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ROBERT S. JOHN I. GAVIN
JACK DAVIS
S IOLLIFF Mayor
e nag r
Dir. of Public Safety
April 3, 1164 City Ma
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I
C ITY l OF WIC MITA FALLS
BOARD OF " +•aF ^J l.ea[er of great ✓Lateral ./'CQSOUCCe
WICHITA FALLS, TEXAS
111 i
April 7, 1964
1 ,,. .._
III
Mayors and City Managers
Gentlemen:
III You will note, upon reading this Report, that the chief elective official
was out of the City at the time the tornado struck, and was unable to return
III until noon of the following day. Therefore, any comment I make in praise of
the official actions of the City of Wichita Falls during and after the tragic
occurrences of April 3, 1964, can be made in the light of one who has observed
III from a distance the outstanding performances of all municipal employees.
i If the City Manager system ever needed vipdication (which it never has,
in my mind) an occurrence of this magnitude will so graphically point out the
III need for professional intellect and direction, that no further comment need
be made.
I The people of Wichita Falls owe to the City Administrative Staff, and to
each and every employee of the City of Wichita Falls, a sincere debt of grati-
tude for the exemplary manner in which order was brought out of chaos. The
III Administrators were subjected to not only the highly unusual demands of a
tornado that took seven lives and did over $7,000,000.00 damage, but were also
forced to handle, with very little assistance, the problem of intergovernmental
rivalries with attendant political repurcussions. No individual, nor group of
individuals, could have done a better job.
As stated in the Report, Wichita Falls trusts that this experience of
II/ ours will never be yours. Should you be so unfortunate, however, we trust
that you will profit by our situation and will determine that your approach
to disaster must be as well - organized and well- directed as is your approach
II to any other municipal problem.
Sincerely,
II/
•
III John J. Gavin
Mayor
City of Wichita Falls, Texas
1
1
D I S A S T E R R E P O R T
City of Wichita Falls, Texas
April 3, 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
On Friday afternoon at 2 :56 p.m. disaster struck in the form of a
destructive terrifying tornado that hugged the ground and ravaged the City
for 31 minutes. This documentary has been prepared in hopes that the infor-
mation contained herein will be of assistance to governmental authorities in
similar emergencies.
After the immediate crisis was passed, all of the supervisory participants
were called together to reconstruct the hectic three days beginning on the above
date. The actions we took, the things we did, as well as the mistakes made, are
documented here. Also included are recommendations on future emergencies with
a list of probable needs, depending, of course, on the type and scope of the
disaster.
It is the intent of this documentary to provide valuable aids to you in
your emergency planning. Lets all hope you never need refer again to this
report, but if you do we believe you can receive valuable guidance and infor-
mation.
I/ The position of Director of Public Safety had previously been created
with supervisory authority over Fire, Police, Civil Defense, and Traffic. The
ability of one man to command all of these vital forces was most important. The
Director of Public Safety was the man charged with the control responsibility in
the tornado area. All assisted him and responded to his general direction.
6
This is prepared and presented with a great deal of pride in the people
documented herein. Not a single municipal employee failed to carry out his
assigned task in this crisis. A strong point is proven in my mind that the
City Administration is best prepared to handle such a situation since we have
all of the various departments and services under immediate supervision. We
are reviewing our emergency policies with the intent of establishing the chief
administrative officer (in our case, City Manager) as Civil Defense and Disaster
Director for the City. Under this proposal the position of coordinator will be
established to act as project officer. Both of these positions will be full -
time paid employees with supervisory authority and this method will not break
down the normal chain of command It might be desirable to pass this duty on
to someone else but in the final analysis the responsibility cannot be ignored
1
Jack Davis
City Manager
City of Wichita Falls, Texas
II
II II REACTIONS OF MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL
11 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORTING ACTIVITY
Relations With Other Agencies:
11 At t:45 p.m. the City's emergency warning sirens were turned on to alert
the .itizens of potential tornados in the City.
I the Director of Public Safety and Fire Chief were in the western part of
th. ;;ity observing storm developments and were in mobil contact with the Police
station.
II The District Fire Chief, later joined by the Assistant Fire Chief, was at
Fire Station #10 in the northwest section of the City also maintaining a vigil
on the turbulent clouds. The officer at this station requested schools in the
II area to be notified of the weather conditions.
At 2 :56 p.m. the tornado dipped from the clouds touching down in the
II northwestern portion of the City From this point it remained on the ground
intermittently for the next 31 minutes covering a 12 -mile stretch. The tor-
nado was actually on the ground for 5. miles, and its width varied from 100 to 500
I yards. It struck in the following sequence:
1, An open field.
2. A half -dozen houses in a sparsely populated area.
I 3. Re- entered another open field.
4. Struck first major housing development (Sunset Terrace)
5. Crossed major expressway then into open field.
11 6. Second major housing development (Lincoln Heights) ;
7. Sheppard Air Force Base.
The officers and men of Fire Station #10 immediately entered Sunset
I Terrace and began rescue operations. Emergency vehicles were summoned to the
area, and additional fire units arrived in the area A group of eight firemen
began a walk- through in the open field between the two major housing develop-
' ments searching for victims. Three bodies were discovered.
Two employees from the Parks and Recreation Department entered the area
I at approximately 3 :10 p.m., and one of them had previously worked with the gas
company and being familiar with the gas mains in the area began turning them
off. This action may have been a primary reason no fires were in this area.
1 Representatives of other utilities, water, power, and telephone, came into
the area turning off broken lines and power to prevent further damage.
I At 3:10 p.m. the only pre - planned function of a disaster went into operation.:
The City Director of Civil Defense went immediately to the two hospitals and
established barricades on streets entering their emergency sections allowing
free access to emergency vehicles. Not enough can be said for all medical and
I hospital units, doctors nurses, and technicians in immediately responding to
care for the injured.
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II Every possible police u'it that could be spared from the City was
dispatched to thf- seas to control operations and act as a deterrent to
i looters.
II Members of t. Reserve Police Battalion were reporting to Police
Ht•i•m irters at this time for assignments.
II A ding Club rod • horseback through open fields to search for victims
bt: :ark hampered their work.
I A unique feature of this tornado was its slow rate of travel. This
nihled units of th. Police Department to enter Lincoln Heights and via
ele, trical siren. :,arn some people in the area of the impending disaster.
After the twister struck this area, Street Department employees who
were in the area immediately called for street barricades. The Traffic
Engineering Department also furnished barricades and personnel.
II At 4:00 p.m. the City Manager and Directors of Finance and Public
Works met at the City Hall after going to the area, to determine what
I supplies would be needed in conducting operations. The following necessi- Q�l
ties were established:
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1. Flasfilights, generators, and lighting for night - -
operations. --4 77 -L
2. Food and fresh water for rescuers.
3. Whist es for Policemen to control traffic.
II Personnel in the Purchasing Department were retained to contact the
necessary business distributors for the above mentioned items. The switch -
board operator was retained for night calls and remained there 33 hours.
At 4 :30 p.m. the first thorough search was conducted by employees
II representing all city departments.
At approximately the same time personnel of the Animal Control Division
were searching for any dead animals to be removed.
II Units of the Texas Department of Public Safety were used as perimeter
f.
guards while local Police were utilized in the disaster area.
I The Salvation Army and the Red Cross, in addition to other outside
disaster functions, served food in the area from Friday evening until Tuesday.
This service was available to all victims and working personnel and was vital
` to the entire operation.
The Central Garage dispatched its gasoline truck to refuel vehicles in
the area so they were not required to leave the location. The garage performed 3.
an invaluable service by setting up a temporary garage operation in the dis-
aster area and taking care of all repairs short of major overhauls. They
II provided a supply of batteries, generators, tires, and etc. This work
saved many trips and considerable time for the emergency vehicles. The
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gasoline truck dispensed 6,000 gallons in the five days of operation. This
included service to any emergency vehicle including Red Cross, Salvation
Army, Department of Public Safety and utility trucks.
In the last few minutes of daylight, Police and Fire units moved through
th, +—as ordering all people and vehicles out by sundown. This was necessary
as 'wners could not be distinguished from sightseers. Only operational
per i were allowed to remain.
Six units of the Police Canine Corps were summoned to the sites to assist
1 in scLaring the areas.
After the area was evacuated, the second major search was conducted in
' •ne two areas. All rubble was thoroughly searched.
By this time a problem of major proportion had developed. A conflict
of authority had arisen between the City and County Sheriff's Department.
the City had assumed authority and immediate control with the City Director
f Public Safety in charge and began immediate rescue and rehabilitation of
:ire area with its own forces. The Sheriff's Department lacking adequate
assistance began requesting assistance of outside agencies to aid them in
their efforts (Army Reserve, Marine Reserve, Texas National Guard, State
Militia, and Naval Reserve),
1 Controlling and channeling these agencies into proper action became a
problem. The City was giving directions along with the County Sheriff, the
result being no one knew who was in charge. It became apparent that one body
or individual must be delegated the authority of controlling all operations.
The City then consulted with its legal staff as to who legally had control
under these circumstances. It was determined, since the stricken area was in
the corporate limits of the City, that the City was responsible and it assumed
the normal chain of command under the City Manager. The City Manager then
utilized the Director of Public Safety as field commander with full authority
' to handle the security in the disaster areas as he deemed necessary.
At 9:00 p.m. the Mayor Pro Tempore appealed to the citizens of Wichita
Falls via T V to refrain from going out to the areas as they only hampered
' operations being carried forth out there. Each time any official was inter-
viewed by radio or T V, the sane appeal was made. Members of the news media
were admitted to the area at all times after presenting proper credentials.
' They performed a tremendous service in informing the public of conditions.
Their assistance could not have been duplicated. Not a single news man so
admitted caused any difficulty. Their reporting was factual and reasonable
though naturally spectacular in content.
The Ham operators were helpful since the Mayor was out of the City and
unable to contact Wichita Falls by telephone. He was able to get in touch
with the City Manager through a system of relay calls set up by the Hams,
Early in the crisis when communications were difficult it would have been
advantageous to have stationed an operator at each of several locations to
have assured quick contact with all responsible personnel. These exact
` locations could be predetermined according to individual needs. The Hams
performed an additional service that did not become known for several days.
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I lephone traffic was almost impossible due to congestion and these operators
.,:e able to send, relay, and receive hundreds of urgent messages in the course
the first two days. These messages came and went to all parts of the United
Fi States. One handled as many as 400 messages and some operated their sets with
very little rest for two days with actual operation about 30 hours. This group,
when p perly organized, can be of tremendous assistance and should be a vital
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part u: any disaster organization.
At 10 :00 p.m. the third and final extensive search was conducted in the
I area The search lasted 41 hours. Searchers would listen while in the rubble
for cries for help. Again representatives of all departments assisted in the
search Every search unit should contain someone with experience in first
Since the Police are on guard the Firemen would provide this service.
The Department of Public Works base station remained in operation for
34 hours controlling Street and Sanitation vehicles in the operation. These 'h
I trucks carried generators, lights, barricades, and ropes to the areas.
At 11:30 p.u. a meeting was held in the City Manager's office to determine
I how to establish a line of authority. The Governor, Adjutant General in charge
of the National Guard, and Director of Texas Department of Public Safety were
notified of the legal decision reached and requested all assistance of outside
agencies be placed under City direction. The Congressman of the 13th district
was present at this meeting and endorsed this action. Shortly after midnight
the responsibility of the City was established and all duty assignments were
completed. Throughout the remainder of the protection period there was cam-
I plete harmony and support from the State personnel. This problem coulu' have
been avoided if a complete plan of operation had been in effect before the
tornado struck.
I • Included in the Public Safety - Civil Defense organization should be a
central coordinator. This person would be the liaison man between the City
and all cooperating agencies. Iit our case, too many people were in the area k
at the wrong time. A coordinator could have requested help for a specific
purpose as directed by the Control Center and have avoided duplication of
effort and better utilized the available manpower in cooperation with the
I various commanders,
It is impossible to single out all of the organizations and individuals
I that responded to the need fur nelp. A checklist of available groups should
be made, listing their abilities and how to contact them. Too many un- authorized
persons were issuing calls for help and as a result many people were turned
I away and had really come in response to a request from someone, This should
be avoided if at all possible.
I III POST CRISIS PERIOD
I - The Post Crisis Period, for the purpose of this report, began at 12:00
o'clock Friday night and ended et 6:00 p.m. Wednesday, April 8.
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All un- authorized personnel had been evacuated from the disaster area;
and at approximately 1 :30 a m , command posts were being established in each
of the two disaster sites, Lincoln Heights and Sunset Terrace. These were
established in Mobile Trailei Homes, furnished by a local concern, to coordi-
nate activities between the various units operating within the areas and to
serve as control points and communication centers for the authorizing of the
admittance of eligible persons.
Command posts were maintained on a 24 -hour basis and stationed at each
location were vehicles equipped with mobile radio units capable of reaching
any unit within the area. Mobile telephone units were placed at each com-
mand post by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company until permanent installations
could be made. Passes which were printed at the City Print Shop were distributed
to these posts In addition, maps were prepared during the night by the employees
of the Tax and Utility Collections Department of the City depicting the property
owners and /or renters of houses contained within the barricaded areas. These
maps and passes were placed at the command posts.
At 5.00 a m all T V and radio stations were requested to inform the •
public of the pass procedure as soon as possible in order to advise the people
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of the system to be used..
At 6:00 a m. areas were opened and passes were distributed to homeowners
and renters. These passes, which were printed in unusual ink to make dupli-
cation difficult, required the signature of the bearer and a uniformed Police
sergeant or City employees pre- designated by the Director of Public Safety.
Identification was required for passes. Property owners and /or renters were
required to show identification by either deeds, insurance policies, drivers
license, or other acceptable documents. Relatives or those assisting the
disaster victims were required to have said person personally vouch for their
admittance into the area and also as to their identity- Adjustors stating
that they were requested to make estimates on damages were required to have
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the person requesting such estimates vouch for them. Lists of those volunteer - "
ing trucks, assistance, services, etc., were maintained at command posts and
periodic announcements of their availability were made through the areas, but
none of these individuals were admitted unless requested by disaster victims.
Passes were distributed on an individual basis and in no instance were several
passes given to one individual. All persons except uniformed personnel in the
disaster area were required to have passes and through such stringent controls
looting was kept to a minimum.
At approximately 7:00 a m., Saturday morning, crews from the Street and
Sanitation Departments, assisted by volunteers both from public and private
segments, began clearing streets and alleys. Debris was stock -piled in
designated places to await burning rather than moving this debris to dump
locations thus saving time and expense.
During the morning hours, personnel from the City- County Health Depart-
ment began inspections of the area for possible health hazards.
_ The Building Inspection Department in conjunction with local utility
companies began inspections on completed repairs in order that disaster
victims could return to their homes, if livable, as soon as possible..
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The Tax Department began surveys of the areas to determine the extent
)t damage and percentage of destruction to individual homes classifying them:
'utal, 507, 25 %, etc
At 5:30 p.m., the second day, disaster areas procedure continued until Wednesday evenings were once again evacuated.
Y g. Each morning during the
Po 'isis period, areas were re- opened at 6 :00 a.m.
,'n Sunday morning, April 5, Water Department employees began leaving
n es on houses which had suffered damage in excess of 50 percent, stating
that water service had been discontinued for their protection and that upon
their request service would be restored.
General operations such as removing debris from streets and alleys,
inspections, etc, were continued throughout the day Sunday and the area was
once again evacuated at 5:30 p.tn.
On Monday morning, homeowners entering the areas were given notices
stating that release forms prepared by the City were available at each of
the command posts. Two types of release forms were utilized in this
operation, one which authorized complete removal of debris from a given
lot or area and one authorizing only partial removal of debris. These forms
required a witnessed signature of the property owner. In no case were
release forms given to property owners unless they had received clearance
from their insurance company for removal operations to begin. These forms
were then turned over to the Director of Public Works. Debris cleared from
lots was handled in the same manner as the debris cleared from alleys and
streets. This service was provided for 21 days after the tornado.
At 10 :00 Monday morning, the first official news conference was held
on the disaster. The Mayor, representatives of the Board of Aldermen, City
Staff, agencies operating within the area, and news media were present.
General procedures which would be in effect for the balance of the post
crisis period were outlined and questions concerning operations presently
in effect were answered. At the close of this conference, a helicopter
which had been dispatched from Fort Sill in Lawton, Oklahoma, upon request
' of City Officials, was available for a survey of the disaster area.
By Monday the policy and procedures governing the areas had become
routine, and no notable changes were made until the guard was finally lifted
at 6 :00 p.m. Wednesday, and the area was opened to free public access.
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SUMMARY
Many mistakes can be avoided and necessary activities expedited by pre-
planning and preparation The following is a brief list of things to be done
before and during an emergency of catastrophic nature.
port but this may serve as of these are
included in the text of this report general list for
M: a. �
Have a Plan! Include the establishment of a coordinator and a chain of
command.
This will assure someone to work with agencies and to coordinate
the work of the various units.
b. Notify the head of the Hams for assignment to proper stations.
c. Implement a plan for assuring free access to hospital emergency rooms.
d. Request mobile phones from teiephone company.
e. Maintain a current list of available power generators and lights.
f. Establish the need for outside help immediately. (Do not
until affirmed need is indicated, then call for a minimum of loutsideelp
assistance).
CIg. / , Keep a list of- - a-tores that can furnish emergency equipment such as
flashlights, rop tc.
h. Have the Central Garage outfitted to provide immediate service to
emergency vehicles.
i• Request a helicopter from the nearest military installation to assist
in control of traffic and rescue.
,
J• Locate trailer home
(s) for use at emergency site (s) for control
center (s).
k. Keep telephone switchborad open constantly:
1. N. the proper star..• offices to stand by to help, if needed.
m. Have an agency respon for the feeding and housing of victims.
n. Cooperate with local ' ' and radio stations in accurately informing the
public of the disaste, Ind requesting sightseers to stay out of the area.
o. Be sure to maintain st.i,t control of traffic in and out of the area.
p. A canine Corp is an effective deterrent to looters, if available.
q. Any important official caught out of the city can be returned by contacting Highway Patrol. g
r. Most important, accept responsibility and assume control of the situation,
as a lack of authority can create panic and discord.
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