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HomeMy WebLinkAboutPersonal Responses to Disaster Situations 1967 PERSONAL RESPONSES TO DISASTER SITUATIONS Published by Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense Reprinted by Texas Education Agency Austin. Texas January 1, 1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. EFFECTS OF DISASTER ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE III. MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF A DISASTER ORGANIZATION IV. SAFETY AND WELFARE OF THE FAMILY V. GENERALIZED PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS VI. RUMOR FORMATION VII. PANIC WHICH IS OVER -RATED CAN BE OFF -SET VIII. DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP IN A DISASTER IX. SUMMARY PERSONAL RESPONSES TO DISASTER SITUATIONS I. INTRODUCTION Disaster organizations must consider the reactions of people to emergency events in pre - disaster planning and in post- disaster operations. A. Disaster organizations exist to help people. B. Reactions of people can affect disaster operations either positively or negatively. Thoughtful and responsive people can be an asset; apathetic and frightened people can be a liability. C. In this brief, it is proper to deal with the following topics: 1. Social - psychological repercussions a disaster has upon the individual. 2. Need for emergency social structure in disaster periods. 3. Importance of the family in disaster activities. 4. Control of fears and rumors. 5. Leadership in disaster' situations. II. EFFECTS OF DISASTER ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE From the social psychological point of view, disasters tend to destroy the social structure individuals depend upon for the needs of life, personal well - being, and security. A. Immediate Effects "...The immediate effect of any catastrophe...is upon the patterns of social interaction upon which all of us depend...Members of families and close friends are separated, and at the same time, the function of various social institutions and social roles -- utilities, medicine, communication, police, transportation, welfare -- may be impaired or destroyed. The social /fragmentation/ is immediate and extensive. Numbers of individuals are suddenly, and possibly without warning, transported from the familiar to the unfamiliar, are threatened and disoriented." 1/ 1/ J. S. Tyhurst, "Psychological and Social Consequences of Disaster," speech delivered before the Medical Civil Defense Conference, Council of National Emergency Medical Service, American Medical Association, San Francisco, June 20, 1954. Page 2 B. Control of Personal Reaction Personal reaction is controlled, in part, by: awareness of dangers, whether or not there has been a warning, injury to individual and people nearby, recognition of scope of damage. C. Continuance of Social Values Social values seldom are completely lost in a disaster. To the contrary, a rather special "emergency" hierarchy of values seems to develop. People are concerned with the following in the order named: 1. Self- preservation or protection. 2. Safety and welfare of immediate family or household members. 3. Safety and welfare of other kin, close friends in the neighbor- hood (other primary group relationships). 4. Safety and welfare of other people in the community, in groups with which the individual associates (secondary group relation- ships). 5. Security of personal possessions, private property, and material goods. 6. Security of property or possessions of kin, intimates, and ac- quaintances, and 7. Security of property or possessions of other people in the community. 2/ a. The range is from self, other people, to things. b. From this point of view, disaster operations are better accepted if they deal with personal protection rather than with protection of property per se. Further, it is rather difficult for people to work for the welfare of others when they are acutely concerned about their own affairs. III. MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF A DISASTER ORGANIZATION If one of the major effects of a disaster is to destroy the social 2/ Adapted from Committee on Disaster Studies, National Research Council, Washington, D. C., 1954. Draft of Human Reactions in Disaster Situations, Chapter XI, "Some Comparative Findings," pp. 4 - (Mimeographed) Page 3 structure upon which individuals rely, it follows that one of the major general objectives of a disaster organization is to furnish the people of the affected area with a temporary emergency social structure around which they can organize their activities until the situation returns to normal. A. Social Effects Disasters have two main social effects: 1. "...The destruction of physical facilities upon which social organizations and social cohesion depend, and the disorientation of the persons whose social roles give the society life. Despite previous planning, for the area itself, and unless social organ- izations are introduced from outside, the result would be a period of more or less social paralysis which is likely to last for at least two days. Individuals and small groups may be operating effectively at isolated points, but, as a whole, the community will be prostrate....Although there may be some rudi- mentary social activity, the social organization will be severely crippled and its immediate recovery will depend upon the introduction of social organization from without." 2/ B. Psychological Repercussions of Disaster on the Individual The longer social structure is in a state of collapse, the greater will be the individual psychological repercussions. 1. "...The severity and persistence of adverse social circumstances will have a direct bearing upon the severity and persistence of individual psychological disorders." J� a. The implication of this factor is that disaster organizations should be able to get into effective operation quickly. C. The Emergency Social Structure The emergency social structure furnished an area by a disaster organ - ization should provide for minimum vital needs of affected people. 1. There may be some tendency in planning to be too elaborate. Minimum vital needs are here held to be needs for: ,/ Tyhurst, Op. Cit., pp. 10 -11 Ibid., p. 15 Page 4 a. Information b. Food c. Shelter d. Medical care as required e. Association with other people J (1) From the psychological point of view, the assurance that "the world has not ended" is as important to the victim as the particular service offered him. (2) People need "pegs" on which to fasten their activi- ties. The five "needs" mentioned above furnish the minimum "pegs" needed to orient people in the immediate post - impact period. IV. SAFETY AND WELFARE OF THE FAMILY Officials working on disaster affairs should keep in mind the fact that the safety and welfare of the family is a key to personal action and psychological response of people caught in a disaster. "...The family is the predominant social force and the rallying point for much of the behavior response. Disasters tend to be much more important in terms of the family than in terms of the individual. Professor Titmuss has said 'the best prescription for stability in disaster is to keep the family together.'" 6/ A. Periods of Recoil and Recovery as Related to the Family "...During the period of recoil (from a disaster) the immediate family is the focusing point, while during the recovery period the extended family with all its cousins, aunts, and uncles becomes a predominant factor in the rehabilitation process." 2/ B. Family Involvement in Disaster Circumstances, particularly of time, determine ways families become involved in the disaster. I/ Adapted from Tyhurst, On. Cit., p. 11. 6/ Barent F. Landstreet, "The Adjustment of the Individual in Disaster - Struck Communities," speech delivered before the Georgia State Conference on Social Welfare, Savannah, November 3, 1953. (Mimeographed), pp.7 -8. 2/ Ibid., p. 8. Page 5 1. "The occurrence of a disaster at a time when a large proportion of the population is separated from members of their family is likely to increase the psychological intensity of the disaster and lead to considerable social disruption in the immediate post- disaster period. The acute anxiety of persons concerning the whereabouts and welfare of missing members usually leads to desperate search activity. In the Arkansas tornado, most families were together at the time of impact. However, of those who had family members missing, more than half engaged in search activity in the first half -hour following impact. This was by far the most prominent activity on the part of persons who were separated from their household members in the immediate post - impact period....Those who were separated from their immediate families had a more intensive traumatic reaction to the disaster (as measured by the incidence of 'shocked, stunned, dazed reac- tions') than those who were not separated....A comparison of the affective reactions of those who searched with those who did not search indicated a greater prevalence of agitated emotional states immediately following impact and even more marked persistence of such agitation over the six -hour period from 6 p.m. to midnight for the searchers than for the non - searchers...." a. "...This anxiety - motivated search activity poses one of the most serious control problems in disasters. The pre - emptive concern of persons who are missing members of their families often leads them to expose themselves to new or additional dangers and to disregard...ccontrol and authority regulations. "...While carefully verified official information concerning the condition of particular persons may be of help in allevi- ating the anxiety of some persons (particularly those who stand in more distant relationships to the person sought...) most persons will still attempt to make face -to -face or vocal contact with their primary group members...." 2/ C. Concern about Family Members Implications of this concern about family members are great for disaster organizations. Committee on Disaster Studies, Op. Cit., p. 6. 2/ Ibid., p. 6 -7. Page 6 1. If the threat is real and if warning time permits, it promotes psychological security if families are permitted to unite by the closing of schools, industries, etc. 2. If the disaster necessitates evacuation, movement and housing should be on the basis of family units if possible. a. ...Evacuation and temporary shelter should be provided in such a ;Wanner that family life, including routine and other meaningful activity can be restored as soon as possible. 10/ 3. "...Persons who are acutely anxious over the welfare and safety of irrmiediate family or other persons with whom they are highly ego - involved cannot be depended upon to engage in more general, community oriented activities....Their primary concern is often so pre - emptive that they cannot function usefully or efficiently in relation to more general needs." 11/ a. It would seem wise in staffing local disaster organizations to assume a high degree of non - functioning and to compensate by: (1) Over - staffing. (2) Drawing volunteers from all geographical areas. (3) Planning to use volunteers only after period during which they can be assured of the safety of their own families. b. It also seems to follow that part of the indoctrination of disaster organization workers should reach their families so that they can operate with maximum self- sufficiency and a clear understanding of the high priority of the volunteer's disaster role. V. GENERALIZED PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS An understanding of generalized psychological and emotional reactions of victims is important to people managing disaster operations. The following 10 Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 21. 11 Committee on Disaster Studies, Op. Cit., p. 6. Page 7 chart gives an over -view of general expectations. 12 (Item 4 in bibliog- raphy of references) DISASTER PSYCHOLOGICAL TIME PERIOD REACTION MANIFESTATION Immediate Impact "Shock," daze, No, or pointless, Post- Impact stupor activity; "freezing" Rescue Recoil Docility News hungry, grateful for help Remedy Post- Euphoria Solidarity; community traumatic followed by work followed by period hostility criticism of relief agencies. A. Manifestations of the Impact and Post - Impact Periods At the time of impact and in the immediate post - impact period, common expectations are for "freezing" -- which prevents people from doing those things which might aid them -- or for "maladaptive" action -- doing the incorrect or pointless thing. In either case, the individual has stopped thinking. 1. Actions are described as follows: a. "...Under disaster shock, many people seem to assume an automaton - like behavior...." b. "Temporary paralysis is one of the modalities of human reaction to disaster...." 12 Chart is based on work of Anthony F. C. Wallace, "The Disruption of the Individual's Identification Infi.th His Culture in Disaster and Other Extreme Situations," speech delivered before the Conference on Theories of Human Behavior in Extreme Situations, held by Committee on Disaster Studies, National Research Council, American Academy of Sciences, Vassar College, February, 1955, pp. 2 -3 (Mimeographed) and J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 3. Barent F. Landstreet, Ops. Cit., p. 6. Anthony F. C. Wallace, Ops. Cit., p. 1. Page 8 c. "Besides general bewilderment and confusion, the possible consequences initially are mass reactions such as 'panic' or mass exodus, or general agitated, random and purposeless hyperactivity." 2. Reactions in the impact period can be improved by: a. Specific training on what to do to meet the disaster. b. Specific information or direction on what action to take. B. The Period of Recoil " ....The period of recoil represents a most important part of this pattern of response to disaster. Both the character of individual responses during this period and their management by personnel en- gaged in rescue and relief would appear to have a crucial significance for subsequent psychological events...." 16/ 1. The more "good" things that happen to victims in the recoil period, and the sooner they happen after impact, the "easier" individuals feel. 2. "A striking finding that emerges from observations in large - scale disasters...is that the people who are most frightened and most upset very soon become extremely docile and can easily be induced to conform to the rules and regulations of...local authorities...." 3. "Catastrophe leads to the development of strong feelings of dependency....People exhibit a strong need to be with others, a disinclination to be left alone, and there is a momentary disappearance of the usual social barriers....The result of this is the spontaneous formation of groups which have a definite adaptive value, satisfying strong temporary needs for reassurance, dependence, and talking out. These groups, however, are not J. S. Tyhurst, Ops. Cit., p. 9. 16 Ibid., pp. 7 -8. 17 U. S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, The Problem of Panic, Civil Defense Technical Bulletin TB -19 -2 (June, 1955) U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1955. p. 1. Page 9 particularly effective in getting things done, or in restoring social organization. The groups are typically shifting and un- stable and are based upon a community of strong feeling, rather than upon any common rational recognition of the need for coopera- tive effort, or upon a program of action and recovery." 12/ 4. Some interesting facets of behavior develop as the recoil period progresses. a. "...There is the emergence of what may be termed a denial - reassurance pattern which takes the form of those who are hardest hit considering themselves to be 'fortunate' and 'lucky' and not so badly off as some of their fellow citizens. In a situation of this kind, it is usually the people who are least hard hit who complain the most." b. As the recoil period progresses and people "shake off" their feeling of awe and dependency, old patterns of behav- ior re- establish themselves and victims will not talk or accept aid as freely as previously. 22/ c. There is some indication in the disaster studies that youths in the 10 to 14'year -old age group withstand disaster pres- sures better than those in the 16 to 18 year -old age group. "In many disaster situations, this younger group of children has played a very positive and predominant role in the res- cue and remedial stages." 21/ 5. Among the implications of the above material for disaster organ- ization personnel are the following: a. Groups of shaken victims must be given leadership, but cannot be expected to accomplish much sustained work. (1) "...There are a number of attitudes and emotional states which contribute to the instability of the groups, and also make it difficult for the leaders of persons from outside to develop effective action. These attitudes 18 J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., pp. 11 -12. 12 Darent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 7. 2,2/ J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 7. 21 T3arent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 6. Page 10 and States include irritability, free - floating, and indiscriminate hostility, self - concern, anxiety and tension, and the pressure to talk about, to reconstruct, and to assimilate the experience just past...." 22/ b. Disaster organizations must have a good sense of timing and be ready "to strike while the iron is hot." Communities and groups have a high degree of solidarity early in disasters and can perform great feats of self -help. In a few hours or a few days, this spirit dies and affairs tend to be run on a "cash and carry" basis. VI. RUMOR FORMATION Rumor formation is characteristic of most disasters and can be good or bad in terms of content. ' "Rumor...develops on the basis of an attempt on the part of people to justify their own behavior, to give the event concrete dimensions, and to reduce it to something that can be under- stood and assimilated psychologically." A. The Effects of Rumor on Reality 'ft.-..The danger is that rumors distort reality and lead to fantastic thinking and baseless fears, sufficiently severe to produce further eruptions of impulsive individual or mass behavior...." B. Inaccuracy and Distortion of Information "...Inaccuracy and distortion in information tends to increase with distance from the disaster- struck area, or from the particular activity involved....The degree of accuracy in information appears to be de- pendent upon at least two factors: (1) the ability to test communica- tions (information) against direct perceptions, and (2) the extent to which the person is ego - involved in the accuracy of the information. nit is not necessarily true...that word -of -mouth information becomes distorted and exaggerated in the process of transmission. Under the appropriate conditions, word -of -mouth reports may become more and more accurate in the process of circulation....Greatly exaggerated rumors appear to be more characteristic of disasters where the danger has already passed, and tend to circulate most frequently among persons who are peripherally or minimally :involved." 22 J: S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 12. Ibid., p: 13. Ibid. Committee on Disaster Studies, Op. Cit., p. 16. Page 11 C. How Rumor Formation Takes Place "Rumor formation is one direct consequence of false or inadequate communication and the importance of providing factual information rapidly, directly, and to the right place is essential...." 26/ 1. If there is a vacuum in information, people will supply their own. Hence, disaster organizations should maintain a steady flow of factual information on the situation and what is being done to meet it. 2. It should be noted that rumors in a disaster frequently repre- sent or may nourish hostile attitudes. People, perhaps foolishly, want to know why the disaster happened and who is at fault for letting it happen. If unchecked, such rumors can turn against officials, government, or some particular group and hinder relief efforts. VII. PANIC WHICH IS OVER -RATED CAN BE OFF -SET Panic is a greatly over -rated possibility. All non - logical or non- typical behavior tends to be called "panic" in popular literature. Chances for panic may be off -set by: A. Disaster Preparation in the Warning Period In the warning period, keeping people working efficiently at neces- sary jobs and preventing activity which may interfere with preparations to meet the disaster. 1. Have plans, put them into action, call public attention to them. 2. "Above all, people need to know what is expected of them....They need to be given clear -cut information as to what the dangers are and how to cope with them." B. Controlling Convergence In the post - impact period, preventing convergence upon a limited escape route by: 1. Having alternate routes. 2. Reconnaissance of traffic flow. 26 J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 20. Adapted from Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 13. Page 12 3. Continuous information to the affected public. 28 VIII. DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP IN A DISASTER It appears that leadership in a disaster is dynamic rather than static. During the disaster period, it tends to shift in terms of need and events. Many people may do many things with or without the direction or acquies- cence of "duly constituted authority." A. The Levels of Leadership There are several levels of leadership and "...a specific individual affected by disaster may work through all levels during different times or he may stay in the same level through the whole disaster. The range of individual behavior seems to be from positive leadership to complete helplessness." The levels are: 1. Must be helped. 2. Capable of self -help under direction. 3. Able to take initiative for self -help. 4. Able to help others under direction. 5. Able to take initiative in helping own families. 6. Able to direct others in helping self and others. 7. Able to organize short -term aid. 8. Able to carry on extended executive leadership of sustained, planned activity. B. Kinds of Leadership "...The kinds of leadership required during succeeding phases of the disaster are different. Whereas leadership during and immediately following a disaster may require the ability to be decisive, authori- tative and directive, and to provide an example with which identification can occur, in later periods leadership must be characterized by qualities that include the ability to work with others, minimize differences wherever possible, to organize and to persevere....These changing re- quirements of leadership should be met by flexible planning and sufficient 28 Adapted from FCDA, The Problem of Panic, p. 2. Barent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 5. Page 13 social understanding before the event so that previous planning and organization for leadership is not so rigid that it cannot be dis- carded as necessary." 1. In an Arkansas tornado "it was interesting to note that, in many cases, rescue leadership and remedial leadership came from different individuals." 2. "There are different levels of leadership....One cannot place leadership in civilian society from outside or from above down- ward and ect it to work, save during the most acute period of crises (sic) when public dependency is maximal. Instead, it is necessary to find out what leaders there are at various levels of society as it exists, to encourage them and to work with them. Failure to do this can be one of the more serious blunders of central planning for disaster or of quasi - military organizations moving into a disaster area from the outside." C. Leadership Characteristics Leadership in a disaster appears to depend upon (1) presence of mind - ability to "keep head " -- and (2) upon possession of skill necessary to help in a given situation. 1. "A number of social roles in society have, in normal times, 'built int potentials for leadership at times of disaster. This is obvious in the case of any uniformed groups such as the military or the police...." 2. People "with well- defined responsibilities for others (e.g., mothers with children, teachers with pupils, etc.) tended to exercise better self - control and behave more adaptively than persons who did not have such responsibilities....This finding...suggests that one of the most important forms of emotional 'inoculation' against disasters is to assign spe- cific responsibilities for others to each member of the community." 3. Disaster organizations must rely upon "emergent" or unknown leaders to carry on a lot of the work in the immediate post - impact period. "...Observers of disaster situations are J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 18 -19. Barent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 5. J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., p. 19. 22/ Ibid. l Committee on Disaster Studies, Op. Cit., p. 10. Page 14 repeatedly impressed with the resourcefulness of both individuals and the social organizations within the community. "' a. Emergent leadership often appears from totally unexpected sources. "...This leadership is usually of a short -term nature and does not necessarily involve people with train - ing. However, ...leadership emerges better and more quickly from those functionplly qualified....People respond to the leader's behavior rather than simply to the threat itself. This is partly because leaders tend to orient them- selves to others rather than themselves, and partly because they respond to stress with positive - action behavior." b. The civil leaders of normal times may be replaced by leaders who emerge during and following a catastrophe....Their ap- pearance is based not solely upon their personal characteristics, but also their background and qualifications in relation to the particular needs of the situation....These emergent leaders can be of greatest importance to the community. They provide energetic and decisive leadership at a time when it is most needed, can galvanize their communities into constructive activity or can provide an effective liaison between organiza- tions coming in from the outside and the local population." (1) The better the disaster organization thless need a there is to depend upon the chance that good emergent ship will appear. c. An aspect of emergent leadership is the appearance of volun- teers at the scene of disasters. These must be given prompt leadership or they will not stay on the job. Under stress, untrained people tend to drift either to "safer" places or to the location where there is the most noise and excitement. D. Maintaining Objectivity and Rationality Members of disaster organizations may have difficulty in maintaining objectivity and rationality in local situations. The reader should review point IV, C, 3, a, above. FCDA, The Problem of Panic, p. 2. Barent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 6. 22/ J. S. Tyhurst, Op. Cit., pp. 13 -14. See Barent F. Landstreet, Op. Cit., p. 10. Page 15 1. "...The persons who are usually most effective in organizing the initial relief and control efforts are persons whose usual occu- pational or social roles have inured them to danger or prepared them for the particular types of problems which are found in disasters.... "...There is little or no difference in their (the disaster leader's) initial reactions to extreme stress as compared with the general populace (e.g., they suffer as intense fear as anyone), but...they tend to regain control over their behavior more quickly and begin active, community- oriented relief work earlier and more frequently than persons who have little or no training...." a. Training in disaster organizations should be specific, con- tinuous, and as realistic as resources permit. 2. In cases where there is conflict between disaster duties and con- cern over family members, the latter frequently getsfirst priority. a. "...Ideally, the over -all coordinating leadership and the specialized personnel needed to cope with the various medical, mortuary, control, and relief problems should be drawn from persons who have a great deal of training and empirical ex- perience in actual disasters and who are strangers (or, at least, have minimal attachments) to the community or area struck...." 3. Ideally, also, members of a disaster organization should have a responsibility in only one group and for one particular part of a plan. Divided allegiance causes confusion. When a disaster disrupts communication, it is difficult to inform members which organization they are to work with or which plan they are to follow. 4. Securing and training needed, leaders to function in a well con- ceived disaster operation plan is a prime responsibility of any disaster organization. Committee on Disaster Studies, Op. Cit., pp. 8 -9. Ibid., p. 9. See Ibid., p. 10. Page 16 IX. SUMMARY Adequately planned disaster organizations and well- trained social leaders are needed in dealing with the problem of successfully solving negative human responses in disaster situations in such a way as to restore the individual and the family to their normal way of life. X. REFERENCES 1. J. S. Tyhurst, "Psychological and Social Consequences of Disaster." Speech delivered before the Medical Civil Defense Conference, Council of National Emergency Medical Service, American Medical Association, San Francisco, June 20, 1954. (Mimeographed) 2. Adapted from Committee on Disaster Studies, National Research Council, Washington, D. C., 1954. Draft of Human Reactions in Disaster Situations. (Mimeographed) 3. Barent F. Landstreet, "The Adjustment of the Individual in Disaster - Struck Communities." Speech delivered before the Georgia State Conference on Social Welfare, Savannah, Georgia, November 3, 1953. (Mimeographed) 4. Chart is based on work of Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Disruption of the Individual's Identification With His Culture in Disaster and Other Extreme Situations." Speech delivered before the Conference on Theories of Human Behavior in Extreme Situations, held by Committee on Disaster Studies, National Research Council, American Academy of Sciences, Vassar College, February, 1955. (Mimeographed) 5. U. S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, "The Problem of Panic." Civil Defense Technical Bulletin TB -19 -2. June, 1955. Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office. 6. Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Disaster Research Group of the National Academy of Sciences. A Brief Review of Salient Spe- cific Finds on Morale and Human Behavior Under Disaster Conditions, April 19, 1958. (Mimeographed) 7. H. J. Friedsam, North Texas State College, "older Persons in Disaster." A report to The Disaster Research Group, National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council. (June 8, 1960) 8. Fred R. Crawford Harry Moore, "Waco -San Angelo Disaster Study." (Un- published Report) The University of Texas, for the Disaster Research Group, National Academy of Sciences. (July 1, 1954) Page 17 9. Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Tornado in Worcester." Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences. (1956) 10. Charles E. Fritz; and J. H. Mathewson, "Convergence Behavior in Dis- asters." Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Publication 476, June 1957. 11. Richard H. Blum; and Bertrand Klass, "A Study of Public Response to Disaster Warnings." (Unpublished Report) Prepared by the Committee on Disaster Research, National Academy of Sciences, 1956. 12. National Opinion Research Center, "Human Reactions in Disaster Situa- tions." (1954)