HomeMy WebLinkAboutReport on the Rescue and Recovery Efforts 1
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Report on the Rescue and Recovery Efforts
Following the Collapse of
Bonfire at Texas A &M University
November 18, 1999
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DEPT J�
Prepared by the
College Station Fire Department
March 2000
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�CITY OF COLLEGE STATION
FI RE 9960 DEPARTMENT
POST OFFICX
E BO 1207
COLLEGE STATION. TEXAS 77842 -9960 TEXAS AVENUE
(409) 764-3700
March 2000
In this report on the rescue and recovery efforts following the collapse of Bonfire at Texas A &M University
on November 18, 1999, we have attempted to provide a useful resource to others involved in emergency
response services.
Those of us involved in the fire /EMS /emergency management business know that we will be faced with
tragic incidents. These are the situations for which we train, and during which we are expected to do our
absolute best. We also strongly believe that it is an absolute necessity to analyze and critique all incidents,
large or small. This is how we learn to do our job better and allows others to learn from our experiences.
Lessons learned on the fireground or at the scene of any emergency arise from the unexpected. Though we
regularly train and instruct our personnel in a wide variety of subjects and constantly reinforce that we must
"expect the unexpected" and think of "everything, every time," there are always those aspects that we
identify, in retrospect, which we feel could have gone better, or that we were completely unprepared to
handle.
There were so many "things" that went very well, and there were some "things" that we wish had gone
better. There were so many people and agencies, public and private, involved that should feel proud of their
participation and what they accomplished. We should all be proud of them, too.
I am proud of the people who agreed to participate on the committee and produced this report. They all
realized the importance of this project and were able to critique and not criticize.
The committee has unanimously agreed that the two most important lessons that were learned from this
incident are:
1. When necessary, you, your department, and your community can rise to any challenge which is
thrust in front of you, and
2. Participation in one incident of this magnitude is enough for anyone.
Submitted by
Bart Humphreys
Chairman, Bonfire Report Committee
Public Information Officer
College Station Fire Department
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Bonfire Report Committee Members
Eric Hurt Thomas Goehl
Assistant Fire Chief Battalion Chief
City of College Station Fire Department City of College Station Fire Department
Mike Donoho Greg Pickerd
Assistant Chief Deputy Chief
City of Bryan Fire Department City of Bryan Fire Department
Billy Parker Elmer Schneider
Texas Task Force 1 -USAR Associate Director
Fire Protection Training Division Texas A &M University Police Department
TEEX -TAMUS
Jack Van Cleve Ralph Staplin
Emergency Medical Services Assistant Emergency Management Coordinator
Texas A &M University City of College Station
Cindy Kirk David White
Risk Manager Consultant
City of Bryan Fire & Safety Specialists, Inc.
Ann Kellett Bart Humphreys
Technical Writer Public Information Officer
Fire Protection Training Division City of College Station Fire Department
TEEX -TAMUS
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18, 1999
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1. Introduction The City of College Station and the
I adjoining City of Bryan each have about 62,000
This report summarizes the rescue and residents. Although College Station and Bryan
recovery efforts surrounding the collapse of share a common boundary and often cooperate
S Bonfire at Texas A &M University at on matters of mutual concern, each is a distinct
approximately 0230 hours Nov. 18, 1999. city with separate governments and emergency
Twelve people were killed and 27 injured in the response agencies. College Station, Bryan and
incident. Texas A &M each maintain separate police
1 The report is a compilation of information departments, and the two cities each have their
gathered from documents and conversations with own fire departments.
participants representing each of the major In March 1995, the College Station and
I emergency response agencies and was prepared Bryan Fire Departments entered into an
under the auspices of the College Station Fire automatic aid agreement. In some areas, this has
Department (CSFD). Unless otherwise noted, all reduced response times by as much as two
photographs are courtesy of David White. minutes. Each agency automatically has the
The times listed in the Incident Command resources of the other agency available, and all
and Response Timeline (Section 12) may be fire departments in Brazos County have adopted
approximate based on discrepancies in the logs the same incident command system.
I of individual responding agencies, but have been The emergency management plan is
determined by mutual agreement. interjurisdictional between Brazos County, the
The overall coordination and operation of cities of College Station and Bryan, and Texas
I this complicated response was considered A &M. Under normal operations, an incident that
excellent by all involved, and the outpouring of originates on campus is sent to the CSFD. If
community support was unprecedented. This assistance is needed, College Station requests
tragedy brought together thousands of responders mutual or automatic aid from Bryan or Brazos
I and volunteers in a professional, coordinated County.
effort to address the needs of the victims as The CSFD has the county's primary haz -mat
efficiently as possible. response team, and the BFD has the primary
I sections: This report is divided into the following rescue team, with support provided by the other
city as needed.
1. Introduction The communications equipment and
2. Overview of Local Emergency Response procedures are compatible among the different
I Structure agencies as well. The City of College Station
3. Texas Aggie Bonfire operates on a city-owned nine - channel 800 MHz
4. Bonfire Construction trunking radio system. The system processes an
I 5. Bonfire Collapse average of 10,000 to 20,000 push talk requests
6. Phase One: Rescue of the Five Trapped per day. A major incident that lasts only one hour
Patients increases the "PTT" request by about 5000.
7. Phase Two: Removal of Victims and The College Station trunking system is
1 Dismantling of Logs backed up by Texas A &M's trunking system. In
8. Support from the Community the event of a failure of the College Station
9. After - Action Review and "Lessons Learned" system, the trunking is switched automatically to
I 10. Aftermath Texas A &M's.
11. List of Participants The CSFD operates on two main talk groups
12. Incident Command and Response Timeline that are programmed into the radios used by the
Bryan Fire Department (BFD) and Texas A &M's
I 2. Overview of Local Emergency Police Department, EMS and Safety Office. This
Response Structure increases efficiency by allowing any agency
working with the CSFD to operate on the
I Texas A &M, located in College Station in selected fire talk group.
Brazos County, is about 90 miles northwest of All local public agencies that operate on
Houston and 90 miles northeast of Austin. Texas either the City of College Station system or the
i A &M is the nation's sixth largest university, with Texas A &M system use the same type of
about 43,400 students.
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18, 1999
portable radio, and backup batteries are bought
bou
P P g
in bulk for use by all agencies.
As a state agency —even though located - µ;
within the boundaries of the City of College
Station —Texas A &M is not subject to city / t
I regulations pertaining to new construction l
building codes, and may elect to act
independently. (A building permit from the city ��,
is not required for Bonfire for this reason.) It.,, t
3. Texas Aggie Bonfire
I
III Texas Aggie Bonfire beg an in 1909, when
students gathered brush, limbs and other shift and the stack to
d iscarded items for a bonfire to be lit at the "yell Rain caused the soil to
lean in 1994. The stack
practice" pep rally held before the annual was pulled down
football game against archrival University of (above) and rebuilt.
Texas. According to local lore, the Aggies will Up to 70,000 attend
beat the Longhorns if the centerpole does not fall the Bonfire "yell
until past midnight. ry
practice" each fall
The first all -log Bonfire was built in 1942, :r (left). (Photos by Bill
Meeks (t
and a centerpole was added in 1946. A ; � and Butch
�,�� Ireland, Bryan-College
centerpole of two logs spliced together has been Eagle)
I used since 1947.
Prior to 1999, the only year that Bonfire had
not burned was 1963, in memory of the recently
I slain President John F. Kennedy. Six years later, 4. Bonfire Construction
Bonfire entered the record books as the largest
ever built, at 109 feet, 10 inches, with a diameter Bonfire is organized by student leaders
of 75 feet. known as "red pots" and the Corps of Cadets
1 A 1970 agreement between Texas A &M and (Texas A &M's military leadership training unit).
the City of College Station limits Bonfire to a "Pot" refers to the safety helmets worn, with the
maximum height of 55 feet with a diameter of 45 color designating positions and responsibilities.
t feet. Even at this size, Bonfire usually contains Participation in Bonfire construction is open to
5,000 to 7,000 logs ranging from 15 to 25 feet in the entire student body, and an estimated 5,000
length, with some weighing more than 2,000 students contribute 125,000 hours each year. All
I pounds. Bonfire workers are required to go through
The Logs are donated by landowners whose extensive safety training.
property needs to be cleared. Each spring since Bonfire is built in six levels or tiers, with the
1991, students symbolically have replaced the largest logs placed in the lower tiers. There is no
I trees that are cut through "Aggie Replant." To
date, more than 40,000 seedlings have been formal construction design or blueprint. The red
pots, who select their own successors, teach the
planted across Central Texas. next class about Bonfire construction methods
I In 1994, the stack began to lean during the and pass down notebooks containing information
final week of construction, the result of unstable on construction and design.
soil conditions following heavy rain. A second There have been three distinct Bonfire
stack was reconstructed using the same logs and designs over the years. By the 1940s, Bonfire
I Bonfire was ignited on schedule.
Since 1992, Bonfire has been held on the was built in a "teepee" design with logs leaning
inward against a centerpole. In the 1960s and
polo fields on the northeast corner of campus. '70s, the logs were placed in tiers but still leaning
I Up to 70,000 students and former students
attend the lighting of Bonfire toward the centerpole, and since the 1980s, the
fire and yell practice tiers have been placed in a more vertical
each year. In 1999, Bonfire was scheduled to "wedding cake" design.
burn at "dark thirty" Thanksgiving night, Nov. Work at the Bonfire site began Oct. 5 with
1 25. the raising of the centerpole. In preparation for
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18. 1999
this event each P
ear, four perimeter poles are stacks —the fifth and sixth —are completed on the
Y P
constructed to support the stack until it is large day before and the day of Bonfire, respectively.
I enough to be self - supporting. Perimeter poles 5. Bonfire Collapse
also hold lights and other electrical equipment.
The two poles selected for the centerpole are
I notched and spliced together with four steel When the structure collapsed at approx-
plates fastened with 12 four - foot -long bolts. The imately 0230 hours Nov. 18, most of the work
joint is wrapped with about 700 feet of 3/4-inch was focused on the third tier, which was
steel wire. The centerpole is buried 10 feet in the estimated to be 40 to 45 feet tall. A crane was
I ground and stabilized with guide wires to the being used to lift logs from the ground to the
four perimeter poles. The Bonfire "stack" stack. Approximately 35 people were working on
surrounding the pole is built in six tiers by the stack at the time of the collapse.
I students working in shifts, and is guarded around �-, _�, s
the clock until it is ignited. Before being lit, k ` F
Bonfire is coated with several hundred gallons of ! t' : � -
II diesel fuel and gasoline. fr
The six tiers contain up to 7,000 logs > : -
wedged tightly together. Each log is tied with a,
baling wire at the top and bottom to three 7,000
/ r , ;
I logs already in place. The wires are looped ' " �� '��
around the logs in a figure -eight configuration. j i r .
Therefore, an individual log has a dozen or so r 1 I ,v/
I wires connecting it to the stack. The logs are tied .
together forming a spiral, designed to make the ` ' „ )110
structure fall inward when burning.
Since 1994, when rain caused the soil to ,{
I shift and the stack to lean and eventually be W
pulled down and rebuilt, heavy machinery and
r '.s ,,
.
..,,,„ .
chemicals have been used to firmly pack the soil W hen removed the next day, the centerpole was found
1 at the site. to be split just above and below the spliced joint. It is
not known whether this caused the collapse or
resulted from it. (Photo by Butch Ireland, Bryan -
College Station Eagle)
1 According to newspaper reports, witnesses
said construction was proceeding in the same
1 -- — manner as in previous weeks when the uppermost
tier shifted to the side, to p , first. In about seven
a ,_
',---- - ;4' ` seconds, the momentum created a domino effect,
and the entire stack toppled to the northeast,
creating four piles in two relatively independent
areas.
Bonfire is builtfrom 5,000 to 7,000 logs placed in six The students trapped beneath the structure
1 "wedding cake" style vertical tiers. Since 1970, the were killed, subsequently died, or suffered
height has been restricted to 55 feet with a diameter of
45 feet. (1997 photo courtesy of Dunn Hall) varying degrees of injury, from minor to critical.
Some were thrown clear. The 911 dispatch was
Workers "on stack" are suspended by ropes called immediately and rescue began within
from as many as 50 safety ropes secured to the minutes.
top of the centerpole. No more than 70 workers The cause of the shift is not yet known. The
are allowed on the stack at one time. weather was clear and cool, and was not an
I The collapse occurred during "push," when apparent factor.
s tudents work from 6 p.m. until 6 a.m. every Both the Texas A &M EMS and Texas A &M
night until the structure is completed. The final Emergency Care Team provide stand -by
1 coverage at all Bonfire events. Present at the time
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18, 1999
of the collapse were a paramedic, two EMTs, and A &M Emergency Care Team, which is always
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two with training in CPR and first aid. present during Bonfire construction. 711 was
I advised that there were approximately 23 injured
persons and as many as 10 trapped under the
44 0 li f f . 46 1 i . stack.
• . Recognizing the enormity of the situation,
et "' , 711 assumed incident command, assigned the
ECT supervisor as triage officer and L -1 as
transportation officer. 711 then requested that a
�. ' „ r . "general alarm" be transmitted to all off -duty
N " CSFD personnel (0254 hours), an additional
, +R. - en ( 724 from Station 4 and an additional
t, mutual aid ambulance from S t. Joseph Re
Health Center. (Normally, the first mutual aid
units would come from the BFD, but these units
. � 0 �Y ; were already en route.)
ir ` `Ii.Z. The first off -duty CSFD member to arrive at
,4:
:�7 • C rr;
the scene was the fire training coordinator, who
' '' , was assigned as staging officer. As BFD units
! of. . *� ,{ ~ ' and additional CSFD units began arriving on
s r, ' " scene, crews were assigned to specific patients.
ri - � L'"1- . Patients who were not trapped or who could
'r • _. be easily extricated from the stack were triaged.
,f �
Within the first hour of this operation, 23 injured
.
students were transported to two area hospitals.
The five known trapped patients had been
Personnel from Bryan and College Station were on triaged as critical. Three were removed and
site within minutes of the collapse. Within an hour of transported within two hours of the collapse; the
the initial call, 23 injured patients had been fourth was removed at approximately 6:30 a.m.;
transported to two local hospitals and the fifth at approximately 9:00 a.m. All the
patients were male.
• 6. Phase One: Rescue and Transport of Patient 1 was on the east side of the
the Survivors stack, pinned by a log on his pelvis
Fo, approximately five feet above ground
to level.
College Station Fire Station 1 was alerted by
dispatch at 0244 hours for a "medical • Patient 2 was on the east side of the
„ stack, pinned by logs and boson's chair
emergency" at the Bonfire site on the Texas
A &M main campus. Engine 721 and Ambulance on his ankle.
761 reported "en route" and were advised that • Patient 3 was on the east side of the
e
there were multiple injuries. L -1, the company stack, pinned by logs, with access
officer on 721, requested that the on duty obstructed by logs.
battalion chief (711) be notified of the call and • Patient 4 was on the west side of the
that the quint from Station 2 (752) and stack, pinned by a log on his arm.
ambulance (762) be dispatched. Access was obstructed by logs.
711 responded and heard VHF radio traffic • Patient 5, the most difficult to remove,
indicating that BFD units were also being was on the west side of the stack, pinned
dispatched. 711 questioned College Station by multiple logs on his legs, right arm
Dispatch and was told that they did not request and body. Only his left arm was visible
the response from BFD. from under the logs.
I Upon arrival at the scene (0248 hours),
711 was met by the supervisor of the Texas
E
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18, 1999
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it
North
Stack 2
i
1 " I Stack 3
N ilo Ilk
..4
• Stack 1 ' Stack 4
•
+MSi . ' y, 'r t0" • • , r 1 •
44
t
_ tit N
edit c
1 fr , '''''
{ter.
t
P
r 1 ak.
1
I
• / 41t" • �f71�+" ill
alt
I
1 R
.. .4 %he POIA—. t
1 re., . e.
Views from the west. The stack fell to the southeast into two relatively distinct areas (bottom left), allowing some
rescue operations to be conducted simultaneously.
II
It
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18, 1999
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1 BON FIRE SITE 11 /18/99
�cFHAF �`. .. PA.NrciNG
I: • 1.4% E S SENT' F,_›
C:ENEFcL,L -, ST:'.:iING T OM at•.ND PL�ST
;.
�TgGErI ; •
i n `,- ai :ROUE
f.
/ , . . .-
PD ! .
/ ,
x, f RESCUE sTAtJir.
' • 'kW_ :, Try
TX- TF1- US.A.R
LOGS �. RE:S AJE CO AM.AND
HEAVY EQ'JnPMINT
/ -- -
•
STAGS IG
. Vii E
1 _
Staging as it looked by about 1500 hours Nov. 19. This configuration worked well, although the lack of identification
I signs created some confusion, and the lack of a "hard" inner perimeter made it difficult for command to keep
unassigned workers away from the hot zone.
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18. 1999
COMMAND
CSFD /UPO I ncident Command Structure
Ge,h,r Setromem
LIAISON
CSFD /8FD
«+ men meet. P.I.O
,.,..SAFETY,., Y CSFD
CSFD/BFD Humphreys
Repayk / Smtesy
•p
OPERATIONS PLANNING ;LOGISTICS I FINANCE
7 1 CSFD . CSFD /CSFD I CSEOC /TAMU
Cook o Olson /Oeney
STAGING "..........
CSFD COORDTAMU PROCUREMENT
Detwiler RESOURCES • CSFDITAMU
..,..�...,..
moon NI es Wryer
HEW EQUIP.
..._......,..,,.. TAM) EHSO _
t RESCUE EMS Romer FOOD UNIT
8F0 CSFD/rAMU EMS Footl Div. Sery
P Kknp TAMU
,
SAFETY TRIAGE
CSFD /BFD TAMU EMS
Rcpcyk/ Mpg., CRITICAL
INCIDENT
STRESS MGMT
Mal , RESCUE TEAMS TREATMENT
BFD CSFD TAF.IU
EMS
ENGINEERING TRANSPORT An attempt has been made to match assignments to recognized
TAMU Dept. CSFD areas of the Model Incident Command Structure.
Iry Keeth,g Conroe,
Coord Students BODY REMOVAL
CSFD - CSFD
Rap,c, TKmen
TX -TFI ` MORGUE
TEEX.FPTD J.P. / Seamy
Pale/ Boyette /UPO
1
The College Station Fire Department, first to respond at the site, established incident command. There was
considerable sharing of responsibilities among Operations, Planning and Logistics, because those involved from
different agencies knew each other well through extensive training and mutual aid agreements that brought them
together almost daily; and because the agencies involved used similar operations.
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18, 1999
1 stabilized the log and cut an opening with a
chainsaw, then dug until the patient's legs would
1 ,�, slide from underneath. The patient was removed
+ ; a at approximately 0420 hours and transported by s,
_ „ ambulance.
Patient 4 was trapped by a log across his
m b and on his arm. Rescuers cut the
obstructing logs with a reciprocating saw. To
# I protect the patient from any log movement, a
1 group of logs north of the patient was shored
with 4 x 4s. Rescuers then dug underneath the
V ' , �` patient's shoulder and elbow until the arm was
1 freed. He was removed at approximately 0630
hours and transported by ambulance.
I , Structural stability was a primary concern,
' _ !;� 1 �" both for the five patients and the rescue workers.
� I �t A A Texas A &M structural engineer arrived at
- ' + 0621 hours to help assess the stability of the
- collapsed structure and how to prdceed with the
* log removal.
• After an initial assessment, the engineer
Members of the CSFD and BFD Urban Search & concluded that:
Rescue teams divided into four rescue teams. Each The structure was stable as it lay because the
I patient site had at least two team members leading the •
technical operations (top). Workers built a shoring momentum and impact of the collapse would
truss to stabilize loose logs near Patient 5 (bottom). have settled much of it. Another collapse or
major settlement of a portion of the structure
I "I have never before seen such leadership of an was not likely unless logs were removed or
i ncident, or firefighters working together —no matter rescue personnel climbed in an inappropriate
what patch they have on their arms —for a common area.
goal."
I — College Station Fire Department member • Logs would have to be removed one at a
time to prevent movement or possible
Four rescue teams were organized among collapse of other logs.
members of CSFD and the BFD Urban Search • In three areas, logs had broken free of the
and Rescue Team. Each patient site had at least stacks and were piled loosely. Logs in these
two team members leading the technical areas could have fallen with very little
operations. Additional personnel provided rescue impact on the other areas.
I and medical care. • Rescue Command and the team leaders were The stack could be split into two regions that
were relatively independent of each other.
issued a CSFD 800 MHz hand radio. Rescue This meant that separate rescue and recovery
I safety did not receive a hand radio, but the sector operations could be performed, at least in
area was relatively small, allowing the sector the early stages of the operations.
safety officer to monitor operations easily.
Bryan Truck 1 crew removed Patient 1 using "This was the best -run disaster I've ever seen or heard
I about. The community support, implementation of
two air bags to lift the logs. Patient 1 was automatic aid —it couldn't have been better. Rank didn't
removed at approximately 0330 hours and matter at first —the focus was on getting trained people
transported by ambulance. on the stack.
Patient 2 was pinned by a boson's chair on —Texas Task Force 1 member
I
his ankle. The rescue team stabilized the logs
with cribbing, thus freeing the patient's ankle and Patient 5, on the west side of the stack, was
enabling him to crawl from underneath the stack. the most difficult to remove of the five. He was I
I He was removed at approximately 0400 hours pinned by multiple logs across his legs, right arm
and transported by ambulance. and body. After Patients 2 and 3 were freed,
Patient 3 was pinned by logs across his legs, additional personnel were used to speed up the
with access obstructed by a log. The rescue team removal of logs from Patient 5. Stack stability
was carefully monitored because it was believed
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18, 1999
1 that removing too many logs might destabilize looped around the logs in a figure -eight
the structure. configuration, with a dozen or so wires
I Only Patient 5's left arm was visible from connecting each log to the stack. Because of this,
under the logs. He could talk and was alert, often it was determined that rescue personnel could cut
giving the thumbs -up Aggie "gig'em" sign to say the wires holding one log to the stack without
g he was okay.
The rescue crew started an IV and oxygen, causing a global stability problem. However,
continuous inspection of the logs was necessary.
placed protective goggles on his eyes, and used Rescuers needed to proceed carefully because
hot packs to help maintain his body heat. many wire connections had broken in the
I The crew helped the patient understand he collapse, as evident by the loose logs that were
would be there for several hours and encouraged being shored.
him to relax. Advisors from Texas Task Force 1 With the exception of some of the smaller
ll Urban Search & Rescue Team decided that all logs in Stacks 3 and 4, most of the logs would
the logs would have to be removed. One log by have to be removed with the aid of a crane. One
his head could be moved without endangering of the two on -site cranes was inoperable after
him, providing about two more inches of room being damaged during the collapse, but the other
around his head. crane and its operator were available for the
rescue efforts. Three additional cranes were
requested and arrived that morning.
Logs above Patient 5 were removed one at a
time. Cutting the dozen or so wires attached to
/ .- r ~., ' each log was difficult because of the figure -eight
,;,:.. 1 configuration and because many of the wires
, - were still undamaged and tightly attached.
1 Rescue personnel removed logs from the top
1 down in diagonal layers.
Removal of the logs immediately above
Patient 5 also was made difficult by the fact that
" logs from Stack 3 had slid down onto the ends of
these logs during the collapse. This interlocking
.� of log ends slowed the rescue effort because
It ` �, some of the logs from Stack 3 had to be removed
A dozen or so wires connected each log to bundles of in order to remove logs from Stack 4.
I other logs already in place, making the use of
chainsaws problematic. "It's like pick -up sticks," Chainsaws were available but were of only
noted Bart Humphreys, CSFD Public Information minimal use during all but the initial stages of the
Officer. rescue and recovery operations. The logs usually
were too closely packed to allow cutting of an
Logs in the area north of Patient 5 lay individual log. In addition, the presence of the
haphazardly and probably would shift if nearby baling wire complicated their use.
logs were disturbed. A shoring truss, nailed
together with dimension lumber and plywood, "The number of different agencies working together,
provided support and prevented these logs from and how they all meshed, was truly amazing. I felt
collapsing. privileged to live here and be part of the operation.
Two areas of loose to g s remained. If these Everyone shined like a new silver dollar."
became unstable, they would fall to the sides of —Texas Task Force 1 member
the stack, not near Patient 5. In addition, During the morning, five additional
protection was provided by a crane disabled engineers arrived to carefully observe the
during the collapse and the shoring truss. operation and look for possible stability
Engineers concluded that rescue and recovery problems as logs were removed.
efforts could be performed on Stacks 3 and 4 A technical search camera was brought in to
I without affecting the stability of the logs of
Stacks 1 and 2. look on the side opposite of Patient 5's location
to determine how he was trapped. Rescuers
Each of the 5,000 or so logs in the stack was found that his right arm was pinned by a log and
secured at the top and bottom with baling wire to that possibly he had two broken femurs and a
three other logs already in place. The wires are
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Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M Universitv November 18. 1999
1 broken pelvis. He complained of the discomfort engineer surveyed Stacks 1 and 2 with the
of being unable to urinate. The patient told operator of the knuckle boom loader, James
I rescuers his blood type and four units of blood Gibson, of the Steely Lumber Company.
were brought to the scene. Gibson had brought his equipment from
The patient was removed at about 0900 Huntsville, Texas, about 55 miles to the east,
I hours and his care was transferred to the Texas earlier in the afternoon. The engineer determined
that sole use of the knuckle boom loader would
be the preferred method for the removal of the
1
. ill
remaining logs because of Gibson's exceptional
proficiency and confidence, and keen under-
standing of the required operation.
This decision was based on:
I
1 ` ` � i • Speed. It was apparent that the knuckle
�, boom loader could remove more than one
log at a time, without having to cut the logs
/ ' - -441107., 4 Y ... im ,.. �'s free, and at a far greater rate than by crane.
�z',, E4 ' • Safety. The use of the knuckle boom loader
;, ty would place only one person, the knuckle
=.r ,;•< :�'^ ;,;'� ' . '! boom loader operator, in a position to get
_ injured. The operator was more familiar with
1 : ' ss •, ' ., r • the dangers of logging than any of the rescue
R f
t r • .4. r: e personnel. No other rescue personnel needed
S , " to be near the stacks while the knuckle boom
' A • • t 1i loader was in operation.
I 1 l
't X M, It was decided to proceed with the knuckle
_ ,�` � _ eui� " boom loader, with the alternative of using the
four cranes on site. It soon became apparent that
this course of action would increase dramatically
Cranes (top) were used to remove the larger logs in the pace of the recovery operation. Two
stacks I and 2, but the tedious work of removing logs
I by hand from stacks 3 and 4 continued well after engineers observed from a platform ladder.
daybreak Rescuers moved with extreme caution when
removing the logs around the last two victims,
A &M EMS team. The patient was packaged and which were relatively high up in the stack, unlike
I transferred to the ambulance. the previous victims, who were at ground level.
As he was being transferred, the patient This was to prevent further damage to the bodies,
showed the crowd the thumbs -up Aggie "gig'em" and because the bodies would be in view of
2 sign, to the delight of bystanders. bystanders and the media.
After Patient 5 was removed, all personnel The knuckle boom loader operator began
were asked to report to rehab, except those who removing logs from the back (northwest) side of
1 knew how to use listening devices. Stack 1. These logs were leaning away from the
location of the loader, and the operator would not
7. Phase Two: Recovery of Victims and be in danger from falling logs. As these logs
Dismantling of Logs were removed, the operator gained safe access to
1 the loose logs on either side of the structure.
Once Patient 5 was removed, rescue teams Dismantling what was left of Bonfire proceeded
met and decided to proceed with the individual generally from the north to the south.
log removal around Stacks 3 and 4 to recover the As the log removal progressed, it became
I five victims in that area. apparent that the weight of the Stack 2 logs kept
Removal of the uppermost logs in Stack 2 apart the logs trapping the last two victims. The
was also begun but curtailed after it was decided recovery crew used a crane and choke cable to
I that the loose logs were too unstable. The victims support the logs to prevent further damage to the
in the ceiling of the cavity could not be removed bodies of the last two victims.
without removing the Stack 2 logs. The second -to -last victim was removed
While the last victim under Stack 3 was shortly after 2230 hours. The last victim was
being recovered around mid - afternoon, the
1 10
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas ABM University November 18. 1999
1
recovered at approximately 0050 hours Nov. 19. Eventually, workers and student
PP Y Y>
The last log was removed at about 0220 hours. leaders in the Corps of Cadets developed a
I Officials at first kept students outside the process in which an engineer at each worksite
perimeter, but eventually let teams of 20 at a time would decide which logs to remove, then team
inside. The students moved about 2,000 logs. leaders would direct the team to sling the log and
1
Allr cut the wires, and a crane would lift the log.
e O nce the log was on the ground, students would ti carry the log away.
. The students worked together efficiently and
r , '� effectively. At first, the team leader would yell
f t
out the number of workers needed, and that
number of students would rush in. Soon, the team
• leader simply had to hold up the appropriate
�� number of fingers. Active duty Marine Corps
i members — University employees who serve as
advisors to the Corps of Cadets — removed the
last few logs around each body.
` Similarly, the event triggered an
unprecedented outpouring of support from the
1 10k
community. Business owners across the region
offered resources, such as food and water,
P S equipment, sunscreen and even teddy bears.
!d. nL �!�' _ + ' "' ` " rr ° _41a_ i Local stores sold out of maroon and white ribbon
` ' as lapel pins featuring the University's colors
It ` ` were made by the thousands.
! , �i 11; People from around the country called to
1 r offer their help — including a psychic who
provided her interpretation of where to look for
•
i victims. Remarkably, as of mid - February, only
After the final patient was removed at 0901 hours, the
I one bill has been submitted out of the tens of
focus shifted to victim recovery (top). As fatalities thousands of dollars worth of goods, both
were removed, rescue personnel and students would solicited and unsolicited, that poured in.
1 form a corridor to protect the victim's privacy
(bottom). "This was the most well behaved bunch of young
people I've seen in my life. They became an important
8. Support from the Community resource, moving 2,000 logs by hand."
—Bryan Fire Department member
1 Texas A &M's 43,400 students and 240,000
f ormer students are known for their loyalty and The incident was reported in most major
"Aggie spirit." This camaraderie, strengthened news outlets around the world. In Texas,
I around the cherished tradition of Bonfire,
resulted in a tremendous outpouring of support thousands attended memorial services, including
a candlelight vigil near the state capitol in
following the collapse. Austin, coordinated by students from the
I Students began congregating at the site University of Texas and Texas A &M in an
shortly after the incident, and soon an estimated unprecedented display of solidarity.
5,000 had gathered around the west side of the
perimeter, engaging in prayer vigils, watching
1 silently or assisting the rescue efforts and
removing logs.
Members of the football team, whose
I practice had been cancelled, joined their fellow
students in moving the logs. The local Army -
Navy supply store sold out of helmets within
hours when students learned they were required
to wear them to enter the site.
1 11
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18, 1999
*< \
.., ... A... _ ,,,,,„,,_
'` '
t. I 4 N 10 -
Ft,
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i .
W
all
'„ " R te — . — wa
—
iiir .
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AO* ir... rillErs 111110
I )1... .
,, ,-, -.1 #11: - • ..,,,,
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• ...
I ot • . ,..,
Thousands of students gathered at the site and around
ti fir; campus to pray, grieve and leave mementoes. Officials
I P ` I at first kept students outside the perimeter, but
-"--71 t eventually let teams of 20 at a time inside to assist in
_
.. . — ; j� removing more than 2,000 logs that were to have been
`�� added to the stack (top right). (Photo at top left by
IL , ` �
,� Butch Ireland, and second from top, left, by Dave
McDermand, Bryan - College Station Eagle)
! - . Community support during the operation was
& ,
MOW tr
r, unprecedented, with food, clothing, equipment and
f I h % — other items arriving continuously (second from
a r
bottom, left). Personnel took breaks after 45- minute
I shifts (bottom left). Stress management teams gave
massages to workers, many of whom were on site for
24 hours (bottom right).
1
ill 12
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18, 1999
1
9. After - Action Review and "Lessons
1 Learned"
All aspects of the intense 24 -hour rescue and
7- CRY A
recovery operation went extraordinarily well, �1RE
I according to those involved. The efficiency of a -, :. the 3,200 paid and volunteer personnel from �
more than 50 departments and agencies was ; - �`
I enhanced by the tremendous community support.
Given the magnitude and emotional nature
of the situation, everyone wanted to help. Rescue
and recovery operations proceeded as quickly as
I possible without endangering the lives of the
rescue personnel and the trapped survivors.
Remarkably, no rescue personnel or bystanders -
1 received anything but very minor injuries.
"Those that I had worked with previously, as well as
those I met for the first time, conducted themselves in
I a very professional manner. The incident was a very 4:,,,"'
' I
emotional and stressful situation, but everyone was s b
focused on helping the students that were victims in . . . — __
this terrible tragedy." s
1 — College Station Fire Department member w,
An efficient process of procuring resources through
An after action review uncovered the mutual aid agreements contributed to the operation's
I following reasons for the operation's success: success.
• Use of mutual aid or automatic aid
agreements. Agreements between Brazos the CSFD and city had trained extensively in
County, the Cities of Bryan and College large -scale incidents and EOC operations,
Station, and Texas A &M resulted in close which allowed the EOC and support system
cooperation in training and emergency to be established quickly and efficiently.
response by firefighters, law enforcement Previous training also gave those involved
I and other first responders. The responders in an understanding of the duties of key
large part knew each other and had trained personnel from other agencies.
•
together — although not specifically for a Safety was the highest priority. Extensive
possible Bonfire collapse —and thus knew training taught responders to take time to
the response process well and knew whom to analyze the situation, evaluate what
contact at different stages of the operation. resources were needed and determine a plan
• Similar operations among the agencies of action, rather than simply rush in.
I involved. The Bryan and College Station (Rescuers also were fearful of the danger to
Fire Departments both operate under the victims and themselves if a second collapse
incident command system and use almost occurred.) In addition, all fire department
I identical operational procedures. Similarly, personnel used their supplied PPE and the
all fire, EMS and support staff were able to Texas A &M medics wore helmets and
talk on one common radio talk group during rugged clothing. Because of a focus on
the emergency. safety during training, the operations were
1 • Extensive pre - planning and training. The
CSFD had participated in a joint drill with handled in a planned, methodical manner.
• Contractors worked well with all rescuers,
Texas A &M's EMS at the Bonfire site. waiting patiently until called to action. The
Familiarization with the site and activities unsolicited knuckle boom loader was
played a key role in the operation's tremendously helpful in speeding up the log
efficiency. In addition, all personnel from removal, and the crane operators were
especially good considering the teams' lack
E
1 13
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18. 1999
of familiarity operations crane o erations hand hot zone and increased command's control of
signals. activities and worker safety.
1 • The student - run Texas A &M Emergency • of workers. The use of
Care Team, on site at the time of the reflective ID vests was helpful, but there
collapse, did an excellent job of START were not enough vests for everyone
I triage. When EMS personnel arrived, all
non- trapped victims already had been involved. With different groups working for
different team leaders, it was often difficult
identified, tagged and sent to a treatment to determine who was on what team.
area to be sorted for transport. In addition, Different teams could wear color- or
I the location of all but two of the victims had number -coded bands or tags to help with
been established within 20 minutes of the identification and work assignments. In
collapse. addition, signs and posts should be made
I available that would identify different
"It was amazing to me how the members stepped up staging areas, the morgue, and other areas.
to the task when faced with such a crisis. Our previous This led to minor problems, such as the
training no doubt played a big part in this."
I —Bryan Fire Department member engineer's difficulty in getting the fire ladder
truck back into position for its continued use
• The system of dispatching the BFD USAR as an observation platform. His request came
team worked well. Most team members were during a change of command between rescue
on the scene within 15 minutes of personnel. Once the proper authorities were
notification. This allowed rescuers to assess located, the truck was repositioned quickly.
the situation quickly and make rescue In addition, Blinn College EMT
I operation assignments. students who roamed the site were confused
• Availability of resources. The method of with Texas A &M EMTs, who were assigned
obtaining resources was well established, to the first aid station. Authorities thought
and equipment provided by city that these students were medics with Texas
governments and through mutual aid A &M and directed them to return to the
agreements with local businesses ensured station.
sufficient supplies and a quick return of
L coverage to both cities. In addition, the
outpouring of public support in providing
both solicited and unsolicited materials was
tremendous. `
��
• Good work glow. The Bryan and College t 91 '" .,'t.
Station fire departments worked in 12 -hour ''''.. - -1(' f,,,K ' .
shifts, 45 minutes on and 45 minutes off. � ' � , .
I This allowed those with knowledge of the `
situation to stay fresh.
I Areas Needing Improvement
The after- action review uncovered other ; ... , • • _
areas needing improvement. These include: i
I • Crowd control and perimeter security. Many
people people admitted into the outer perimeter +a- 4 li
were identified only by a hardhat, "pot" or ow
t T -shirt. Police had difficulty knowing whom _ . °,., L �
to admit or keep out. An incident - specific ID Crowd control and perimeter security became a
system (such as armbands) would have problem as thousands of students, local residents and
I helped control access inside the outer
perimeter. A "hard" inner perimeter — orange media representatives crowded the site (top). Initially,
a temporary morgue was staged near the collapse
plastic fence with a single entrance —would (bottom). The lack of identification signs created
have kept unassigned workers away from the confusion among the various staging areas early in
1 the operation.
1 14
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18. 1999
I • Identification of victims. The medics who Staging of non - rescue personnel such as
performed the initial triage on scene tagged physicians and engineers also was an issue.
I patients with colored bands (tie wraps) as Many of these professionals arrived at the
outlined in the Brazos County Emergency site offering to help. Previous contact could
Management Plan. These were difficult to have made better use of their expertise. The
I see and some of the patients were triaged county emergency management plan should
twice because other medics did not see the list personnel such as engineers and doctors.
original bands. The medics eventually used (The emergency management plan lists a
traditional triage tags in conjunction with the medical director, who often lives in another
I colored bands. Later, the identification tags town and is not necessarily the one contacted
of two victims apparently were switched en first.)
route to the hospital, and the families were Furthermore, these personnel often are
I sent to identify the wrong body. unfamiliar with ICS management, and a
• Communication both on -site and off -site. meeting to explain how to report and request
Radio communication is considered an manpower, material and equipment would
ongoing problem in Brazos County. There is have been helpful. The Bryan and College
I a need to develop a communications plan Station Fire Departments use air horn blasts
that ensures all emergency response entities, for evacuation signals, but contractors,
whether on 800 MHz, UHF, or VHF, can engineers, and others did not know the
t communicate through equipment purchases,
equipment "patches ", or "commo nets." A signal. This information should have been
given in a safety briefing prior to work
lack of radios and cell phones meant that assignments.
supervisors and command staff had to use • Self - dispatching by the BFD. Under normal
I their personal phones. operations, fires that originate on the Texas
In addition, EMS units on stand-by for A &M campus are sent to the CSFD, which
non - related calls in the city did not respond requests assistance if needed through mutual
I to requests, but responded to the site.
• Lack of regular briefings or automatic aid agreements with the City of
fings and updates in the Bryan and Brazos County. On this occasion,
EOC. This had little effect because the Brazos County 911 self - dispatched three
g location was close and media coverage was Bryan ambulances, their ladder truck and
good. However, people both in the field and rescue unit. Although the units were needed,
at the EOC need to be kept informed as this resulted in units arriving before a
decisions are made and actions are staging area could be set up and before
I performed to improve coordination,
command and control. scene size -up and security could be
established. Self - dispatching to major
• Donations management. The outpouring of incidents can result in confusion and a
I public support was overwhelming, and there breakdown in communications in the
is no accurate record of who provided incident command system.
resources or volunteered their time. This • Safety staffing did not increase as
means that not all the donors can be thanked, manpower became available. Safety should
II and may impact negatively the recovery sector just like operations. Safety officers
costs provided by the federal government if need to be rotated same as operations
the incident costs had been submitted for a personnel.
I disaster declaration, since the value of safety worksheet was not available. •
donations can be used as a local match. A Clipboards and paper were in short supply
systematic method of registering and during initial operations. More command
verifying the credentials of volunteers and post supplies should be stocked. A safety
I any unsolicited donations should be officer worksheet should be developed since
established to keep track of donors and to new rules are increasing safety officer
help address certain liabilities associated duties.
I with accepting volunteer help.
• Staging. Unit placement caused some The Emergency Operations Center should
be reorganized in line with ICS structure
problems initially, because the temporary and equipped to handle large -scale
I morgue was set up too close to the ladder disasters. The existing mobile command
truck. post vehicle is inadequate to handle large-
1 15
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas ABM University November 18. 1999
scale, multi-agency responses that require • Have a designated public Y information
P q g p .f
use of the unified command structure. officer who is a primary media contact.
I • Sector safety did not meet with incident They can be an effective buffer between
safety. Incident safety and incident command media and command and provide the most
functioned well, as demonstrated by the timely, accurate information.
I timely arrival of food, drinks, shelter and Even in the early stages, when facts are •
machinery. Sector safety functioned well, as sketchy, set yourself up as the authority for
demonstrated by the lack of injuries to current, accurate information. There always
workers. The operation may have been more will be people who have to talk in front of
I coordinated if they had met and shared the camera, so make sure the media knows
responsibilities. that information is not official until released
by the P10.
I r " " " I • Know what you want to say beforehand.
> • Anticipate the types of questions you will be
asked. • I ir ' \ • Stick to the facts (or what you are ready to
release).
"rill Don't speculate! Defer to another authority.
1 r 1 • Don't be afraid to say "I don't know," but
I
really try to find out the information
A converted shuttle bus donated by Texas A &M serves requested.
as the county's mobile command post. (Photo • Try to limit who is giving out information.
I courtesy of the Brazos County Division of Emergency
Management) This prevents bogus information and gives
you consistency and credibility.
• Try to monitor news feeds and reports. This
• The incident command system structure lets you correct misinformation as soon as
I needs to be fully staffed, with possible.
representatives from all responding Take care of the local media. You live or die
agencies. The command staff must be with them all year long.
1 clearly identified at all times and all
responding agencies must comply with Be accessible. If at all possible, grant one -
on -one interviews. Return phone calls. The
unified command decisions. media want "sound bites" and direct quotes.
• Texas A &M's decision not to activate and • Be cordial to the media and they will
I staff the University's EOC. This had little reciprocate. They are a tremendous tool for
outcome, but may have resulted in a less you and your department to use.
efficient operation if the City of College • Understand that the media want the news,
I Station had not put into action its EOC they want it now, and they want it first.
without being asked.
• Incident command kits should be prepared
and ready for use emergency situations.''
I Although resources generally were not a �^ II
problem, supervisors lacked an incident I. \"
command kit with ID vest, notebooks, pens, 1
I flashlights, triage tags and other items.
• There was no designation of who was
responsible for official body counts and at 4
what point a body was counted. )
I Working with the Media :
edia '
AMP
More than 70 media outlets set up shop on site.
111 Texas A &M's Office of University Regular briefings and one -on -one interviews with key
R elations and the CSFD's public information personnel, such as Dr. G. Kemble Bennett, director of
officer recommend the following for emergency the Texas Engineering Extension Service and Texas
1 response personnel who work with the media: Task Force 1, kept the public informed throughout the
operation.
1 16
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18, 1999
1 10. Aftermath temporarily halting work, although it is not
known if this contributed to the collapse.
I Twelve Aggies (11 students and one former - M
student) were killed in the Bonfire collapse, and
27 were injured.
John Comstock, the final patient removed ` . , -- -4. injured. , Ai - .. _ =4:
alive, suffered numerous internal injuries and
underwent several surgeries during 83 days in the r--ucam
College Station Medical Center. His left leg was - r f' --
I amputated above the knee, and his right wrist, 4 y
which was shattered, remains immobile and
wrapped in bandages as ofmid- February. �.,
I He was transferred Feb. 8 to the UT _
Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas, where he
The scene a week later. Hundreds of mementoes lined
will complete his fall semester courses via the the perimeter; these are now part of the collection of
1 Internet while continuing physical therapy. the Cushing Library on campus. (Photo by Dave
At Texas A &M's request, engineer Leo the Cushing Bryan- College Station Eagle)
Linbeck, Jr. of Houston headed an external
investigation into the cause of the collapse. The Texas A &M refunded the fall tuition of
I commission issued a report in January stating those involved, and paid the families of victims
that a shifting of logs between the first and $20,000 each, half of which was provided by
second tiers was one of "several factors" that insurance and half by the University's alumni
I "probably" played a role in the collapse.
On Feb. 22, in an article by Staff Writer association. Financial provisions were made to
survivors based on the severity of their injuries.
Kelly Brown, the Bryan - College Station Eagle A Bonfire memorial fund administered by the
reported several possible theories behind the alumni association has grown to more than
1 collapse: $300,000 by mid - February.
• The structure was overloaded with None of the families involved had initiated
heavier Togs on the north side, legal action against Texas A &M as of mid -
prompting it to collapse toward the February, and only one bill for goods requested
south; during the rescue operations has been submitted
• The logs were not interlocked enough for tens of thousands of dollars worth of items
into the upper stacks to maintain provided. This remarkable absence of litigation
i I stability; and is attributed to the spirit of loyalty found among
• A half -inch steel cable usually placed Texas A &M's students and former students.
around the first and second tiers had not The investigation is expected to cost Texas
I yet been added. A &M more than $1 million, to come from a
In addition, Brown reported that a crane hit a reserve account (not state funds). The
cross tie on the top of the stack on the night of commission's final report is expected in May
1 Nov. 15, knocking out a chunk of wood and 2000.
1
1
1
1
1 17
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A&M University November 18. 1999
11. Participating Agencies
t City of College Station
• Fire Department /EMS. CSFD employs 84 personnel, 72 of whom are assigned to Operations, with
three 24 -hour shifts of 24 personnel each. College Station operates four stations. The Operations
Division staffs three engine companies and one quint —all of which are ALS equipped —with a
staffing minimum of three, three ALS ambulances and a shift commander's vehicle. CSFD
averages 4,200 runs annually, 65 percent of which are EMS related.
• Emergency Management. The agency includes representatives from Brazos County, the City of
Bryan, the City of College Station and Texas A &M who serve as signatories for county-wide
emergency plans and procedures. These representatives are the designated Emergency
Management Directors and Emergency Management Coordinators for each participating political
subdivision and for Texas A &M. Local emergency planning efforts are coordinated with the DPS
Division of Emergency Management and the DPS Regional Liaison Officer in Waco.
• Police Department. The CSPD has 94 personnel organized into eight operational units and an
administrative services unit.
• City Council
• Administration
• Parks and Recreation
• OTIS /MIS
• Human Resources
• Public Utilities
• Public Works
• Development Services
• Economic and Community Development
• Public Communications and Marketing
• Fiscal Services
• Emergency Dispatch (911)
City of Bryan
• Fire Department /EMS. The BFD has 78 personnel who work in three rotating shifts of 24 hours
each. The department operates out of four fire stations, staffing four engines, one aerial ladder
platform, two medics (ambulances) and one command vehicle. The department has specialized
teams trained in confined space/high angle, trench rescue, a hazardous material team and water
rescue. The Department's Urban Search & Rescue Team is the primary rescue team for Brazos
County.
• Police Department
• Emergency Management
• Risk Management
• Emergency Dispatch (911)
• Stress Management Team
1 Texas A &M University
• Office of University Relations. Responsible for gathering and disseminating information about
Texas A &M people and programs deemed to be of general interest to the public or specific
constituencies. The executive director of University Relations and the CSFD's public information
officer acted as media liaisons.
• University Police Department. UPD has 57 commissioned police officers, 72 non - commissioned
security officers, nine communications officers and nine support staff to provide security and crime
prevention functions for the University community.
• Emergency Medical Services. Entirely student -run, the EMS was established in 1980 and today
operates a mobile intensive care unit ambulance around the clock, year- round, with a second on
1 stand -by. Answers its own enhanced 911 telephone calls and dispatches ambulances via an 800 -
'1 18
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18. 1999
MHz radio system. Currently answers about 700 to 900 calls for emergency assistance a year.
Works very closely with the University Police Department and both city fire departments.
• Emergency Care Team. Student -run volunteer organization established in 1976 to provide students
with entry-level experience in pre- hospital emergency medicine. Provides stand -by coverage at all
Bonfire events. At the time of the Bonfire collapse Nov. 18, present at the site were one
paramedic, two EMTs, and two with training in CPR and first aid.
• Corps of Cadets. The University's student leadership /military training program, a legacy of Texas
A &M's founding as an all -male military training institution in 1876. About 2,000 male and female
students are members. Historically, members of the Corps were responsible for overseeing the
construction and lighting of Bonfire.
• Department of Student Life/Memorial Student Center (MSC). The MSC is the largest student
activities program of its type in the world, currently involving about 1,800 students in various
leadership roles and committee positions. The assistant director of the MSC is the official advisor
to the students who build Bonfire.
• Physical Plant. The University's largest nonacademic department, with more than 1,200
employees, the Physical Plant provides custodial, mail, utilities, landscaping and related services.
State of Texas
• The Texas A &M University System. The System is headquartered in College Station and consists of
nine universities, eight state agencies and a health science center that serve 90,000 students and
reach more than four million people each year. Texas A &M is the flagship institution of the
System.
• Texas Task Force 1 (TX -TF1). The state's first Urban Search & Rescue team, established in 1997
and headquartered at the Texas Engineering Extension Service's Emergency Response and Rescue
Training Field in College Station. Members respond within six hours to mass casualty disasters
anywhere in the state. TX -TF 1 has 186 emergency services personnel from 48 organizations and
departments across the state. Members are divided into three 62- member teams, on a 30 -day
rotational call. Each team has five components: a command structure, a rescue group, a medical
group, a technical group and a search group, including canine search team. The team maintains a
$1.3 million state -of -the -art equipment cache, including high -tech listening devices and fiber optic
search cameras
• Texas Department of Public Safety
I Texas Department of Transportation
• Texas Army National Guard, 4 -112` Armor
• Critical Incident Stress Management Teams from Galveston County and Permian Basin.
Hospitals
• St. Joseph's Regional Health Center. Located in Bryan for more than 60 years, the St. Joseph
Health System has 399 beds, about 1,600 employees and an extensive physician network to serve a
12 -county area. Treated 11 of the 27 injured.
• College Station Medical Center. Established in 1931, what is now the College Station Medical
Center has 119 beds. Treated 15 of the 27 injured.
1 Brazos County
• Emergency Management. The Brazos County Division of Emergency Management has a limited
response capability in the event of an incident. The two staff members can provide technical
advice, coordination with other agencies and handle requests for outside assistance, as well as
assist with the operation of the County Emergency Operations Center and Mobile Command Post.
The Mobile Command Post —a converted shuttle bus donated by Texas A &M —has a full range of
communication equipment including all local city and county radio frequencies, cellular phone,
cellular fax and short-wave radio, as well as a basic supply of maps, flashlights, and related items.
• Sherds Office
• Justices of the Peace
' 19
1
Bonfire Collapse at Texas A &M University November 18. 1999
Other Agencies /Participants
• R.A.C.E.S. Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service, a group of amateur radio operators who
1 donate their services in time of natural disaster or emergency. They provide communication for
fire, police and other agencies that need assistance.
• 911 Dispatch Centers
' • American Red Cross
• Salvation Army
• Galveston GIS
1 • Texas Fire Training School, Recruit Training
• U.S. Army Reserve, 420 Eng. Battalion Stress Management Teams
• Local churches
• Local restaurants
• Local businesses
• Local general population
• Neighboring fire/rescue departments
12. Incident Command and Response Timeline
This chronological listing of significant incident events was complied from several sources. Base time
benchmark is receipt of initial call at College Station Emergency Communications Center. Times are
approximate.
Phase 1: Rescue, Treatment and Transport of Injured
0230 hrs Bonfire stack falls
A &M Emergency Care Team members on stand -by at site immediately begin
triage.
0243 hrs Initial call to College Station Dispatch
0244 hrs CSFD engine (721) and ambulance (761) dispatched to "injured person"
0245 hrs Direct call from University Police Dept. to Bryan dispatch requesting all
available units
0247 hrs First CSFD units arrive on scene; L -1 assumes command. Texas A &M
Emergency Care Team advises of 20 -25 injuries and 10 -12 still trapped.
0248 hrs Command requests additional CSFD ambulance and that the shift commander
(711) be notified. 711 en route to scene.
0249 hrs Local hospitals advised of mass casualty incident
0251 hrs Command requests additional engine (752) and ambulance (762)
0253 hrs 711 arrives on scene and assumes command. Assigns L -1 as Transportation
Officer and TAMECT supervisor as Triage Officer
0256 hrs Command requests additional engine (724) and ambulance (mutual aid)
Command requests "general alarm" be sounded to recall off -duty CSFD
personnel to staff reserve units to provide coverage for the community.
0257 hrs Station 4 (724) notified by telephone because of excessive radio traffic
0300 hrs First off -duty CSFD person arrives on scene (771) and is assigned as Staging
Officer. First BFD units arrive on scene. BFD Urban Search & Rescue Team
1 requested.
0302 hrs Transportation of injured begins.
0303 hrs Forward staging area designated.
Command Post established.
0310 hrs Additional ambulance requested (mutual aid)
BFD USAR Team members begin to arrive on site.
Advisors from Texas Task Force 1- Urban Search & Rescue Team arrive on site.
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Bonfire Collease at Texas A&M University November 18.1999
I 0318 hrs Request CSPD chaplain to respond to scene.
Request Justice of the Peace to respond.
I 0322 hrs Additional ambulance requested (mutual aid)
0333 hrs PD chaplain on scene.
0335 hrs First trapped patient extricated through use of air bags.
I 0340 hrs BFD USAR requests lumber cache be delivered to scene.
0354 hrs Command requests that City Emergency Operations Center be activated.
0400 hrs Temporary morgue area established.
0405 hrs Second trapped patient extricated.
I 0410 hrs City Manager notified of situation.
0413 hrs Texas A &M students (notably from the Corps of Cadets) organized to remove
logs not yet stacked from action area.
I 0426 hrs Ambulance 761 available on scene
By this time, one hour and 43 minutes after the initial call, 24 injured persons
had been transported to two local hospitals.
I 0433 hrs College Station EOC operable.
0440 hrs Rehabilitation Sector set up.
I 0443 hrs Local funeral homes requested at scene.
0505 hrs Mobile Command Post arrives on scene.
0610 hrs Structural engineer requested at scene
I 0616 hrs Additional "hot packs" requested for trapped patients.
0630 hrs Media Area established.
0637 hrs Trapped patient freed and transported.
0643 hrs Command requests two cranes to site.
I 0700 hrs First full press briefing held.
0704 hrs Large forklift requested.
0716 hrs two large tents requested at site.
It 0752 hrs Crane at staging.
0839 hrs 3000' "no fly" zone declared.
0901 hrs Last survivor freed and transported.
0905 hrs Listening devices deployed. All radios turned off except at Command Post.
Silence maintained for 45 minutes in attempt to locate more survivors.
0950 hrs Command requests several long handled wire cutters.
1 Phase 2: Victim Recovery
1028 hrs Command requests hand held "bull horns" and air horns.
1139 hrs First trapped victim freed and removed to morgue.
1155 hrs Incident Command transferred to 714.
1340 hrs Second trapped victim freed and removed to morgue.
I 1415 hrs Third trapped victim freed and removed to morgue.
1612 hrs Fourth trapped victim freed and removed to morgue.
0003 hrs Fifth trapped victim freed and removed to morgue.
0055 hrs Sixth and final victim freed and removed to morgue.
I 0219 hrs Last debris removed from stack site.
0225 hrs Emergency Operations Center closed.
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