dietrich (left) with Generalfe1dmarschall von Runstedt early 1944. Dietrich was then commander of the I.SS Panzerkorps. By December he had been promoted SS Oberstgruppenffihrer and was in command of the 6.Panzer Armee Sepp Dietrich proved to be a successful commander throughout the war. He served as one of Hitler's bodyguard in the 1920's during the early days of the Nazi movement. Later, h~commanded the famous "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'(LAH), Hitler's /. I personal bodyguard. Though most of the Army officers consid~red him as ignorant and doubted of his military abilities, Hitler always trusted him. At the beginning or' WWII, Dietrich was~afthe lead of the regiment sized I 3. Fa::=- I Generalmajor Wadehn k k SS Bngaderhr Lanvnerdlng S5 Oberfhr St;rtdler 58 Standartenffihrer Krass "LAH" and met a large successes during the war in Poland and the French campaign. The "LAH" later grew up to a full size Armored Division and was often used on the East Front in hot sectors and earned prestigious successes. Dietrich was highly regarded and respected by his~IIien and a large majority of his officers nursed ar1" uildying'l~alty\to...bi!P-. Dietrich was a capable division commander but rather limited as Korps or Army commander. For "Wacht am Rhein" (code name of the German offensive), Senior Officers of the OKW made certain that a capable and intelligent chief of staff would assist Dietrich. /' His force would strike in the north through the thick forest with 4 SS armored divisions and 5 regular army infantry divisions organized in 3 Korps, the LXVII Korps, the I. SS Panzerkorps and the IC SS Panzerkorps. ( LXVII Korus This Corps was created in September 1942, under the name LXVII. Reservekorps and was in charge of all the Reserve divisions in the west. It became LXVII. Armeekorps on January 20, 1944. Commanded by Generalleutnant Hitzfeld, its mission was to attack on either side of Monschau and open roads leading to the east, roughly in the direction of Eupen. General Hitzfeld had two Volksgrenadier divisions, the 272. Volksgrenadier Division and the 326. V olksgrenadier Division. -4- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I.SS Panzerkorus The Headquarters were formed on July 23, 1943 in Berlin and served on the East front until the end of the year. It's then transferred to the west and took over the 1. and 12- SS-Ranzer Division. It is almost annihilated during the Normandy campaign and the retreat. The 1. SS Panzerkorps is reequipped for the Battle of ,the Bulge and SS Gruppenfi1hrer (SS Lieutenant General) Hermann Priess became the new commander. For the Battle of the Bulge, the 1. SS Panzerkorps is given the main effort and is ,reinforced by 2 Volksgrenadier divisions, the 12th and the 277th, and a division of paratroopers, the 3rd Fallschirmjiiger Division. At H Hour, on December 16, 1944, after an extremely heavy concentration of artillery, the infantry divisions would breach through the American lines and open pre established routes for the armored column\~/ \,,.-( To reach his first objectives, bridges across the Meuse river, Dietrich selected '-. ; ,fP ELSl":NBORN '" " " ... '....... ___~or routes of penetration, named Rollbahn, through the American lines. Those routes were labeled A through E. Rollbahn A and B : will be open by the 277th Volksgrenadier Division for armored battle groups o.f the 12th SS Panzer Division. Rollbahn C : will be open by the 12th V olksgrenadier Division for a third armored battle group of the 12th SS Panzer Division. Rollbahn D : attributed to the last Regular Army unit, the 3rd Fallschirmjiiger Division, to allow the breakthrough of a large armored combat group of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Rollbahn E: The last penetration route, will be used by the bulk of the 1 st SS Panzer Division. The I.SS Panzerkorps did have a timetable. One day for the breakthrough, one day to get the armored battle group on the high ground, one day to reach the Meuse river and crossings secured the 4th day. PLANNED ATTACK ROUTES of the I. SS-PANZER-KORPS Tht."1'J'C'l..~lM: fi,...UlCiot of ltoUbuhn ...'\.. [I an~J C vven,,; c,,"fablishe:d fn:.:n ,a hattleul.ap carried b,., a l'1'lC'tnbt:T of (.jn~:nadicr Rl"gin~n' 984 wbu Yw-Uh ~~a.ptuN.."d h,.. Sgl. (.t.c.orgc L. M~hnke.. J7Uth Field ArtiJlcf'Y Hutlnhon. ') WILLIAM C. WARNOCKfWlLL1AM NEFF -5- II. SS PanzerkorDs Activated in 1942 as SS Panzer Generalkommando , it became II. SS Panzerkorps the year after and served on the East front, specifically in Karkhow and Koursk. After a short period in Italy, it came back to the East front, in Tarnopol, mid 1944. After the D Day landing, it is hastily sent to Normandy where it took part in the last combats and the retreat. Hold in reserve, the II. SS Panzerkorps led by SS Obergruppenfilhrer Wilhelm Bittrich should be committed into action when the crossovers on the Meuse river would be secured. This Panzerkorps is constituted of the 2nd SS and 9th SS Panzer Division. Apart the organic artillery of its divisions, the 6. Panzer Annee had been . attached three corps of artillery, three brigades of rocket launchers, four heavy mortar batteries and one battery of heavy artillery. This made 685 guns, 180 of them had a caliber of 150mm o(over, 340 rocket' launchers of 150mm, 210 mID ~d 300mm. With the 211 tanks and SP guns of the L SS Panzerkorps and the 280 tanks and SP guns of the II. SS Panzerkorps this represented a fantastic force ready to run over the weakly defended American front. I.SS PanzerkorDs in detail 272. Volksf!renadier Division r- The 272. Infanterie Division had been badly mauled in Normandy and the remaining elements were sent to Doberitz where they were added to the newly formed 575th VG Division. In September 1944 that new division took the name of 272. Volksgrenadier Division. In November, it was sent to defensive positions in the West Wall near Monschau and was in constant contact with the US 5th Army Corps until the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge. 326. Volksf!renadier Division The 326. Infanterie Division disappeared in the Normandy campaign and its number was attributed to the new 579. Volksgrenadier Division who was in formation and basic training near Kaposvar, Hungary. The division became 326. Volksgrenadier Division and moved to Gerolstein, Germany to join his Army Corps on the west front. Due to the lack of horses and equipment, it is transferred to an other Corps, the LXVII, who was much closer. The division reached its assembly area early December 1944. SDecial ODe rations To facilitate the advance of the 6. Panzer Annee, two special operations were prepared. One, codenamed ((Stosser", called for paratroopers to be dropped in the early hours of the first day on the high ground behind the American lines. The German paratroopers were supposed to capture and secure a road junction at Baraque Michel, on the Hohes Venn (High Marshes), and either open the road for the oncoming armored battle groups of the 12 SS Panzer Division or block the roads coming from Eupen and Verviers and thus prevent any American reinforcement to reach the front. Oberst (Colonel) Friedrich von der Heydte, a much decorated veteran of the airborne forces was chosen to lead the operation. Because of bad weather conditions, inexperienced pilots and jumpmasters, the operation turned out to be a disaster. Of the 800 paratroopers that took off, 450 jumped on the Hohes Venn area but only a hundred came down on the drop zone. With a combat group so depleted, Oberst von der Heydte was forced to change his objectives. Mter several days of guerilla like actions, he was forced to pull back towards the German lines. Exhausted, with a broken arm and frozen feet, von der Heydte was captured by US troops in Monschau. The second special operation, codenamed "Greif', involved a two battalion size brigade - Panzerbrigade 150 - partly equipped with captured American vehicles. This brigade had formed American speaking commandos whose mission was to penetrate the American line dressed in American uniforms and driving jeeps. They would disorganize supply lines by changing road signs, occupy vital crossroads or bridges. Their commander, SS Major Skorzeny, was one of Hitler's favorite and famous for leading commando operations. Though the operation "Greif' was not a real success, it was certainly a psychological victory. Rumors of Germans in American uniforms spread on the entire front and generated a great state of confusion. 12. Volksf!renadier Division The 12. Infanterie Division has fought brilliantly since the beginning of WWII. It was involved in the Poland and French campaigns and then transferred to the East front. In September 1944, the division was moved to the west and was engaged in the defense of Aachen. Its name is simply -6- changed into 12. Volksgrenadier Division in October. It was removed from the front early December and sent to its assembly area were it was refitted. When the division reached its jump off positions, it was at 80% of its strength. The 12. Volksgrenadier Division is a veteran division, well equipped, well trained and led by officers and NCO's with combat experience. This is the best infantry division in the 6th Panzer Army. 27th Volksf!renadier Division The 277. Infantene Division Was cut to pieces in Normandy and what is left of it is sent to Hungary to be incorporated in the new 574. Volksgrenadier Division in basic training near Budapest. On September 9, 1944, the division's name is changed into 277. Volksgrenadier Division. Early November, the division reached the West front and takes over a portion of the West Wall defenses near Losheim. The division met some troubles two days prior the attack when it was relieved. One of its battalion wasn't relieved in time and the attack was made without it. The 277th VG Division is at 80% strength . 3. Fallschirmiiif!er Division Activated in France in October 1943, the 3. Fallschinnjiiger Division fought fiercely in Normandy and its loss are severe. In October 1944, the division is in Holland' where it is reequipped. Replacements are most of the time ground troops of the Luftwaffe (air forces) with no combat experience. Moreover, when the division reached its jump off positions the day before the attack, one of its regiment was missing. The next morning the 3. Fallschirmjiiger Division started the offensive with only 2 regiments instead of 3. r- l.SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) The unit was activated as a motorized infantry division in 1941 with troops of Hitler's personal body guard. It fought on the East front where it became a Panzer (Armoured) division in 1942. In the Spring of 1944, the division is in Belgium for re- equipment and reinforcement. It is engaged in Normandy where it fought fiercely and suffer important losses. In November, the division is back in Germany, again for re- equipment and training of new recruits. When the division reached its assembly area near Stadtkyll, it is at 90% strength. Its tank regiment has 71 tanks in its 1 st battalion and its missing 2nd battalion is replaced by the schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 501 (501st SS heavy tank battalion) equipped 30 King Tiger tanks. The division's tank destroyer battalion totaled 10 TD's. 12. SS Panzer Division (Hitler JuaendJ Originally formed as a Panzergrenadier Division (armored infantry division) it became Panzer Division in October 1943. The division, also know as 'Hitler Youth' division, was engaged for the first time on June 7, 1944 in the Caen sector in Normandy. Badly mauled, the division kept fighting and was part of the rear guard that kept the 'Falaise pocket' open. It suffered a lot in Normandy and during the retreat through France and Belgium. Its famous and fearless commander, SS Oberfi1hrer Kurt Meyer, was captured in September during the retreat and was replaced by SS Standartenfi1hrer Hugo Kraas. When the division reached its assembly area in December, it was at 90% strength and 80% of equipment. Its tank regiment counted 76 tanks in its 1 st battalion and the missing 2nd battalion had been replaced by the schwere Panzer Abteilung 560 (560th regular army heavy tank battalion) equipped with 25 TD's (Jagdpanther type). The division's TD battalion totaled 21 TD's. 2. SS Panzer Division {Das Reich} Formed in 1940 as an motorized infantry division, the unit has its roots in one of the most known SS unit, the 'Das Reich' regiment. The division fought in Russia and became armored division in 1943. After severe losses on the East front, it is send.in France for re-equipment and replacement in 1944. It was involved in the Normandy campaign and escaped through the Falaise pocket. Reformed near Paderborn , the division totaled 118 tanks at the start of the Battle of the Bulge. 9. SS Panzer Division {Hohenstaufen} Mter basic training in France in 1943, the division fought in Russia in the Tarnopol area. It was hastly deployed in Normandy after the D Day landing and took part in the last combats. Mter the retreat through France and Holland its strength dropped down to 20% when it was caught in the allied airborne operation in Arnhem. Despite its low strength it played a key role in the allied , defeat. It was reorganized near Miinstereifel, Germany and was at 75% strength at the start of the Battle of the Bulge. -7- Equioment and tactics III trained, ill equipped and skeletal at the end of the 1930's, the US Army was now the best fed, best clothed, best equipped and best paid army compared to the other nations involved in WWII. ' Infantrv weapons: American and German usual infantry weapons were similar in quality and performances. The standard US infantry rifle - the Ml Garand - was a semi automatic cal.30 rifle, fed by an 8 round clip. It was superior to the German boltOCtThn 7.92 mm and semi automatic G43. The German machine pistol MP40, called ~P.JW~, was superior to the Cal.45 Thomps nand M3 Grease Gun. c: ) The usual American grenade, a fragmentation grenade, was powerful and deadly. It looked like a pineapple and could be thrown up to 40 yards but the f:u;ginents were ~p to ~O ~ards. On the other= hand the German and grenade, known as "potato masher", was an offensive grenade onlyaangerous By concussiolrand-Iethal at only short distance. >' ~/ The standard German machine gun was the MG42, a 7.92 mm air cooled weapon with an extremely high rate of fire. The MG 42 was- very superior to the American BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), a relic of WWI and the Browning cal.30. Both armies had mortars as close fire support. Both used 81mm mortars at battalion level. At company level, the . Americaninfantry used 60mm mortars and Germans 50mm mortars. They all had similar performances. One important point of comparison was the amount of ammunition available on both sides. The American soldier had almost as much as he needed. The dying German economy and industry were severely restricting the amount of ammunition available on the front and forced the army to use a large variety of weapons captured from the enemy. Artillerv The American artillery was available in large number in organic units or in separate battalions. The logistic and-the high degree of mechanization of the US Army made ammunition available in large amounts and artillery was used lavishly. As for the infantry weapons, the German artillery was excellent but due to the lack of ammunition, it has to be used with parsimony. Both armies used 105mm howitzers as mepium artillery for direct support, usually one artillery battalion in support of one infantry regiment. Both. also used 155mm howitzers (150mm for the Germans) for general support. The Germans substituted a part of)their artillery with Nebelwerfers, multi'barreled rocket launchers nicknamed "Screem~/Meemies" because of their deafening ~nd frightening noise. At this stage of the war, the shortage in transportation and prime movers was important and most of the German artillery was horse drawn. / J Tariks - Tink destroyers - SP Guns During the Battle of the Bulge, the 6.Panzer Annee used three types of tanks. The Panzer W, workhorse of the German armored units throughout the war. This 25 ton tank was armed with a 75mm gun. Panzer IV during the Normandy retreat The Panther (pz V), probably the best tank ever made during WWII. It had a thick frontal armor and was armed with a high velocity 75mm. Panther in action during the Normandy campaign The Konigstiger (pz VI) - King Tiger. This is the most famous German tank. With its 69 tons and the deadly 88mm gun, this tank was extremely difficult to destroy. Both -8- the Panther and the King Tiger were superior to the American Sherman. 69 tons King Tiger German tank destroyers available in the 6. Panzer Annee units were the Jagdpanzer W /70 (TD version of the Panzer W, equipped with the same gun, a 75mm) and the Jagdpanther (TD version of the Panther but with the 88mm gun of the King Tiger. mechanically reliable. One of his major defect was a tendency to catch fire when hit. Sherman crew used to nickname their vehicle 'Ronson tank'. Ronson being lighter well known for its easiness to lit under any condition. Sherman tanks drive through France. At this stage of the war, the American tank destroyer units were in evolution. The towed 3 in. gun, though effective, was slow to set up in position, and since the middle of 1943 it was replaced by the new full tracked Stunngeschutz III were used as Self MI0. Other tank destroyers, such as the propelled guns (SP) and provided close Ml~.!!~llcat and the M36 Jackson, also artillery support for the infantry. They were eutered in service in mid 1944 but no units equipped with a 75mm gun. ~quipped with the latest were involved in the _~4., ....- north shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. Sturmgeschutz III taking position, Germany Fall 1944. The American Sherman had a short barreled 75mm and was inferior to many German tanks. On the other hand, it was available in large number, was easy to maintain in combat condition and was M 10 tank destroyers - Aachen Germany Fall 1944 -9- Brief history of the West Wall In March 1936, when German troops marched into the west side of the Rhine, demilitarized under the Treaty of Versailles, plans were immediately drawn up for a defensive wall. These plans led to the building of the first defensive structure along Germany's western border. Following Hitler's order of May 28, 1938, the building of the 'West Wall' began. Some 138 small concrete bunkers were erected along the border, ~ crossroa~ important firebreaks or hills and the main fighting line was established to the rear. This was supposed to be reinforced with individual pillboxes, machine gun nests, mine fields and hundreds of miles of barbed wire. Hitler ordered then the enlargement of the main fighting line to a proper line of pillboxes. Within about 4 months, almost 12.000 pillboxes were constructed between the Dutch border, in the north, and the Swiss border, in the south. r- The construction of the western fortifications exacted. enormous sacrifices from the German population, which at the time was going through an identity crisis with regard to National Socialism, and had to be justified. Besides, Hitler needed for his policy of strong hand, which at the time was just beginning to steer a dangerous course towards war, an mechanism which he could manipulate according to circumstances, i.e. he could either deter potential enemies from attacking the expanding German Empire or, however, with the same intention, he could feign peaceable desire for defense and thus play the role of the wolf in sheep clothing. Following the end of the hostilities in the west in 1940, the 'Westwall' had served its function. Everything that was not clinched or riveted was removed from the pillboxes. It was even largely disarmed because -wrongly- it was expected that it would never be needed again. However it retained its reputation, mainly as a result of the extensive propaganda which continued to accompany it. A large part of the installations fell into a slumber lasting about 4 years. After the successful landing of the Allies in Normandy on June 6, 1944, the German high command considered defending the 'Westwall' and reinforced it by the building'of'oorriers, especially anti tank ditches and obstacles. While the Canadians, British and Americans advanced towards Germany's western border during the second half of 1944, they had full respect for the '.&:ggfdpd Line' as they called it. On September 12, 1944, the first American troops reached and penetrated into the 'Westwall'south of Aachen. From then on until March 1945, the Germans held the American advance in many locations and sometimes with unexpected success. Strongpoints named Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Wahiersheid or Udenbreth in the Ardennes Forest will soon appear on Campaign Ribbons of many American units. Most of the concrete pillboxes were destroyed after the war and many trenches filled by farmers. Today, the last visible structures of Hitler's West Wall are the anti tank obstacles, also known as the 'Dragon's teeth'. They appear as being laid on the ground, one---\ at the time, with no logical layout. Each one is in fact part of a large underground concrete structure of about 150 by 60 feet. Each structure supports a good hundred of Dragon's teeth. -10- The 99th Infantry Division Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges' 1 st US Army occupied a defensive sector stretching from Aachen to the southern fringes of Luxemburg. Like the rest of the Allies, his Army fell victim of an extended supply line. The "Red Ball Express", a series of continuous truck convoys originating from Normandy ports, brought supplies to rebuilt the offensive power of the Army. The 1 st US Army was a strong and. capable force. Many of its divisions were seasoned and the defensive positions on the "ghost front", named because of the area's inactivity, allowed less experienced unit to take over. The philosophy was for units to gain combat experience by active patrolling on the front and acquainting them with the sounds and sights of the battlefield. One of those green units was the 99th Inf~ Division. ,-. ./ Activated at Camp Van Doorn, Mississippi in November 1942, the division moved to Camp Maxey, Paris, Texas in September 1943 where it completed its training before being deployed overseas. The average soldier in the ranks was of extremely high quality. Many came from the ASTP (Army Specialized Training Program), which trained and educated men with a high academic aptitude. The young recruits chosen for the program would attend some form of civilian education and then proceed to the OCS (Officer Candidate School).Unfortunately, because of human need on the front lines, the program was disbanded and the young recruits became replacements in combat units fighting overseas, most going as basic infantrymen. In September of 1944, the division staged at Camp Miles Standish, Massachusetts, in preparation for movement overseas. The 99th Division left Boston on September 30~, 1944 and arrived in England on ~)Cto ber 1 q, 1944. / r- In a matter of weeks the convoy landed men, vehicles and equipment in France and by 10 November the first elements of the division were relieving the 9th Infantry Division on the front lines, in the Ardennes. The 99th Division was w.ell trained and green only in combat experience. The 99th Division was commanded by Major General Walter M Lauer of Brooklyn, New York. MG Lauer deployed his three Infantry Regimertts:'on line from north to south. In the north. the 395th Infantry Regiment was1'Olk;'wed by the 393rd Infantry in the center and the 394th in the south. In addition, the 394th prOVided one15aftalibfi for the division reserve. The 99th actual front ran from Monschau in the north to Lanzerath in the south. This sector, a 20 mile front, was greatly overextended ana was a s~ of concern, especially in the south. At the extreme left flank of the division was the famed Losheim Gap, notorious because of two Getman invasions. The gap had just a few units covering it. A Task Force of the 14th Cavalry Group, not equipped for defensive actions, was manning observation posts and did reconnaissance. This obvious weak spot worried MG Lauer so much that he located his ~4th reserve battalion there, just behind . ( the 394th Infantry. He also Instructed Col Riley, commander of the 394th Infantry, to place an outpost in the village of Lanzerath to watch the gap from an elevated position, just in case. The relief went smoothly, veterans of the seasoned 9th Division explained the enemy situation and the disposition of pre dug defensive positions. The month to come was valuable for the (. - three Regiments. Men experienced. great success in their patrols, artil1ery~ fired a number of effective missions. ana all units were close to full strength; making the divisi~:m a powerful force to be reckoned with. / -11- On line - Pfe Harry Arnold, Co E, 393rd Infantry. ". . . We unloaded from the trucks at Krinkelt ... the atmosphere of the place was somber and subdued --and we knew we weren't far from our destination. It was November 10, 1944. We marched f!om Krinkelt up snow concelilea roads through fields and7itio woods. The forest, heavy with fresh snow was a childhood dream of a-limd of Christmas::. 1st Squad was halted after awhile, and in the usual Army fashion we stood awaiting the next development. A 9th Division Sgt told me, Jupko and Johnson to follow him. J upko was our BAR man and Johnson his assistant gunner. The Sgt carried us to an opening in the forest which was about 60 feet across and extended indefinitely in either direction. There, by two open holes in the ground we stopped. 'How far are we from the front line?' I asked. 'The line is back there where we just left from' He said. 'This is your OP, that's the border betw.een Belgium and Germany. You just stay in those holes and keep your eyes peeled and stay qli.let. You' llbe relieved in a few hours by an other crew. Not much happening here, you seldom see a Jerry, but he's over there. If you go into the woods over there watch out for mines and booby traps. The path we came up was cleared of mines but not the sides. That's about it'... r- Aggressive patrolling Pfc Byron A Whitmarsh Co C, 395th Infantry ".. . our platoon went out to two road blocks made from piles of trees several times. On November 19 patrol we were told to bring some prisoners because S-2 people wanted to have someone to interrogate. We were concerned we would be in for a very rough day but the weather was so bad it made the job easy. We came all the way to the second roadblock and around it without arousing the,G~rmans.They were six German soldiers in foxholes close to the road block and all of them had their heads down with a poncho over them to try to stay dry. Two of them farthest from us ran through the woods. We took four and started back to our lines. On November 23, Thanksgiving day, our mission was to ./ ' clear out Germans fr~m around a road(blockWe had part of the weapons platoon and an artillery observer who had/radio contact with his battery. As we approached the roadblock, some Germans to the fight and back of the roadblock fired automatic weapons, hitting no one. We took cover and one Iof our mortar men try to hit the Germans. This was impossible because of the dense growth ofthe1trees made visibiliry almost zero and anyway the rounds detonated high in the trees. Th~ artillery obserVer' called his battery. This didn't work either for the_same reason as before. After each blast the Germans would let go a burst of fire to let us know they were still there. Our platoon leader then directed us to fix bayonets and form a skirmish line to sweep the woods. I thought this was the craziest thing I had ever heard of because it seeme'(Fmany of us would be shot. However when we advanced through the woods, most of the Germans took off, except three or four that we captured. We started back to our line [ollowing the road, as we were going around an oth~1:-7f!Jlblock,~e man'tl[rf!:ont of me, Bob V ose, set off a mine along the shoulder of the road:-There was a big blast and~ V ose was killed instantly. The blast knocked me down and I was temporarily blinded and could not ,hear for a time ... " '-, -12- 1:1 o II) .S ." a e-o +I ::c. ~ ::c 1:1 ..... ..= +I 0\ 0\ ,~ ~ t <{ c: o '(j) '> o c: a c: a a.. CD I co I 0 0 I- I<{ I<{ e 0 0 0 Q) ro 0 Q) .!2 t- ro 0 .S 0 '0 0 c: c: :2 'E 0> OCD Q) Oco 0 0> a 0 c: :2 () Ci5 w 0 0 Q) .c .c 0:: ..... .c 00 .c 00 .c ..... 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C9 I t:: (J) - c: ~ (").c ~ 0 0 .s ..... ...,. 5 0 0 (J) 0) ('t) 'E 0) I/) (") ~ (J) (") Ctl ..... 0 0 0) '0 0 0 0) 0 0 I- 0 -13- TABLES OF ORGANIZATION 1 st Platoon (Rifle) 1 4 12 12 12 INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY TIO & E 7-17 26 February 1944 12 12 12 2 33 Company Strength: 6 officers. 187 enlisled men Weapons Platoon I I Platoon 11 Hq. 5 12 I SD-mm Mortar Section I Light MG Section 3rd Platoon (Rifle) ~12 ~ WEAPONS (WPNS PL T): (2) .30'cal. LMG (3) 60-mm mortar 12 5 5 5 5 5 INFANTRY HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY TIO & E 7-18 26 February 1944 1 st Heavy MG Platoon , 1 sl HMG Section 2nd HMG Section 2nd Heavy MG Platoon 2 32 1 st HMG Section -14- Company Strength: 8 oHicers, 158 enlisted men I 1st Mortar Section 81-mm Mortar Platoon ~' Hq. 5 2nd Mortar Section I 3rd Mortar Section 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 "\ VEHICLES: HEAVY WEAPONS: (14) Trailer.1I4-lon (8) .30-cal. HMG (19) Truck.1I4-lon (6) 81-mm mortar (1 ) Truck. 314-lon we (1) .50-cal. MG '\. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY, 105-mm HOWITZER TRUCK-DRAWN TIO & E 6-27 27 Seplember 1944 j B.",,,, S...""." 5 ."..~ Forward Observation 1 Section 2 Firing Battery Hq. 1 2 MAIN WEAPON: (4) M2A1 Howitzer, 105-mm 1 8 10 10 VEHICLES: (2) Trailer, ammunition, M10 (3) Trailer. 1/4-lon (1) Trailer, Hon (4) Truck, 1/4-ton (4) Truck, 314-ton, WC (1) Truck, 2 112-lon~ cargo (6) Truck,2 112-ton, SWB 10 FIELD'ARTILLERY BATTERY, 155-mm HOWITZER TRACTOR-DRAWN TIO & E 6-37 27 Seplember 1944 1 25 MAIN WEAPON: (4) M1A1 Howitzer, 155-mm 1 7 Battery Slrength: 4 officers, 102 enlisted men '- --- ---'" 10 1 9 VEHICLES: (2) Trailer, ammunition, Ml0 (2) Trailer, 1/4-lon (1) Trailer, Hon (3) Truck, 1/4-to,; (1) Truck, 3/4-lon, command (3) Truck, 3/4-ton, we (1) Truck, 2 112-lon, cargo (1) Truck,2 112-ton, SWB (5) Tractor, HS, 13-too, M5 . -15- 1 25 The 2nd Division attacks Wahlerscheid Early December 1944, the 2nd Infantry Division, who was in position along the West Wall east of StVith, was removed from the lines. The Division was trucked north to an assembly area near Camp Elsenborn, just behind the 99th Division. The 2nd Infantry Division was a seasoned unit who landed in Normandy at D+ 1 and fought fiercely in Brittany. Vth Corps had planned an offensive whose goal was the capture of important dams located on the Roer river, just a few miles into the West Wall. General Gerow's Vth Corps, with a 25 mile front which extended from H urtgen in the north to Lanzerath in the south was in an excellent position to launch direct attacks toward the dams from the north, west and southwest. However Gerow decided on an enveloping attack with the 78th Infantry Division striking from the north wing. The 2nd Division attacking from the south wing would push northeast to the Wahlerscheid crossroad and from there strike the dams from the south. General Gerow was particul~rly concerned by the exposed right flank of the 2nd Division so he ordered'the 99th Division to provide a flank protection. What the Americans didn't know was that the entire German defense of the area soon to be under attack was in complete status of flux. The 272. Volksgrenadier Division holding the area to be attacked by the US 78th Division was slated to regroup as the northernmost unit of the 6.Panzerarmee during the Ardennes attack. The 277. Volksgrenadier Division, defending the Hofen-Wahlerscheid sector, was slated to move south and form the central attack force of the 6.Panzerarmee. These top secrecy moves were successful, intelligence of both sides was unaware of the new positioning. As a consequence, these secret troop exchanges by both American and German, directly affected the outcome of fighting in the North Shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. On December 10, 1944, Col Alexander G. McKenzie, CO of the 395th Infantry was informed that his regiment would participate in a V Corps attack aimed at capturing a series of dams on the Roer River. The 2nd Infantry Division would spearhead the attack and capture an important strongpoint in the Westwall, the Wahlerscheid crossroads. Col McKenzie's 395th Infantry Regiment had only two of its three infantry battalions, the 1 st and the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion had been dispatched in early November to Hofen and was not available. Col McKenzie was attached the 2nd Battalion of the 393rd Infantry as reinforcement, as well as supporting artillery and chemical mortars. His orders were to move forward with his combat team and protect the right flank of the 2nd Division. He also had to capture a group of enemy fortifications a few miles southeast of Wahlerscheid crossroads. D Day was set on December 13, 1944. Weather was bad that morning. Snow had fallen the last two days and the fog limited the visibility to about 150 yards. At 0830, the 395th RCT jumped off toward its objectives following a small forest path named 'Hasselpath'. In the meantime, the 9th Infantry Regiment, the striking force of the 2nd Division, started its move toward Wahlerscheid. What they did not realize was they were attacking a small fortress. The road coming from Belgium was the only approach way in the entire area. That specific strongpoint of the West Wall was made of a dozen of pillboxes and concrete bunkers. They were grouped around the Wahlerscheid road junction and sited to provide interlocking fire. These fields of fire were completely clear of trees and underbrush and the entire clearing was encircled by booby trapped barbed wire. The snow hid a network of antipersonnel mines, mortars and artillery were zeroed in on the crossroad. On the route of march, the lead elements had received sporadic mortar fire since the dense forest concealed the size of the movement. The Germans fired only on what they believed to be the usual heavy patrols in the area. By the end of the afternoon, the lead battalions, 1 st Battalion west of the road and 2nd Battalion east, have reached the edge of the clearing. Now the element of surprise was gone and heavy artillery concentrations began to rain. Because of their exposed nature the position was untenable and attacking elements of the 1 st Battalion continued the move toward the crossroad. They soon ran into AP mines and heavy small arms fire. Caught in the open, they were forced to withdraw several hundred yards back into the forest. The situation was identical east of the road with the 2nd battalion. Repeated attempts to breach the defenses the next day ended in failure despite the use of the 3rd Battalion. Finally in the late evening hours of December 15, a group of pillboxes was surrounded and captured. The next morning, December 16, the mop up was completed. Five days of combat had cost the 9th Infantry Regiment 826 men, half of them victims of the terrible winter conditions. -16- N ~ ~ ~ ts8hle cheJd crossraod , 6.) ;0" _., )-~. _"'"; ? \ U" " i,_ I , '-, ( 395th RCT .~ 13th - 16th Dec. 44 ~ _, .JI ( -., ..,t '\ ./ \-..- ( 1\ / .,;~. -, ( ~'I~..~ I I , \~, S/Une?~es ~~ -:.:~-- --~-',.->~-;;;;/ -"I <r-:: / . nl:~ )~mY ',;: ) , I, ( ~f' b I r.~ " I rt It " \ \ , , , I I I I \ \ , :ci I _ (r ( .) ..- \'1' l / - l { \ . l, I. \ ~ \.. ....., I '-~ \ Rocherath /.'-' \, ". r' \. J i. J IIA II ~ ;\ , ,. / , I .~ 1~3'J3' \0. { \\ . ' '\'- I"" \ . \ '\, ,;"" '\ L \, < \,\, -... '. \ / C ( I I I , , ---""'-.-~" / I ( I /~ i) ,i '- I I I I I I I I I I L.. J' ~~ I .,~ -17- The 395th R.C.T. On the night of December 12, the 395th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) bivouacked in its assembly area. Barrack bags, blankets and personal belongings were stacked there in order to carry extra loads of ammunition. Officers and NCO's were briefed and everyone tried to prepare themselves for a push through deep snow and over rough terrain against stiff resistance from the world's most strongly fortified area. The chaplain saw extra duty that night. As the 2nd Division was marching towards its objectives, Col McKenzie's 395th RegImental Combat Team (RCT) proceeded as scheduled on the right flank. They followed a muddy forest path known as Hasselpath, which paralleled the route of march of the 2nd Division. In this sector too, the snow and the fog slowed down the progression. The end of the Hasselpath comes out onto a deep valley, which forms the border between Belgium and Germany. The German side of this valley is in turn separated in two by a gorge at the base of which runs a creek. The two German valley tops appear on maps as Hill 621 and Hill 627 which were the objectives of the L~t Battalion, 395th RCT. A half mile to the south-east, an other group of pillboxes known as Daubenscheid was the objective of the 2nd Battalion, 393rd Infantry. The German defenses of the West Wall are firmly rooted above the valley with strongpoints on both hills. At about 1430, on December 13, 1944, the lead elements of the 1st Battalion, 395th Infantry dropped down the Hasselpath and Co B attacked its first objective, the base of Hill 621. They immediately came under mortar and small arms fire. A number of men, including the company commander, Capt Hugh M. Gettys, were killed and more than a dozen were wounded or captured. As darkness fell, the Regiment organized its positions and prepared to continue the attack the next morning. No one slept that night since blankets and warm clothes had not been brought from the assembly area and the thoughts of what happened to Company B also added to the misery. The next morning, after a 15 minute artillery preparation Company A and C attacked down the deep ravine of the creek and scrambled up the precipitous wooded hillside of Hill 627. Rapid advance was made across small trees and brush in spite of constant small arms fire. In the mid afternoon, Company Chad reached the top of the hill and had formed a perimeter of defense around the first captured pillboxes. The squads were told to that one man in each foxhole had to be awake all night. This order was useless because without blankets, and in many cases, without overcoat, very few slept that night. On Hill 621 the 2nd Battalion, 395th Infantry had also taken most of the objectives, as did the 2nd Battalion 393rd Infantry at Daubenscheid. The next two days, December 15 and 16, the last objectives were taken on both hills and the positions were improved. German artillery and mortar fire remained constant and heavy, causing numerous casualties. Among the blizzard of incoming shells were "88" rounds. These were the high-velocity projectiles of the legendary 8.8cm gun. If any weapon in the German arsenal can be said to have most impressed the American soldier, it was the "88". To the GIs who occupied Hill 627, the "88" turned their surroundings into the epicenter of Hell on earth. They dubbed the place "88 Hill." Hill 621 was later dubbed "Purple Heart Hill". Withdrawal The first evidence of the German massive counter attack of December 16 was not apparent to the 395th RCT. They were still waiting further development with the 2nd Division at Wahlerscheid and focused on their own objectives. Early on December 17, Col McKenzie was informed of the all-out German attack and the critical situation. He was ordered to withdraw his RCT as soon as possible toward the north of the twin villages of Krinkelt- Rocherath, where they had assembled 5 days before, and protect the withdrawal of the 2nd Division. This was to be done rapidly to avoid to be cut off from the rear. At 1100 on December 17, the 395th RCT began its withdrawal, leaving behind equipment and weapons not considered as vital in a rapid retreat. For those unfortunates carrying mortars, BAR's, machine guns, the journey was almost impossible. At the end of the afternoon the 395th RCT had reached its former assembly area. The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 395th Infantry prepared defensive position facing north and the 2nd Battalion 393rd Infantry established a defensive line facing east to stop the first German patrols trying to enter Krinkelt- Rocherath. At about 2000, the 395th RCT was in position north and east of the Rocherath- Wahlerscheid road. The 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments of the 2d Division, which had captured 18 pillboxes around Wahlerscheid the day before, withdrew through the newly established defenses. This withdrawal was completed by about -18- 2100 on 17 December. The position was held in spite of constant German small- arms fire and intermittent artillery fire until the afternoon of the next day, December 18th, when a withdrawal order was issued. The entire 395th RCT, with the 2nd Battalion, 393rd Infantry still attached, pulled back cross-country toward Elsenborn. Upon reaching Elsenborn, the retreating column was stopped and ordered to return to the position from whence it came. A radio message had apparently been misinterpreted and no withdrawal order had been issued. When the 2nd Battalion, 393rd reached its original positions, at dawn on December 19th, they discovered the Germans had been slow in taking advantage of the situation. Some Germans were in the positions, but they were quickly routed. On the morning of the 19th, very early, the battalion was hit with a barrage from what appeared to be friendly tank destroyers. It caused casualties in E, G and H companies, with the fIring lasting half an hour. The barrage was finally called off. r- ~~~~~~~~~~ r-- However, it had been a costly action, the battalion suffered 7 killed and 17 wounded. This made the treatment and evacuation of the wounded very difficult. It also caused a great state of confusion. The enemy started to press in more closely during the morning, hitting the 395th RCT from the flank with large patrols. It remained under German fire throughout the day. The actual withdrawal order to the Elsen born Ridge was finally released in the evening and the men were told that they might have to fight their way out, as the Germans were known to be in Rocherath- Krinkelt by the time. There had been confused fighting there the night before. Under cover of the darkness, however, the 395th RCT moved back without troubles. The night however was broken many times with flares from both sides and the sounds of battle were all around them. They reached a point east of ElsenborI,1 and closed in at about 0100 on the December 20. ~~~~~~~~~~ 88 Hill - Pvt Vemon E Swanson, Co C, 395th Infantry "...1 can still remember climbing up the almost vertical slope of the hill and thinking '- This is stupid, we're all going to get killed before we get to the top'. 1 still marvel that we possessed the guts and stamina to make that climb..." "... 1 shared a foxhole atop "88 Hill." with Jack Beckwith. At dawn on December 16, 1944, Beckwith was at the battalion aid station seeking medical attention. Along with many others, he had "trench foot". 1 expected he would be evacuated but there was nobody to replace him. Beckwith explained that only five guys were evacuated. The rest had to go back. As 1 listened, there was a burst of flame, the blast blew Beckwith 15 to 20 feet. He had been ripped apart bu shell fraaments. His left foot was severed and his left leg smashed. Blood oozed from smoking holes in his abdomen and head. 1 shouted for the medics, 1 saw warm air rising from his mouth. He appeared to be breathing. Finally, somebody grabbed me and said, 'He's dead.' 1 can't remember what 1 did after that point..." "... Our retreat started down the precarious side of the hill. 1 was carrying my BAR ... 1 remember stumbling along a narrow path and suddenly staring up at steep and slippery upward trail. My initial reaction was '-Do 1 want to collapse here or just prolong the agony'. Suddenly a medic came up to me and said '-Give me your gun and I'll meet you at the top of the hill', I'll never forget that guy. -19- 39Sth R.C.T. 17th - 19th Dee 1944 N + ~ " ;S JJ>> .,. ~ " ;S OJ ;.. o ,,/ . .-::;~~::_;;:-.:=.:....;.:::;;:...~:::;/ \. l_~ ! "....- r ( \ ..- .? \ t..... ",- ~... " J\'" I -I :~....~.,. '\ . . \ . ,~.~, \ ~~ ::P" ~f ,.; j\ n~ , ,../ )111 " /. I' ? '. ./ \... D If, :11 '. /I"''''~ ~ ~' .~ II. ,~ , ,. A 'f' ....--"-'l,.~,. ""-- ",' -, j , J r' .,. -, /.---..... 1. '\,/ I'... ~(' ~ L..j JPS 2003 -20- ,..... Hofen - 3rd Battalion. 395th Infantrv As soon as the 395th Infantry went on line early November 1944, LtCol Butler's third battalion was detached to the German village of Hafen, Germany. His men relieved elements of the 102nd Cavalry Group and took up defensive positions overlooking the charming town of Monschau. Monschau itself had no strategic importance, it lay in the bottom of a narrow valley surrounded by sharp cliffs. However, the road leaving the town to the west was a direct access to the Belgian town of Eupen, important rear base of the 1 st US Army and the US Vth Corps. Hafen was not more strategic, except th~t it was sitting on a major route leading to Elsenborn, Malmedy, Spa and Liege, the heart of the 1st US Army. At 0530, on the morning of December 16, a tremendous German artillery and Nebelwerfer rocket barrage rolled over the battalion lines and left to the west. The fire was continuous until 0545, when it abruptly ceased. The shelling produced an enormous amount of damage within the town of Hafen. Fires raged everywhere and the streets were chocked with debris of smashed buildings and fallen telephone poles. All wire lines to subordinate, adjacent and higher echelon were severed. Wire crews were still frantically working to restore communications when the fIrst assault companies of the 326. Volksgrenadier Division appeared.. Accurate mortar and small arms fire caught them in the open and stopped them dead. Those who survived long enough to reach the American forward lines were cut down at very close range. At about 0830, the attack was over and communications had been restored. Sporadic American artillery concentrations were fired throughout the morning and the battlefield remained quiet until noon when a second attack developed. This one was stopped dead in the open field by heavy artillery concentrations. Col Butler's battalion was in a static position since its arrival, early November 1944, and the supporting artillery units, including the battalion's mortars, were perfectly zeroed in and many targets were accurately mapped to offer protection in any situation. When dusk fell on Hafen, dozens of German bodies were piled in front of the battalion's positions Decem ber 17th was spent almost without contact with the Germans, except for sporadic artillery and mortar fires. On the 18th, having failed to breach north of Monschau, the Germans focused their attention on Hafen again. In the early hours of the morning, an infiltrating force succeeded in penetrating the northern edge of the village in Company I sector. Despite murderous small arms fire from the battalion, the Germans infiltrated deep enough to reach the Battalion CP area. The battle was extremely confuse but at daylight, after considerable close quarter fighting, Co I was able to restore the lines. At about 0900, after a heavy concentration of German artillery, the Germans renewed their assault, this time in Co K sector. Despite heavy casualties inflicted by the battalion's mortars and heavy machine guns, the Germans succeeded in effecting a penetration. American artillery concentrations were called on the penetrated area and the Germans withdrew in disorder. The entire battalion front had been cleared by 0930, but only for a short time. At 1000, a battalion size force attacked the center of Co I and drove a penetration of about 400y wide and 100y deep. Approximately 100 Germans infantrymen who had moved into 4 large stone buildings in the penetrated area were firing from windows and doorways. Mortar and artillery fire was placed on those houses but with negligible results. Two anti tank guns in position near the penetrated area were moved closer and fIred point blank at the buildings, methodically shattering the stone walls. The fire of those guns proved effective, but the Germans did not surrender until riflemen attacked with phosphorous grenade and forced the Germans out. This was the final attempt to take Hafen. From 19 to 24 December 1944, the Germans maintained constant pressure on Col Butler's battalion with raiding patrols. Those were usually beaten off by mortar and artillery fire. The battalion prepared to repulse an other attack on December 25 but none developed. For its superb defense in Hofen, the 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry earned itself the Presidential Unit Citation and two men were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Nation's second highest award. They were Sgt Thornton E. Piersall and Pvt Richard Mills, both members of Company I. -21- Richard D Mills, Hofen, November 1944. Mills' citation reads: "Private First Class Richard D. Mills, 38553332, Company 1, 395th Infantry Regiment, 99th Infantry Division. For extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy on December 18, 1944 in Germany. When the enemy launched a filrious attack against his unit's positions and penetrated the main line of resistance, Private First Class Mills opened fire with his automatic rifle, killing many of the enemy and wounding others. Time and again he turned back their repeated fanatic attempts to pass his position. On the final attack, PFC Mills' weapon jammed. With utter disregard for his personal safety, he left his foxhole and standing in the open, hurled grenades, dispersing the hostile attack. By his superb personal courage and unhesitating action, PFC Mills contributed materially to the stemming of the German drive and the protection of his battalion's communication lines. Lt Col McClernand Butler C.O. 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry -22- b YODBChaU ~ ,. A \)it V~ ~ N + ~, Ro.....n ~ It ---- ...- r' ~A,,~~ 18 Dec. A A ~, / c.- ~o~ '" ~e.(q .~ ~e ...6- ~",e~~r ~o ';; ~ ~ . ,-~/ /. * A * -23- 393n1 Infantry Re2iment. With its 2nd Battalion detached to the 395th RCT, Colonel Jean D. Scott's 393rd Infantry Regiment had only 2 battalions on line, the 3rd Battalion under LtCol Allen and the 1 st Battalion under Major Legler. These . battalions were dug in at the edge of the forest along a large road nicknamed "International Highway". The road, forming the border between Belgium and Germany runs north - south, along most of front of the 99th Division. Directly south of the 395th Infantry was LtCol Jack Allen's 3rd Battalion, 393rd Infantry. Col Allen had deployed his 3 infantry companies on line in .order to cover the majority of the uneasy terrain. L company was far in the forest covering the battalion's left flank, I company in the center and K company on the right flank across a small forest path and linked by cross fires with Major Legler's 1 st battalion. The forest path running through K company led to the village of Krinkelt, some 3 miles to the rear. It also offered an ideal MSR (Main Supply. road) for the battalion. Unknown to Col Allen and the boys of company K, that path appeared on the German plan as 'Rollbahn A', the first of the five attack routes. 16 - 17 Dec. 44 - 3n1 Battalion sector. At 0530, the Germans laid on the entire front a tremendous artillery barrage that lasted more than an hour. Just as the barrage lifted, the first assault troops of the 277. Volksgrenadier Division. hit K company on both flanks. The entire Grenadier Regiment 989 hit one platoon of K company dug in astride Rollbahn A and at the same time, the Grenadier Regiment 990 breached on the right flank. Both German regiments were supposed to make a flank attacks and join as soon as possible in a draw just behind K Company's positions. From there, they would push through the forest alongside the MSR and open the way for the waiting tanks of the 12. SS Panzer Division. At about 0900, the Germans had reached the draw and had nearly annihilated Co K. Captain Stephen K. Plume, CO of Co K had lost 65% of his men within the first two hours of combat. The gap was almost opened but not totally. Company I, a few hundred yards north had seen only little action and L Co farther north in the forest only heard the rumble of the battle. Facing this critical situation, Col Allen had no other solution than ordering a general withdrawal. It has to be done quick because the Germans were nearly behind Co I & L. Those two companies fought their way back to the Battalion CP area. At the end of the afternoon both companies and the -24- remnants of Co K had joined the CP area and formed a new perimeter of defense. The heavy mortars of Company M had expanded all their ammunition - 1265 rounds. The situation was extremely critical and Col Allen radioed Regiment and asked for reinforcement. The only available force was a company of the 394th Infantry hold as Division reserve. The company arrived during the night. Though virtually surrounded and unaware of the size of the German attack, Col Allen prepared to counter attack the next morning and re establish the original line of defense. The night was spent in a high tension, the Germans were all around sending patrols and trying to find a weak spot. The next morning, Rollbahn A was still not opened, the Germans committed the tanks of the 12.SS Panzer Division to action. This was a seasoned SS outfit and the pressure on Allen's battalion became unbearable. As the German tanks slowly crushed the thin defensive lines, firing point blank into the foxholes, Col Allen, requested permission to withdraw and it was accepted. Still in contact with the Germans, the companies began to withdraw, one after another. One , of the last unit in contact with the Germans was Sgt Vernon McGarity's squad of Company L. His squad still continued to cut down SS Grenadiers accompanying the tanks with heavy small arms fire. This forced the tanks to stop for awhile. Taking advantage of the situation he ran back to an ammunition hole and re supplied his men. He single handedly destroyed a MG position firing on his position and directed fire on a Flakwagen (Anti aircraft light canon mounted on a half track). His squad finally ran out of ammunition and they were all captured. For his gallantry in action, Sgt McGarity received the Nation's highest award, the 99th Division's only Congressional Medal of Honor. In the meantime the men began to destroy papers, radios and all sorts of equipment in the CP area, . At 1500, the withdrawal was completed and the last defenders left the hill. The battalion suffered many casualties throughout the 16th and 17th December. Capt Frederick J McIntyre, the Battalion surgeon, and his aid men, volunteered to stay behind with the wounded who could not be evacuated. They were all captured at the end of the afternoon. We attack! Unterofflzier Karl Heinz Franke 3. Kompanie, Grenadier Regiment 991 At 0530 the silence was suddenly broken by fire of heavy and light artillery. The eastern horizon became a bright wall of fire. . Countless anti aircraft searchlights shone on the enemy positions. Along with that came the sinister screeching and howling of our Nebelwerfers. Without pause whistling shells hammered the trenches and approaches to the enemy lines... Squads in white suits hurried past me through the minefield passage. .. very near to us, to our front, lay the US positions. .. I hurried to my squad, with machine pistols and assault rifles at the ready we stepped crouched down through the snow toward the invisible enemy. The road. .. hand grenades... explosions, we broke screaming into the first American positions. We fired our assault rifles from the hip. We hastened past the first American dead and encountered others who resisted fiercely but our firepower mowed them down. The survivors raised their hands, the first position was in our hands... There was a short whining and heavy shells crashed among us. To run was senseless since shrapnels whined all around... Then quiet... sudden quiet is always suspicious, brown clad figures were hustling toward us. I raised my assault rifle, burst, burst, shot, shot... cease fire. I glanced at my squad, Muller to my right moaned and attempted to find a better cover, his right ann was smashed. He raised a little to high, was hit in the chest and collapsed. My company commander, Hauptmann Hagedorn, was several meter behind me, I saw him yelling orders and waving his ann as he was hit and collapsed. A medic crawled fonuard and raised the Hauptmann's head. He was dead. At the end of the day wefound out that our battalion was reduced to 45 men. Medal of Honor citation TjSgt Vernon McGarity "TjSgt Vernon McGarity, a squad leader with Co L, 393rd Infantry Regiment, 99th Division, was painfully wounded in an artillery barrage that preceded the powerfull counteroffensive launched by the Germans near Krinkelt, Belgium, on December 16, 1944. He made his way to an aid station, received treatment, and then refused to be evacuated, choosing to return to his hard pressed men instead. The fury of the enemy's great Western Front offensive swirled about the position held by Sgt McGarity's small force, but so tenaciously did these men fight on orders to stand firm at all costs that they could not be dislodged despite murderous enemy fire and the breakdown of their communication. During the day, the heroic squad leader rescued one of his friends who had been wounded in a forward position, and throughout the night he exhorted his comrades to repulse the enemy's attempts at infiltration. When the morning came and the Germans attacked with tanks and infantry, he braved heavy frre to run to an advantageous position where he immobilized the enemy's lead tank with a round from a rocket launcher. Fire from his squad drove the attacking infantry back and three supporting tanks withdrew. He rescued, under heavy frre, another wounded and then directed devastating fire on a light cannon which had been brought up by the hostile troops to clear resistance from the area. When ammunition began to run low, Sgt McGarity, remembering an old ammunition hole about 100 yards distant in the general direction of the enemy, braved a concentration of hostile fire to replenish his unit's supply. By circuitous route the enemy managed to emplace a machine gun to the rear and flank of the squad's position, cutting off the only escape route. Unhesitatingly, the gallant soldier took it upon himself to destroy this menace single-handedly. He left cover and while under steady fire from the enemy, killed or wounded all the hostile gunners with deadly accurate rifle fire and prevented all attempts to reman the gun. Only when the squad's last round had been fired was the enemy able to advance and capture the intrepid leader and his men. The extraordinary bravery and extreme devotion to duty of Sgt McGarity supported a remarkable delaying action,which provided the time necessary for assembling reserves and forming a line against which the German striking power was shattered." -25- 3ni Batt. 23rd Infantry - Rescue With two of its three Regiments involved in the attack of Wahlerscheid, General Robertson, CG of the 2nd Infantry Division, had kept his remaining Regiment, the 23rd Infantry, as reserve. The extremely serious situation on the entire front forced him to deploy a part of his reserve. He detached his 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, under LtCol Paul V Tuttle, behind Col Allen's and Major Legler's Battalions. Col Tuttle had to deploy his men around the Ruppenvenn crossroad, where Rollbahn A and B join. Should either Col Allen's battalion or Major Legler's collapse, or both, sooner or later the .Germans would reach Ruppenvenn crossroad. It was already dark in that late aftemoon of the 16th December when Col Tuttle's battalion reached Ruppenvenn. His men detrucked and disappeared into the forest toward their respective positions. Company I, under Capt Charles B McDonald (who became later a noted military historian and writer) dug in astride Rollbahn A, some 1000 yards east of the crossroad, Company L astride Rollbahn B some 500 yards south of the crossroad, Company K was deployed between. The night was pitch black and sporadic small arms fire could be heard far to the east, where Col Allen's Battalion and Major Legler's were trying to survive. Tuttle's men began to dig positions in the frozen ground and prepared for the worst. Late that evening of the 16th December, an extra supply of ammunition arrived. Given the magnitude of the German attack, the battalion had to hold at all cost. However, no anti tank mines and bazookas rockets were available. Col Tuttle was then informed that a support in the form of a platoon of Sherman tanks of the 741 st Tank Battalion would arrive in the morning. With the fIrst lights of the 17thDecember, heavy small arms fIre and loud bangs of German tank guns echoed in the forest. The 12. SS Panzer Division was breaching through Col Allen's battalion. Shortly before noon Col Tuttle was informed than the remnants of Col Allen's battalion would withdraw through his position, closely followed by SS Grenadiers and SS tanks. In the mid afternoon, soon after the last elements of Col Allen's battalion had pulled back, the fIrst German tanks started coming down the ridge in front of Co I, chinking and groaning along the narrow forest path. This was the leading elements of Kampfgruppe Milller, a combined infantry-tanks combat team led by SS Major Siegfried Miiller. Artillery fIre was requested and tanks began to scatter but almost immediately, Co I was attacked by swarms of SS Grenadiers. Heavy machine guns of the company cut down this first attack and forced the enemy infantry to seek cover in the ravine. The fight died down briefly, the battlefield is now covered with dozen of German bodies. They can be heard screaming and crying. After a brief lull, grindings and squealing of motors and tracks grew closer_and the first tanks appeared. SS infantry have come out of their hiding places and follow the tanks. The situation is critical, Co I has only a few bazooka rounds, German tanks are methodically pumping shells into the foxholes and the line is about to collapse. SS infantry is however pined down by intense machine gun and rifle fire but ammunition is now getting low. By 1600, the defense is cracking into bits, individuals, groups, entire squads began to withdraw to the West. Co I is disintegrated, Co K and L still barely hold. The machine guns of the two Sherman tanks of the 741 st Tank Battalion are beating the woods with with devastation. As the day wears on, Col Tuttle is pleading for tanks, artillery, ammunition, reinforcement but the answer is "Hold at all costs". Lt Victor Miller, the officer in command of the Shermans, moved two of his tanks, including his, to the edge of the forest in order to cover the approach of the German tank column. He is fearful of what may happen, he knows how deadly the German high velocity guns are. Indeed they are. The two Shermans engaged the leading German tanks whose returning fire blew holes in their armor, killing most of the crew, including Lt Miller. The night is slowly falling on the forest and it is obvious that the situation is now hopeless for Col Tuttle. German tanks have breached his defense, German infantry has infiltrated everywhere and in many places his men have been overwhelmed and had been forced to pull back. Two isolated nests of resistance, in the form of two machine gunners, were still holding. Those determined soldiers were frantically blasting away, controlling the belt with one hand and firing with the other. The heroes were Pvt Jose Lopez and Pvt Richard Cowan, both were awarded the Medal of Honor, Cowan posthumously. Lopez, firing from the edge of the forest, was finally knocked flat by the concussion of a shell but unharmed, he put his heavy gun on his shoulder and moved away. Enemy men and machines were now streaming out of the forest to the west. The woods East of Krinkelt held for 36 hours by the 99th and 2nd Divisions allowed friendly troops to organize and put the Germans largely beyond schedule. -26- Lausdell- nie:ht of the 17th-18th In the mid afternoon of the 17th, the 9th Infantry Regiment, in full retreat from the Wahlerscheid area (see chapter Wahlerscheid), was stopped north of Krinkelt-Rocherath by General Robertson. He knew that the situation was critical in the forest west of the twin villages. He directed the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (1/9), to a place known as Lausdell, a cross road in the middle of nowhere. Lausdell stands in open ground and offers direct access to the twin villages. The 1/9 is hastily deployed in the path of Kampfgruppe Milller. ~'. Commanded by LtCol William D McKinley, a nephew of President McKinley, the 1st Battalion had suffered high rate of casualties in the 4 day battle around Wahlerscheid. Its men, though veterans of the Normandy campaign, were exhausted, cold and hungry. They did not know what to expect but their orders are extremely simple : "stand against any enemy coming at them". To complicate the matter, . scattered groups of friendly troops were still coming from the forest. McKinley's men began to scratch the frozen ground to make shallow foxholes, deployed anti tank mines and set up a number of machine gun nests. I t's dark by the time and a thick fog now covers the entire area. At about 2000, the ominous sound of squealing bogies and turning tracks are heard. The first German tank appeared in the fog, rolls over a mine and bogs down on the road forcing the others to disperse across the fields. Bazooka teams leave their holes and go hunting the steel monsters. The accompanying SS Grenadiers deploy in the fields and begin to return fire. The night is now filled with explosions, shouts and heavy small arms fire. Tracers arching from all directions and burning Panther tanks lighten the scene with a frightening wan light. To add to the chaos, American artil- lery is raining but given the poor visibility, corrections are impossible. Some of the shells fall short, exploding among McKinley's men, others go wild. In this inferno, the fact that the artillery performed such a great support given the circum- stances is a miracle. By 2200, that evening of the December 17, the battlefield became quiet, the Germans had momentarily pulled back. The blood of McKinley's men is buying time to allow friendly troops to organize the defense of the twin villages. At about midnight, more Panthers emerge from the woods east of Lausdell, they are accompanied by walking and riding Grenadiers. The artillery officer, Lt John C Granville, screams over the radio that all available shellfire must be laid immediately on the fields between Lausdell and the forest. The radio remained silent. After an endless minute, the whistle of in coming artillery filled the sky and the entire area erupted with hundreds of explosions. German men and machines scattered in every direction to escape flying steel and the crushing force of the explosions. After fifteen minutes, when the shelling lifted, silent descended on the freezing and foggy scene where so many young Americans and Germans have just died in pain and terror. Dawn of December 18th, came with the air still fIlled with smoke smoldering from the burnt vehicles. The rifle companies of McKinley still stand despite extremely high losses. Around 0700, German artillery began to rain on the crossroad, obviously preparing on other assault. Soon after, Panther tanks emerged from the morning fog. The first two are destroyed by bazooka teams but the others broke through and disappeared toward Krinkelt-Rocherath. SS troopers accompanying the tanks reach the line of foxholes and the battle became a fierce killing with hand to hand and grenade fighting. This is too much to handle and McKinley's battalion is falling apart. More Panthers and Grenadiers join the carnage. This is the end. When the withdrawal order is received, the battalion is annihilated. McKinley is now trying to extricate the survivors. The Battalion CP is finally abandoned, the last one to leave being McKinley himself. About 10% of the rifle soldiers have survived the engagement at Lausdell. Out of a total of 600 men on December 14, 196 esc'aped the slaughter. For the defense of Lausdell, McKinley battalion was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and an infantryman received the Medal of Honor. This was the 4th MOH awarded in the path of the 12. SS Panzer Division. -27- 16 Dec. 44 - lat Batt. 393rd Inf. Just south of Col Allen's battalion was Major Legler's 1 st Battalion. He had a smaller front to cover but the terrain was more complicated. He only deployed two companies on line, Band C companies, and kept A company as battalion reserve. B Co was on the battalion's left flank, still on the west side of International highway but C Co, on the right flank, had one platoon west of the road and two platoons east of it. In this sector also, a dirt road went east-west through the forest. It provide a nice MSR for Major Legler's battalion but it was also a direct access to Krinkelt for the Germans. That dirt road known as Weisserstein appeared on the German plan as the second penetration route, Rollbahn B. 1- Major Legler's 1 st Battalion was also hit hard that morning. Mter the early morning shelling lifted, Grenadier Regiment 991 broke through on Company B's left flank and in the meantime, the Grenadier Regiment 990 attacked Company C. ' Company B stood fast and inflicted serious casualties to the attacking Grenadiers. In Company C's sector, the situation was more critical. Their fighting positions were extremely precarious. They were dug in on both sides of the main road in a densely forested sector, they were blocking the entrance of Rollbahn B and their positions offered a very limited field of fire. By 1030, the two platoons east of the main road had been wiped out and the survivors had pulled back to the west side. The only battalion reserve, Company A had already been used with no result. It soon became obvious that Major Legler's battalion could no longer resist and he asked Regiment for help. The only one help available was the Mine Platoon of the Regiment's Anti Tank Company. This platoon, under lLt Harry Parker, was quickly detached. Upon reaching Company C's CP, Lt Parker came across German grenadiers who already had crossed the highway. He ordered those of his men with bayonets to fIx them and formed what infantrymen call a "skirmish line". They charged the Germans grenadiers, shooting as fiercely as they could. Much to their relief, the Germans broke contact at this sudden and unexpected charge and withdrew. Some fled, others tried to stand fast and were killed or captured. At the end of the afternoon, Major Legler had lost nearly a half of his battalion, Company D's heavy mortars had expanded all its ammunition, radio contact with his companies and the regiment were sporadic and he was not aware of the situation on his flanks. He requested permission to withdraw the remains of his battalion and formed an all around defense in his CP area. As in the 3rd battalion sector, the night was stressful. Though the fight had died down, German patrols were trying to infiltrate the perimeter. Throughout the night, small arms fires echoed through the forest, revealing in the flashes Germans as close as 50 yards. Nobody knew exactly where 'the enemy was. As the darkness of the forest gave way to the daylight of the cold morning of December 17, the frozen remnants of Major Legler's battalion were still holding. At about 1100, he, like Allen further north, also received a withdrawal order and was told to move his shadow force to the north west and to link up with the 2nd Division unit positioned at Ruppenvenn crossroad (Col Tuttle's 3rd Batt, 23rd Inf - see preceding chapter). Major Legler's contacts with regiment were so fragmentary that he could barely keep track of what was going on at his flanks. Surprisingly, the German pressure is not as intense as the preceding day. They had apparently decided to by pass Legler's battalion and keep moving west. This was obviously facilitated by large gaps that existed now between Legler's battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 394th Infantry. Toward the end of the afternoon, leading elements Legler's retreating column made contact with Col Tuttle's battalion at Ruppenvenn only to find them fiercely fighting back tanks and infantry of Kampfgruppe Milller. When he got word that the defense around Ruppenvenn had been torn apart, Legler decided to save what was left of his battalion by moving west cross- country. To complicate the situation, Legler was notified that a patrol of the 2nd Battalion, 394th Infantry, originally in position south of his battalion (see chapter 2nd Battalion, 394th Infantry) has made contact. Moving such a large group in the dark through the forest was impossible, Legler decided to stay an other night in the forest and move out the next morning. SS troopers emerged now from all the directions and a new perimeter of defense was established. Weary, frozen and fearful infantrymen prepare to spend an other frightening night in the middle of the forest. In the pre dawn hours of December 18th, Legler orders everyone to get out the best they can and regroup at the southwestern edge of the forest. They will join the column of the 2nd Battalion 394th Infantry and escape to the village of Miirringen, known as still being in American hands. In less than 48 hours, Legler had lost nearly 80% of his battalion and the survivors are exhausted. -28- 01 00 0\ r ~ = ~ ~ .. .. N ~ (1)= (I) 'a; . I-. NE-< P"I.c- u<: 2 s:: .c.c s:: III '. . MI(,..~IO~ ~;g )?"'~:" ,~ )o,y).i ,'LY<~r: ~ III 0 .,'~~ ~1. ftF~ ~ ~ , J, /II (" -5 - ".f Jf~~~~ rtJ . .-" IAl . ~~ 4' · ~ 'Sf . ~ ~ en 01 to ~, =' ~' ~ e 0\73 O\Q) ~ ~Q) "0 =::J ~ ~ ..~". I ~-~~1;~'5J C QJ ,~ ~\~~r~\ ,~ /~l ~~-\:r \l~B'~1 , f oJ _~. · ~ 1 Jj · , : 'j 'Ir\ ~ ~~ ~~ffi~,~ .,.~'" .~ ~3 s:I Cl cS & .s ~ wg r: ~ ~ 0\ " (W) J2i * '"' ~ .8 'il .!o! -29- 394th InC. Relrt - 16 December The 394th Infantry was also part of the defensive line of the 99th Division running North - South alongside the International Highway. Its 2nd Battalion was in position just south of Major Legler's 1 st Battalion, 393rd Infantry. Its companies were deployed east of the International Highway and its Battalion Headquarters west of it. Company E's positions were overlooking the village of Udenbreth, the other companies were positioned in a heavily forested area. The battalion had no major road either to protect or defend. The only trail leading to the battalion was a log road built by the engineers and dubbed 'Corduroy road'. Like all the American units dug in along the international highway, the 2nd Battalion had endured the pre dawn artillery barrage of the 16 December. When the barrage lifted, surprisingly no attack developed. The Germans had focused their assaults north and south of the battalion to open their vital Rollbahn and since none were located in the battalion sector, the German command did not invest troops to push them aside. Nevertheless, a small attacking force, in the form of a the - Filsiliers Kompany of the 277. VG Division, showed up that morning. They came from the village of Udenbreth. After the artillery cut loose on them, the attack force pulled back to the village. They tried again later this time accompanied by three ' Sturmgeschutz (tracked self propelled 75 mm gun). Big 155mm shells frred by the American artillery quickly scatterred the SP guns but despite leaving many dead and wounded some Filsiliers got in among riflemen of Company E. Well protected in their log covered dugouts, the Americans requested the battalion's heavy mortars to bring their shells down, right on top of all. Completely naked to the rain of steel and tree bursts, the Filsiliers withdrew in disorder. The 2/394 Executive Officer, Capt Ben W. Legare, is now leading the battalion. The early morning artillery barrage has left the original commander, LtCol Philip Wertheimer, in a such state of terror that he is no longer able to perform his duty. Mter much hesitation, Capt Legare finally took over. He was of course as ignorant as were his counterparts along the front about what is going on. Mter the second Filsiliers attack was repulsed, Capt Legare sent a patrol to fmd out what was happening on the Battalion's northern flank. There was no trace of Major Legler's 1 st Battalion of the 393rd Infantry to be found. What was to be found are hundreds of -30- Grenadiers moving west along forest trails. Second Battalion radioed the situation to the 394th Regimental Headquarters located in Hunningen, 4 miles to the southwest. As in other sectors, communications are fragmentary and confused but the 2nd Battalion nevertheless fares well compared to the other battalions of the 99th Division engaged on the forested borderland alongside 'International Highway'. Company E let blood but not as copiously as their attacking Filsiliers. The other two rifle companies, the heavy weapons company and the Battalion HQ were intact. Capt Legare and his company commanders are however sorely worried. Why has the sister battalion to the north (Legler) vanished to be replaced by the enemy? What is going on to the south where International Highway branches at Losheimergraben with an excellent paved road leading to the west and to American rear bases? Unknown to Legare, Losheimergraben and the paved road are the L SS Panzerkorps' main objective, Rollbahn C. This confuse situation continued throughout the day into the night, when, again on the left flank, there was a considerable amount of small arms fire which lasted all night. The next day, the 17th, although there were indications that the Germans were beginning to get behind the positions Capt Legare remained in place. At 1405, conditions had grown so bad on the whole regimental front that they were ordered to withdraw to Murringen. This order came down by runner very late, since it stated the withdrawal would begin at 1500. Legare called hastily the Company Commanders and issued their own march orders by about 1430, leaving them Y:z hour to get moving. This was just another evidence of the state of confusion then existing, and the Battalion was late in moving out. The plan was to move out motor vehicles and heavy equipment first, leaving a skeletal force to cover the withdrawal. The vehicles were sent back and Legare took the lead of the foot column. Things were in bad shape. There was little contact with anyone and a patrol was sent out to make contact with Major Legler's unit on the left flank. At 1630 Legare had still radio contact with the patrol and was informed about Legler's withdrawal. At about midnight they picked up word from Regiment that they were going to withdraw all troops to Krinkelt and from there work them to Elsenborn Ridge. Moving his Battalion through the forest in the dark was extremely perilous so Capt Legare decided to assemble his men at the edge of the forest north east of Murringen and move ou t the next morning. Miirrine:en - 2/394 When the last troops of the 394th left Murringen on the evening of the 17th, they left about a thousand Americans out to the east. They are the survivors of Major Legler's battalion and large groups of the 2/394 trying to make their way to the west through the dense and snowy forest. During the night both units have joined forces and decided to escape to the west the next morning. At daybreak, on the cold and foggy morning of December 18, the column emerged from the forest. Beyond, the fields go up hill to a group of farms and barns, the village of Miirringen. Using his field glasses, the officer leading the column stared at the village one mile across the valley. Though the view is obscured by the morning fog, no enemy activity is detected. r-- Tactic in combat zones always requires patrols to move forward to 'feel'the terrain. For whatever reason, the officer orders to form a skirmish line and move toward Murringen. Co E is deployed on the right (north) flank and G Co on the left (south) flank. Co E marches a half mile over the open fields and, for some unknown reason, stops. Not aware of this halt, Co G keeps going and soon reaches the first buildings of Murringen. There is an intersection and a road coming from their left. The lead platoon prepares to cross. All is quiet and silent. The first three squads have already crossed when a lone German walked out one of the buildings, he is shot dead by the lead scout. The loud bang of the M 1 rifle draws the attention of the Germans occupying the village. German Grenadiers had placed a machine gun in a loft of a barn overlooking the place where G Co's leading platoon had crossed minutes before. The German gunner, quickly recovering from the surprise, is now blasting straight across the street. He cuts loose in the American infantrymen caught in the open, preventing them from withdrawing and the rest of G Co from approaching. At such a close distance, the wounds inflicted by the machine gun are terrifying. Since there is no way for the Americans to pull back, the only way to escape the slaughter is to move forward or enter one of the buildings. Other Grenadiers soon join and begin to fire from doors and windows. For the bulk of G Co, pinned down at the crossroad, all they can do is to return fire with the hope that their companions caught in the exposed position could escape the trap. The result is very discouraging and the trap closes tighter each minute. Co E who should have been to their right, could have wiped those ,-- r- -31- Germans easily with an enveloping move, but Co E is nowhere to be seen. Resist would only mean death and the survivors flnally surrender. At the end of the afternoon, a ragged column of G Co soldiers pulled back to the edge of the forest, leaving 23 men behind them. A cold and black night is coming down once again and join with the fog rising from the draws and stream. This makes command and control nearly impossible and to add to their misery, there are wounded among them. The plan now is to move to the west following a creek running east-west between Krinkelt and Murringen and then to Wirtzfeld, which leaders believe to be still in American hands. The valley is a mile long and is an easy walk on a sunny summer day but certainly not on a dark winter night. Small groups begin to move on, sloshing through the mud and water, sliding and falling down, grabbing brushes and small trees. To the north, the sky over the twin villages is lit by a fiery glow, adding an other dimension to the scene. Artillery fire and machine guns stutters can be heard distinctly. The 12.SS Panzer Division has broken through (See Lausdell chapter) and is now engaged in fierce and bloody street fightings with the 2nd Division in Krinkelt. The head of the column has now reached a few buildings at the end of the valley, an old saw mill. Distant booms are suddenly heard and the black night whistles and vomits a stream of heavy artillery. Those are 155mm shells fired by an American guns, mistaking the column as being German soldiers. The men are caught in the open, no place to hide or seek cover. The valley is shaken for long minutes by big explosions, tearing, decapitating, cutting human flesh unmercifully. As medics bandage the wounded and deliver morphine to the dying, others are fleeing away from the creek. The shelling has split the column in a number of small groups, each trying now to escape the slaughter. A 2nd Division outpost is finally reached and a message is sent to the artillerymen, the shelling abruptly stops. Dazed and shocked the survivors slowly emerge from the valley and continue to the west. Each battalion._ started with about 800 men on December 16. When they reached the Elsenborn heights, 72 hours later, Major Legler's 1st Battalion, 393rd Infantry had less than 250 men left. Capt Legare's 2nd Battalion 394th Infantry was in a better shape with about 550 men and officers. Mter a brief rest in Elsenborn, they will be deployed on the Elsenborn Ridge until late January 1945. Miirringen - Sgt Harold F. Schaefer - Co G, 394th Infantry. ...we picked up another logging trail that ran along the side of a draw until we broke out of the forest. Beyond the stream were open fields, cut by hedgerows, extending up a steep then gentle rise all the way through Milrringen... I've often wondered what was going in the minds of our co's and staff as we looked at that peaceful scene ... a recon patrol could have found out what we needed to know, instead we advanced on Milrringen in the same formation used in the draw. As we advanced, we restock our packs with rations found in abandoned foxholes, we must have been nuts to think Regiment was still in the village. I was about 100 meters from the first house when the first Jerry was spotted.. . somebody fired at him and woke up the whole damn Gennan Army. ... Jerry is now fully awake and had set up a MG in a loft of a bam and is firing down the road. The MG is on E Co's side of the road and has to be knocked out. A part of the squad is sent across to contact E Co. I followed the hedgerow approximately 100 yards when I saw a human form squatting down on the other side of the hedge. I walked up, squatted down and said "hello", I was looking in the blue eyes of a Jerry soldier... my Ml is faster than the German rifle and he got to die for his country. Being an ASTP boy, I was bright enough to know that E Co was not in Gennan uniforms and headed back to infonn my squad leader... our retreat from Milrringen took us on a path 400 meters infront of where E Co was. r- r-- r- r- Major Matthew L.Legler C.O. 1st Battalion, 393rd Infantry -32- IA 1 p~J 393 i - I 2nd Batt. 394th Inf ~ j ~ o~ IN ~ 3~ A ~<r ~<r M'iirriDgen A Jj ~,~ It I ... ~. ! "'...... 'Vi,~ . " b ,- '-,_~:, ~ ", .- ':,,' j:_ .~' ~2, \ ... A \ r- ,l Corduroy \ Road , I J / / / / / Udenbreth ~ ''''0 Fiisiler Kp I Gr Rem 99] ~ ~ ~I ~ GI o!:: .~ ~ - crt 8 '.::J ctJ' ~ff s ................ ~ "" ~ r- It It " ~ , , " h ... ... J ....... ...... ...- * A ~ ~ 2 I I ~ .t1 ~ A ~ 3~4 III ~ 394 * A r- j it It It A .. ~ ~ A ~ k It ~ :4 ~ To 8uilii} -__ ROllbah 1 11 liCit A It gell It ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ SPEDER 2005 -33- Losheimerl!raben - 16 December Losheimergraben is a little custom post in the forest where four main roads join together. There are a few buildings for the custom guards and clerks and some two hundred yards to the south, there are three brick houses for their families. All have evacuated in September and the buildings now serves the Americans. r- Col Douglas' 1 st Battalion, 394th Infantry, was deployed in a large arc east to southeast of Losheimergraben crossroad. The left flank was occupied by Co C, in the center, B Co's had its squads and machine guns spread widely in the forest and mainly covering shallow depressions, little ravines or fire breaks. It was not a continuous line of resistance like in other sectors, the forest was too dense and the front to defend too wide. Most of the gaps were covered by mines and booby traps. A Co was deployed the same manner south of the Losheimer - graben-Losheim road. During the day, B and A Co's occupied OP's (observation post) with artillery observers at the edge of the forest and watched the German town of Losheim. The battalion's heavy mortars were dug in just south of the crossroad in a small clearing. Col Douglas was worried, there was a railroad track embedded in a deep ravine, this was a natural obstacle but ran on his front and right (south) flank and went deep into the American lines. The road coming from Losheim was not only a direct access to the heart of his battalion but to the west it went straight to American rear bases. Fortunately the bridge over the railroad track had been blown by the Germans in September and the road was cut. His battalion however covered a front much too wide and his companies were spread in the dense forest with a very limited field of fire. He also had three 57mm anti tank guns covering the three most vulnerable approaches. Douglas' worry was well-founded. The road coming from Losheim had been used by the Germans to invade Belgium in 1914 and in 1940. Unknown to him, that road and the vital crossroad had been selected by the German planners as the main objective of the L SS Panzerkorps and the road labelled "Rollbahn en. To attack and size the crossroad, the Germans selected the best equipped of their infantry divisions, the 12. Volksgrenadier Division. On their time table, the objective should be captured within three or four hours. Though well dug in, the men of the 1 st Battalion were living in miserable conditions. Visibility was extremely poor because of the darkness in the forest. The fog, the melting snow and a thin rain lead the men to nickname the place "creepy corner". The night preceding the German attack, outposts of B Co had reported more activity than usual in Losheim, mainly sounds of motors and'spots of lights moving around but apparently not enough to attract attention. The 12. VG Division was mainly staffed by seasoned cadre who had, for some of the officers and NCO's, several years of combat experience in Russia. Most of the battalion and regiment commanders were holders the famous Knight Cross, the equivalent of the American Medal of Honor. Col Osterhold, commanding officer of the Grenadier Regiment 48, was one of those highly decorated officers. The division commander had prepared two flank attacks to capture the crossroad. Osterhold's Grenadier Regiment 48 would attack on the right, to the north through the forest and then switch to the west toward the crossroad. On the other flank, two battalions of Col Lemm's Fusilier Regiment 27 would progress west along a railroad track embedded in a deep ravine and switch to the north. Osterhold and Lemm were long time friends and shared a 4 year combat experience in Russia, they know how to carry out an attack. Osterhold had not been able to prepare correctly his attack. He had been allowed very limited patrolling and he doesn't know exactly where the Americans are. He knew however than the edge of the forest was not occupied during the night. He would take advantage of this. On December 16, before the artillery opens its barrage, he moved his leading elements to the forest, as close as possible to the American lines, in order to take advantage of the surprise when the barrage would lift. At the head of his men, Osterhold moved through the forest. Trip wires were difficult to locate and abattis across forest paths slowed down the progression. Shortly before H Hour, Osterhold contacted his artillery to let them know they had already penetrated the forest. Nobody answered. The line was broken somewhere. Before they could re- establish contact, a rain of shells and rockets fell on his leading battalion. His men were smashed to pieces. As the giant hammer rolled over to the west, Osterhold realized that the losses were very important, 2/3 of his L Battalion had been wiped out. He immediately moved up his reserve battalion as the new spearhead. -34- On the left flank, the situation was much better. Col Lemm's Fusiliers were progressing without opposition along the rail road tracks. As scheduled, the I Battalion, commanded by Major Breger, soon tumed north toward Losheimergraben and the III Battalion kept moving along the tracks (see Buchholz station). Major Breger was also an experienced officer and he moved his men swiftly behind Co A with very few losses. They reached a point where the dense forest begins to thin out. There, across the clearing, in the distance, the first buildings of Losheimergraben can be seen. ,...- Well dug in the Clearing, the six heavy mortars of Co D had fired throughout the morning on the entire battalion front. The situation was obscure but the mortarmen knew that Co B was in difficulty and that Co A was also fighting Germans back. Little did they know that about two hundred Germans were heading toward their half acre clearing. r- When the Germans appeared in the clearing, it was a surprise, neither side knew the other was there. The American reaction was swift and precise. Small arms fire deflected a large group of Fusiliers back into the forest and right into Co A's ~. positions. Quickly recovering from the surprise, Major Breger re-organized his men and attacked the mortar position. American routine was to call the artillery to saturate the area but the enemy was too close. The Germans were now in the position and the combat turned into a wild melee and hand to hand. A mortar section leader then ordered to turn the tubes around and elevate them at 890. As they dropped shell after shell into their tubes, mortarmen crouched low in their position to escape their own bombs coming down a few yards away. The effect was devastating. The German attack was broken and the survivors fled back into the forest. About 20 torn Germans bodies laid on the scene, one of them was a Major. In the meantime on the other flank, Osterhold's men were still tangled in the forest. They moved as fast as they could using ravines and gullies to keep out of sight but isolated groups of Co B fiercely resisted throughout the morning and the early afternoon. The Germans were closing in to the road net but not as easy as they thought. The defense is about to crack and Col Douglas ordered his companies to withdraw as best as they can to the crossroad. As dusk falls on the cross road, the Americans were crowd together in the custom houses. This was a mixed bag of riflemen, mortarmen, anti tank gunners, -35- clerks trying to turn their buildings into a fortress. The night was quite calm, each side liking its own wounds and trying to get its forces together. Losheimere:raben - 17 December At day break, Osterhold had gathered his forces and was ready for an other assault. He was supported by three Stunngechiitz. Clanking and grinding the armor appeared down the road. Pumping shells into the custom houses, they slowly approacheed the crossroad. As the first tank appeared at the edge of the first house, it was destroyed by a well aimed bazooka shot. The defenders were firing from the basement windows and still prevented Osterhold's Grenadiers to leave the forest and follow the SP guns. An other one is set aflame by one of the 57mm AT gun, the third withdrew. As the afternoon of December 17 drained away, the situation had gone from bad to desperate. The Americans still barely held in the rubbles of two custom houses and the crossroad was completely surrounded. The situation was hopeless and they decided to surrender. Osterhold was moving all the time with his point men and was next to the first house when a white flag appeared from one of the basement windows. Osterhold stood forth boldly and moved toward the building, small arms fire stopped abruptly. Osterhold spoke English fluently and explained the situation, if they did not surrender, they would be blown with the houses. The sermon was not necessary, everybody started to strip down the weapons and one after an other they emerged from the rubbles. The entire Losheimergraben defensive line collapsed at the crossroad, Those who had been lucky enough to slip out the houses converged to the Battalion CPo The night had come and the battle was over. Co!. Douglas regrouped what was left of his depleted battalion and ordered a move to the west. Without contact with the higher echelon since the morning, Col Douglas hoped that the village of Miirringen, rear base of the 394th Infantry still held. 260 men out of about 800 will fmally reach the Elsenborn ridge. Co B had taken the brunt of the combat. From 186 men that started to fight the Germans, only 21 were in combat condition three days later. For its outstanding.performance, the 1 st Battalion, 394th Infantry was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. When Col Osterhold finally cleared the crossroad, in the night of December 17, his regiment was completely depleted. The early loss of his I Battalion had affected all the action and he was 36 hours behind schedule. Losheimergraben SjSgt George Ballinger - Co B, 394th Infantry ... I was SI Sgt and was the machine gun section leader of the weapons platoon of Co B. We were on the extreme leftflank of the company and were facing a shallow ravine, that flank was called ((creepy comer". On Dee 16, the German artillery began falling at about 0530 and lasted until daylight. Our platoon leader was killed and others wounded by a direct hit. A few minutes after the shelling stopped, the Germans began yelling very loudly and in unison, probably to cause us to think there were more of them than they really were. It was a cold, damp, misty morning with snow on the ground, there was absolute silence and we waited for the attack to come. There came six Germans, walking in the exact center of our field of fire. George Boggs was the gunner and he wanted to begin fire but I could see others coming. I told him to wait. ... The Germans put a tripod on the ground, then a machine gun on it, I told Boggs to fire. He fired a long burst and they all fell. That seemed to be the signal for everyone in the area to fire, it was deafening. ... I was told that the Germans had broken through on our right and were now behind us. It seemed that all their fire power was concentrated on our position. Our hole was covered with logs and they were being disintegrated by machine gun and rifle fire, it was impossible to return fire. We decided it would be best for us to surrender. r- ~~ Oberst Heinz Georg Lemm Fusilier Regiment 27 Oberst Wilhelm Osterhold Grenadier Regiment 48 -36- Buchholz Station - 3M Bn. 394th Inf. r- The 3rd Battalion, 394th Infantry was on the front defending the cross road of Losheimergraben. On December 6. They changed place with the 1 st Battalion and went a mile to the west to occupy a rear reserve position. A few days later, Col Moore, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, was ordered to move one of his companies, Co I, to support the 395th RCT in its drive to the Roer River dams. The battalion was in reserve but the front line was only one mile to the east. There was a large gap southwest of Losheimergraben and a railroad track ran east-west through that gap and lead directly into Col Moore's reserve position. Acting as gate keeper of his regiment's right flank, he deployed his two remaining infantry companies around Buchholz station. L Co occupied the railroad station and K Co deployed in the forest directly north of the station. One and a half mile northwest of Buchholz station is the village of Honsfeld. Honsfeld was a R&R (rest and recreation center) for the 99th Division and nearby units and was considered as a safe place. r- On the morning of the Decemb~r 16, like all along the front defended by the 99th Division, a tremendous artillery barrage fell on Buchholz station, tearing tree tops and spreading hot metal and tree bursts over the forest floor. As the barrage moved to the west, Col Moore's men emerged from their holes in the still black morning, lit here and there by smoldering fires. Nobody understood why should they be the target of such a powerful shelling, they were in a reserve sector. There was nothing to do, except to keep the weapons ready in case of. The men in Co L prepared for breakfast and formed a chow line. They stood around stomping their feet in the slushy snow as the first lights of the icy cold morning came. Fog and the feeble light prevent good vision but the men saw a column of marching soldiers down the railroad track. As the column drew closer to the station building, the marching men were suddenly identified as Germans and everybody started shooting. The Germans were the lead elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment 27. The Fusiliers were caught in the open and had only few places to hide and shoot from. Some used box cars to escape the heavy small arms fire but well aimed bazooka rounds and 57mm anti tank gun fire smashed the freight cars and its occupants. Small groups of pinned down enemy gave up and those who tried to '-37- escape were shot dead. The fight slowly died down and the Fusiliers were forced to back off. Just before noon, mortar fIre began to rain on the station, apparently the Germans were regrouping and preparing an other attack. Several more companies of Fusiliers were now moving up the railroad tracks and through the forest. The fight again reached a peak and tumed into a wild melee. Col Moore's battalion was now down to about 5 platoons, Co L had lost nearly 30 men and Co K still held. By mid afternoon Moore repositioned his men, brought clerks, cooks, HQ personnel into the battle. His right flank was open and two platoons of K Co were hastily deployed along the road south of the station. The German attack began to weaken and as the grey winter twilight arrived, the enemy withdraw, leaving more than two hundred killed, wounded and prisoners behind. From sporadic contacts with the 1st Battalion engaged around Losheimer - graben, Col Moore knew that the situation was even more critical there. It soon became obvious that the Germans were trying to capture the crossroad and the vital N32 leading west towards Biillingen. During the night, he ordered the battered Co L to move to the north to establish a defensive line across N32 just behind the 1st Battalion. Ammunition was low and barely sufficient for a short fight, his battalion strength was dangerously low and he only left a skeletal force of 2 platoons of K Co to defend Buchholz station. In the pre dawn hours of December 17, Buchholz station was captured ( see chapter Honsfeld-Biillingen) and at day break, Germans who had by passed Losheimergraben through Buchholz station were infiltrating Moore's perimeter. He realized that his position was extremely precarious. He established contacts with the 1 st Battalion in Losheimergraben but he can't really help with a Battalion reduced to 5 platoons. With his S3 (Operation Officer), Moore also established physical contact with the 2nd Battalion further up to the north. When he arrived, in the late afternoon, the 2nd Battalion had already begun its withdrawal. With Losheimergraben now surrounded and about to collapse, Col Moore was physically isolated from his battalion. Shortly before dark, he ordered his staff by radio to withdraw what was left of the battalion and move to Elsenborn via Miirringen and Krinkelt, which at the time were still in American hands. Colonel Moore and his S-3 joined the 2nd Battalion motor column and moved out with them to Elsenborn. Speder 2004 -38- ,J Lanzerath and the I&R platoon The I&R platoon (Information and Reconnaissance) of the 394th Infantry was commanded by a twenty year old Lieutenant, Lyle J. Bouck, Jr. They were equipped to travel light and move fast, observe and report enemy activity and gain / intelligence. They were the ears and eyes of the Regiment. The I&R 394 was in position on the extreme right (south) flank of the 99th Division, on a wooded knoll northwest of Lanzerath. They observed a large open area known as "the Losheim Gap". Off to the east, the gap opens into Germany and the defenses of the Siegfried line and to the south, the scene is a series of rolling hills extending to a high plateau known as the Schnee Eifel. The latter was occupied by the 106th Division but the 4 mile wide Losheim Gap was only occupied by a Cavalry Group. Lightly equipped, the cavalrymen mostly patrolled the open ground and key points were defended by AT guns of the 820th TD Battalion. Lanzerath was not really defended, it was occupied. Two AT guns were in position on the south-eastern edge of the village and a four man observation detail of the 371 st Field Artillery Battalion was watching the eastern approach. Expecting no more war after the German retreat of mid September, many locals had returned and shared their house with the cavalrymen and the tank destroyers. r- At 0530, the morning of December 16, the eastern horizon became a bright wall of light and the silence was suddenly broken by hundreds of shells and rockets. Like all their 99th Division companions further up to the north, the Americans in Lanzerath were awakened by a tremendous artillery barrage. Destruction in Lanzerath was minimal and the barrage soon moved to the west. Bouck was puzzled, he knew that the Germans would not waste so much artillery to terrorise them. He called the TD crew in the village since 'they had a better view in the valley, but the line was dead. There was something going on, but what? Though little and insignificant, Lanzerath was vital for the planners of the L SS Panzerkorps. The road going through the village branched at the northern edge with a road going to Honsfeld and Biillingen, Rollbahn D on the German plan. As the fog saturated morning light arrived, Bouck and his men saw the tank destroyers hitching their guns to their half tracks and hightail to the west. The right flank was now wide open and there were no friendly troops within a mile. Bouck was bothered, he jumped in his jeep and went down into the village to join the artillery observers, from there he would be able to see more and report to Regiment. As they looked out the window to the southeast, German paratroopers in march formation appeared in the gloom and foggy morning. They were the lead elements of the 3. FaUschinnjaeger Division. The observers called for artillery, but none was available because the howitzers had been hit by the enemy shelling and were moving to an other position. Bouck raced back to the hill, closely followed by the observers. Soon after, a vanguard of about 100 paratroopers moved into the village. There was a break in the column, then a small group, probably officers, then an other break and finally the bulk of what appeared to be a battalion size unit. In the village, some civilians were out, talking and wondering. Among them, 13 year old Tina Scholzen. Intrigued by all this unexpected activities, she was on her front walk. She had seen the American tank destroyers living in a hurry toward Buchholz station and there was now a large group of Germans approaching. Most humans have a tendency to make a good story better or a bad story worse. Several noted authors have repeated a story whose origin is unknown and moreover false. That story says that a little blond German refugee with red ribbons in her pigtails ran from one of the houses and pointed to Bouck's positions. Betrayed, the Americans opened fire and the fight for Lanzerath started. Following is the real story . On his front walk, brown haired Tina Scholzen was watching the large group of German paratroopers passing by. At the end of the group was a couple of officers. They stopped and one of them walked over to Tina Scholzen, asking her where the Americans were. Tina replied that they left that morning toward Buchholz station and pointed the direction. From his well camouflaged position, Lt Bouck observed the scene through his binoculars. His mind was churning since he had been ordered to hold at all costs but he can not obtain artillery support. A unit of at least a battalion size, was approaching his 20 man platoon and he did not want to engage such a large enemy force. The head of the German column had passed the last houses of Lanzerath and approached the fork. If the Germans turned northwest to Buchholz station, this will put them on his left flank, with the bulk of the paratroopers still in village. He could not wait any longer and gave the order to open fIre. The German column instantly deconstructed and paratroopers jumped in the ditches or sought cover behind the buildings. -39- r- Mter quickly recoveiing, the Germans formed an assault platoon and charged blindly uphill toward Bouck's position. Well protected in their log covered dugouts, Bouck's men sent a swarm of bullets down the slope at them. At this stage of the war, German paratroopers have nothing in common with the battle smart and well trained paratroopers who fought in Crete, Mrica or Normandy. They were mostly composed of ground forces of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) and had very little combat experience. Having nothing learned from the initial attack, they launched an other frontal assault, still without preparation. They were wiped out by heavy small arms fire. The artillery observers who had joined Bouck were still trying to obtain artillery support but none was available because of the worsening situation of the 99th Division artillery. From time to time a couple of American shells were coming but with no result. In the early afternoon, Bouck's isolation was complete when a mortar fragment killed his radio. He knew it was just a matter of time, his ammunition was very low and the Germans now had an idea of size of his unit. His only hope was to stand until dusk and then slip away through the forest. Unfortunately for him, German paratroopers had suddenly become smart and a large group penetrated Bouck's right flank. From there they moved behind the firing line, tossing grenades in the holes and firing automatic rifles. Bouck and his platoon were captured. It was 1630 and a cold winter dusk was coming down. Several of his men, including him, were . . wounded. One of the artillery observers had been killed. They were marched into Lanzerath and assembled in a large cafe. Cafe Scholzen was apparently the CP of the paratroopers. There were many wounded, a few civilians and the place was busy. Bouck and his men were interrogated and then assembled in a room. From where he was, Bouck could see the feverish activity in the CP of the 3. FaUschinnjiiger Division, responsible of opening Rollbahn D for Kampfgruppe Peiper, a powerful armoured combat team of the 1. SS Panzer Division. SS Colonel Peiper was a 29 year old battle hardened officer, commanding one of the most famous unit of the SS, the SS Panzer Regiment 1. Bright, smart and fearless, he was very popular among his men. His mission, though simple, was very tough. He had to lead 150 tanks and half tracks and 6000 men as quickly as possible through the American lines and capture several strategically vital bridges on the Meuse river. The objectives had to be -40- reached and crossings secured the 4th day, December 20th. Lyle Bouck glanced to his watch, it was midnight, his 21st birthday. Grindings and squealing of motors and tracks grew louder outside. The door of Cafe Scholzen suddenly flung open and a short officer clad in a black leather uniform appeared. This was Bouck's first contact with SS Colonel Peiper. Peiper was furious, his lead elements had been caught in a giant traffic jam on its way to the front and he was 12 hours beyond schedule. Moreover, the paratroopers were supposed to be much farther west instead of waiting in the village. The angry tone used by Peiper as he talked to the other officers was understood by all. He ordered everybody to move west, the paratroopers will guide his tanks in the pitch black night. He was completely beyond schedule and had to keep moving to catch up with his time table. Shortly before 0100 on the 17 December, the column moved off toward Buchholz station. Lt Bouck and his platoon were marched into captivity. For its superb stand in Lanzerath, the I&R platoon was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and his men decorated in 1981 (!) Lyle J Bouck, Jr Camp Robinson, Little Rock, AI( March 1941 /'-' Honsfeld December 17. It was about 0130 this December 17, when the sound of clanking and groaning, coming up the road from Lanzerath, reached the skeletal force left behind by Col Moore to defend Buchholz station. (see chapter Buchholz station) Was this an other retreating group of American vehicles, like those they saw the day before or Germans? They soon experienced the awful fire power of Peiper's Panther tanks. After a brief exchange of fire, accompanying paratroopers slipped in the dark through the thin American line of resistance and captured the two unfortunate platoons of K Company. The road to Honsfeld was open. Prior to December 16, Honsfeld was a R&R center (Rest and Recreation) for the 99th Division and also for a number of small units in position in the area. There, the men can take a shower, change clothes, buy goodies in the PX, watch a movie and, what a luxury for infantrymen, sleep in a bed. Honsfeld was considered as a safe place, way behind the front. On top of all, Marlene Dietrich, darling of the mud soldier and international movie star, was scheduled to arrive at Honsfeld on December 16 for a pre Christmas show. Unfortunate'ty the early moming German shelling on December 16 cancelled the performance to the utmost disappointment of hundreds of soldiers. At about 0330, December 17, a retreating column of American light tanks and half tracks of a cavalry unit was slowly making its way through the town. Nobody noticed steel monsters lurking in the night and ready to pounce. Peiper had a long experience gained on the Russian front, he knew that in the night men and machines of one side looked like those of the other side. The road was crowded and Peiper had no reason to open fire. Rather than engage the Americans, he slipped his tanks and SS Panzergrenadiers in the traffic. Peiper's Trojan horse tactic put his tanks and half track in the center of Honsfeld before the Americans realized they were under attack. Small points of resistance were quickly destroyed and within a half hours Honsfeld was captured. Most of the Americans were caught in bed and pulled in the streets, those who did not move quick enough were executed. About 25 disarmed Americans were murdered in and around Honsfeld. They were the first of a long and bloody trail left by Kampfgruppe Peiper. Peiper gathered his officers and immediately prepared the next move. Rollbahn D was now open and the next objective was the town of Biillingen, two miles north of Honsfeld. The town of Biillingen was no sleepy village like Honsfeld, it was one of the largest town in the area and a supply base for many units. A variety of troops occupied the town including two artillery service batteries of the 99th Division (units that keep howitzers and crews supplied), engineers, quartermasters, signal corps and a fuel dump. There was also a small air strip that hosted two dozen of small Piper Cubs (single engine aircraft used as artillery spotters). Peiper knew about the dump and his machines were thirsty. At about 0530, he started his point vehicles up the road to Biillingen. Half way to Biillingen, they came across a road block hastily established by a company of engineers. It will take about 40 minutes before the SS Panzergrenadiers fmally broke through the road block. In Biillingen, the garrison had no unified command that can muster the defenders. Capt Jim Cobb, commander of the Hq Battery, 924th Field Artillery Battalion knew that danger was prowling to the south. He formed several teams and sent them up the road to Honsfeld in order to establish road blocks. As dawn gave way to a foggy morning, one of the teams led by Sgt Grant Yager proceeded to the edge of the town, carrying a bazooka. The noise of heavy motors grew louder and suddenly a Panther emerged from the fog. The three men sought cover in the brushes and loaded the bazooka. Aiming the bazooka, Yager noticed that the sight was broken. The fIrst tank was gone and he fired at the second aiming as best as he could. The rocket hit the track and stopped the tank. SS Grenadiers dismounted quickly, swept the brushes and captured Yager and his men. The other teams had no less luck, they were also captured. A severely wounded was executed and the others were piled on the hood of the half tracks to serve as a shield to enter Biillingen. Peiper moved his men and machines rapidly to the center of the town and began to search for the fuel supply. It was 0900 and most of the American supply had already been evacuated, many Piper Cubs had escaped and only a limited supply of gas was captured. By 1000, Peiper had gathered 30 tanks and about the same number of half tracks. Part of his machines were refuelled and ready to push west, Rollbahn D was now completely open. -41- Elsenborn Ride:e Anchored to east Belgium's High Marches and reaching an altitude of two thousand feet, the Elsenborn heights opens to the east over a large panorama of hilly fields and patches of woods. The slope descends eastward to a distant valley arid the dense forest of the Belgian-German border. From Kalterherberg, Germany, on the north side, the heights extends eight miles southward to the village of Biillingen, Belgium. Between these two towns is the village of Elsenborn and a natural military obstacle, the lake of Biitgenbach. The Elsenborn high plateau, known as Elsenborn ridge for military historians, acts as a natural rampart guarding the way west to Verviers and Liege. The tactical threat of the Elsenborn ridge as a place where the Americans may take a defensive stand against the L SS Panzerkorps seemed not to have been considered by the German planners. Mter four days of stubborn resistance in the forest along the border, large numbers of American troops had retreated west and had taken new positions on the ridge. The sacrifice of the 2nd and 99th Divisions fighting in the forest had bought enough time for the 1 st US Army to prepare the fortification of the high ground. Two battle ' hardened American divisions, the 1 st and 9th Infantry Divisions, were hastily engaged to complete the defense. The 9th Division was deployed on the northern portion of the ridge, in the Kalterherberg forest and next in line, south of the 9th Division, in the open terrain, were the remains of the 99th and 2nd Divisions. The 1 st Division closed the southern corner of the Elsenborn ridge. By December 20, all the American units had retreated to the new positions. Though the 99th and 2nd Divisions were largely under strength, the defensive line on the entire ridge was supported by sixteen divisional artillery battalions, six artillery battalions assigned by the Vth Corps and 1 st US Army plus twelve regimental cannon companies and a battalion of 4.2 inch mortars. General Hinds, artillery commander of the 2nd Division, was in charge of coordinating all these guns to deliver death and destruction anywhere on the ridge's front. As a rehearsal the American artillery fired a TOT (Time On Target) on Krinkelt-Rocherath on December 19. Time on Target is an artillery term meaning that a number of batteries are firing on different times, calculated to have all the projectiles impacting on the same spot at the same time. The demonstration of December 19 laid 3300 rounds in twenty minutes on the twin villages, they were levelled to the ground. -42- All night long, December 19-20, the 99th was frantically digging in the hilly fields in the center of the defense. The 394thRegiment was in position on the left flank (north), the center was occupied by the 324th Engineers Combat Battalion and the depleted 393rd Regiment was on the right flank (south). The 395th Regiment was dug in just behind its sister regiments. The frrst German probe occurred at dusk December 19, when 3. Panzergrenadier Division, newly arrived attacked on the road Wirtzfeld Elsenborn with SP guns and infantry. The 99th Division artillery saturated the fields with high explosives and phosphorous shells. The attack was broken in a torrent of flames and hot metal. Throughout the night American front soldiers listened to the cries and screams of the German wounded. Another attack developed the next moming, December 20, with the same ending. Before day's end, the 3.Panzergrenadier Division, made a second attempt to fight their way to Elsenborn. This time Panzergrenadiers attacked in the seam between the 393rd Infantry and the 324th Engineers. The powerful attack involved Grenadiers and Sturmgeschiltze (SP guns). American mortar and machine gun fire pinned the infantry down but the SP guns were dangerously close. Once again the artillery forced the Germans to halt. A storm of steel and smoke, shattering flesh and bones and machines, raked the snowy fields and drove the Germans back. From that day, no other major attack developed in the 99th Division sector. Germans only conducted harassing combat patrols. Probes and heavy attacks hit the 9th Division near Kalterherberg and on the south flank, the 1 st Division ruined the ambitions of the 12.SS Panzer Division. Throughout the end of December, the front became stable, replacements came in and the major concern became the terrible winter conditions. Masses of snow and an ice cold wind was now whipping the Elsenborn ridge. On both sides the life was miserable and after the guns, the cold began taking its toll. Despite discouraging conditions, the 99th Division continued to harass the German with raiding patrols throughout the month of January. Vth Corps drew plan to recapture the ground lost in December. The offensive began on January 30. The Germans offered little resistance, pulled back and found refuge in the fortification of the Siegfried line. The 99th Division was finally relieved on February 12, 1945 for a much needed rest and re-supply. The defense of the Elsenborn ridge will remain in history book as "the Little Round Top" of the Battle of the Bulge. CAMP ELSENBORN Camp Elsenborn is one of the biggest Belgian Army camp. It is the only training ground which permits the fire of live artillery. Beside artillery, the camp also allow the use of standard infantry weapons such as rifles, MG and grenades as well as anti tank weapons, either tracked or air mounted. The target types are stationery, remote controlled or moving and a combination of different stands makes it possible to conduct battle runs. The camp is run by 180 officers, NCO's and men. Their task is to take care of the firing range, do the needed repairs, keep the barracks in good condition for the troops in training. At full capacity the camp can handle a maximum of 4500 men. Among the personnel of the camp there is also an EOD section, which is part of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service, their task is to destroy unexplosed ammunition. EOD teams of the Belgium Army have an excellent reputation throughout the world and they often work outside Belgium, i.e. in Laos, Yugoslavia where their knowledge is deeply appreciated. Belgium has been a battlefield for long periods during WWI and WWII, consequently EOD sections remove and destroy about 250 tons of ammunition each year since the end of WWI. Camp Elsenborn was born at the end of the 19th Century, in 1894. General Yon Loe, commanding the VIII Prussian Army Corps, had found that area very realistic for training his troops and bought that land for the Prussian Army. His wish was to buy the village of Elsenborn, right next to the actual camp, but the price was too expensive. Thus, General Yon Loe decided to plant tents a few hundreds yards west of the village, along the main road Sourbrodt - Elsenborn. That tent camp was later moved to the west near a junction with another road going north, in the direction of Kalterherberg. Once there, the construction of many corrugated iron barracks, wooden stables as well as concrete buildings began. In 1901, the camp was a huge one, with a full capacity of nearly 5.000 men as well as stables for 1.500 horses. A local railway going from the camp to Sourbodt railway station was also built. After the German defeat in November 1918, the Treaty of Versailles gave that part of Germany to the Belgium government. People living there, Germans one day woke up as Belgians the following day! The fIrst allied troops who occupied Camp Elsenborn were British. They came in late 1918 and hold the camp until 1920, when the Belgian army finally -43- took over .At the start ofWWII, on May 10, 1940, the German army invaded Belgium again, and after 18 days of desperate resistance, the Belgian army surrendered. Soon after, the camp was reoccupied by the German Army. During this new occupation, the camp was hold by the Luftwaffe (German Air Corps) and was specifically a Flak training camp. Flak is the German term for anti aircraft artillery. The camp also hosted Russian and Pole POW's. They were used as stonebreakers. Many of these prisoners would never see their country again. They were buried in a special plot in the cemetery of the Nidrum. The US Army Air Forces bombed the camp on August 9th, 1944. Over a hundred bombers coming from the east dropped their bombs but missed a large part of the ground installations. Some 200 German soldiers and Russian prisoners were killed during that bombing. Finally, On Sept. 14th, 1944, troops of the 9th Infantry Division captured the camp and liberated the area. The US troops proceeded north and east, and finally reached the German border as well as the first defenses of the Siegfried Line. For the next three months, there was no further move in that sector, only switching of units. Two days after the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions fighting east of the camp, regrouped near Elsenborn. The 99th Infantry Division located in the training camp area and the 2nd Infantry Division in the fields south of it. They were joined a day later by the 9th Infantry Division who mled the gap north of the 99th ID and the 1st Infantry Division sited south of the 2nd Infantry Division. Those four Infantry Divisions with their attached units held together and out of their valiant stand came the name of the Elsenborn Ridge, the Little Round Top of the Battle of the Bulge. After the war, the Belgian army came back, rebuilt the destroyed barracks, built new ones and the camp became one of the most active camps in the Belgian Army. Today the camp also hosts foreign armies of the NATO, who have here all the needed installations to prepare their future missions all over the world. ~ Sources and recommanded readin2s . "The Shock of WaT" VoL I & II - J. C. Doherty. . "Dauntless, a history of the 99th Division" - W. C. C. Cavanagh. . "A Time for Trumpets" - Charles B. McDonald. . "Company Commander" - Charles B. McDonald. . "Up Front with Charlie Company" - Vemon E. Swanson. . "Easy Memories" - Harry Arnold (unpublished memoir). . "The Key to the Bulge" - Stephen M. Rusiecki. . After Action Reports and Unit Joumals - National Archives. . Author's collection and personal research. No part of this guide may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the author. Copyright 2005. -44- ~ ~ ~ ' .J <fA]V' -Lol./ (r JeeL ~vG Hv fl1vvrl(~JV L/j3L 4fv J/SorJ J)I&-&-~X~ rt<ltv~r. I3E MAt..L t1A~I~Uf ~vc- SovJ - Wo.e.v /J g LJ b 3 0 ~ Il 5 S EN 6- E D I CGE..f!... HA F.. K @; ScAI..Lf.i. BE f1 ENESTI3GY 3b-;:JN- Luc RlJe Du ToHBGvX 1:02..- i J'O-1 STt3MI3E/3 T BI.?LGI'c.9/1" ])/GGEI3~ LUcO S IrY;VL~T J3&~ I I I I ---- , S? Sped.e-r l"3, ~~ du We<he L1Cf5o W ~i MIS~ 3>e1 ,<],\ ~ . cLj3 e,r. ph;1 @ uersatela.ds/.. be . r I r