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HomeMy WebLinkAbout14th Annual State Conference Presentation 1975 PRESENTATION FOR FOURTEENTH ANNUAL STATE CONFERENCE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORS Austin, Texas February 25, 1975 D.C.P.A. Responsibilities for Preparedness Dr. William K. Chipman Deputy Assistant Director (Plans) Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Department of Defense I'm extremely happy to have this opportunity to meet with you ladies and gentlemen -- representing counties and municipalities from throughout the State of Texas. It's good to be with you partly because of the chance to meet with some old friends -- such as [Chief C. 0. Layne, your emeritus Coordinator of Texas Disaster Emergency Services, well known and much respected by colleagues in all of the other States]; and Colonel Parks Bowden, your present State Coordinator -- also highly respected and regarded in civil defense circles throughout the country. It's also good to be here because of the chance to make some new friends from among Texas county and city Directors and Coordinators -- who are the people who are on the firing line, who make and indeed who in a real sense are the civil defense program. And lastly, it's good to be with you here in Austin because Texas is acting as a laboratory and testing ground, and is thereby leading the way for the rest of the country, in developing what may be one of the most important elements in what we term "full- spectrum" civil preparedness, namely, crisis relocation planning. COL Bowden told me that this session, entitled "DCPA Responsibilities for Preparedness," was purposely somewhat generally defined -- that the best thing would be to give some insights, as best I could, into what may 2 lie ahead -- what DCPA may be thinking of for the year to come, and how the civil defense program is seen by the Department of Defense as part of the overall defensive posture of the United States. As it happens, this is precisely the right time of year to stand back and take that kind of look at the program, for just two weeks ago the Secretary of Defense, Dr. James R. Schlesinger, released his annual Defense Department Report to the Congress. This year's report has quite a lot to say about civil defense, and much of it ties very closely to what a number of you have been doing in the area of crisis relocation planning. I'm sure you are all well aware that since the early seventies, DCPA has stressed the need for "full- spectrum preparedness" -- readiness for both peacetime and attack preparedness. This dual -use approach has been included in DCPA's mission since the agency was established by a DoD Directive (5105.43) in July 1972, which included in DCPA's mission that of providing "natural disaster preparedness planning assistance to State and local governments" in accordance with agreements between the Director of DCPA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of OEP -- agreements made earlier in 1972. (I should add that an updated agreement was concluded between DCPA and FDAA in November 1974.) I'm sure you are also well aware that the reason a civil defense program exists at the Federal level is to promote nationwide readiness for attack emergencies. However, one could not, even if one wanted to, develop attack preparedness without at the same time developing improved readiness for peacetime emergencies -- the tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and other disasters of which Texas gets its full share and perhaps a Tittle more. 3 Thus the Federal program cannot help but be dual- purpose in nature, valuable for both attack and peacetime disasters, and this was both recognized and welcomed in the Secretary's recent report to the Congress [page II -56], as well as in the one of a year ago: "Developing flexible - response capabilities for use in case of a severe crisis or nuclear attack requires that local jurisdictions throughout the United States be able to conduct emergency operations to support and assist their citizens. This in turn generates, as a highly desirable bonus, improved readiness to conduct coordinated local operations in peacetime emergencies or disasters. Such peacetime capabili- ties are accordingly a secondary, but important, objective of the Civil Defense Program." What, then, is included in "full- spectrum" preparedness, beyond the general proposition of readiness for both attack and peacetime emergen- cies? More specifically, we see a need -- and we know that you do as well -- to be prepared for each of the types of emergency that may confront a particular city or county. This includes both emergencies that can arise swiftly and those that arise more gradually; and those due to acts of God as well as to works of man. The starting point for preparedness is thus to make a "hazard analysis" for your own jurisdiction. One community may be subject to a hurricane threat. Another, to floods, including both short - warning flash floods and those that give more warning of their coming. Communi- ties near major airports should be prepared for the possibility of a major aircraft crash. 4 And there are additional potential problems for which many U. S. communities must build preparedness. For example, the world energy crisis is giving even more impetus than before to the development of nuclear power plants. One of the requirements for licensing of such a plant is development of standby emergency plans, covering operations both at the plant itself and if needs be, by nearby local jurisdictions. Remote as the possibility may be, local authorities must be prepared for a worst -case incident, that could result in accidental release of radioactive material to the environment. This could in turn require evacuation and other emergency operations in areas that could be affected. There could also be transportation accidents involving radioactive materials. DCPA is working closely with the States, with what was until recently the Atomic Energy Commission, and with others concerned to develop guidelines for this kind of peacetime radiological response planning. (I say "until recently" because the AEC was reorganized last month, and the people we have been working with are now in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC.) DCPA is responsible for assisting State and local governments to develop the mechanism for coordinated lifesaving operations in response to nuclear incidents. We are also responsible for help and advice on the use of civil defense resources -- such as warning, communications, training, and of course radiological defense personnel and instruments. Thus, as the range of possible emergencies expands, DCPA's responsi- bilities expand accordingly. Our Regional staff members, together with State civil preparedness staffs and people from a number of other Federal agencies, will be available to assist you in sizing up the hazards that could confront your own jurisdiction, and in preparing for them. 5 What about the potentially most damaging hazard of all, nuclear attack? Certainly attack upon the United States is not likely. It is indeed extremely unlikely, and we trust it will remain so. But, as Secretary Schlesinger said in his recent report to Congress [page I -8], "With the differences that exist between our own social system and that of the USSR...it would be surprising indeed if there were not an extended period of time between the first steps toward detente and the more deeply cooperative relationship to which we aspire. Meanwhile, we must anticipate that moments of cooperation and agreement will alternate with periods of dispute and competition. In such circumstances the risk of confrontation, crisis, and miscalculation will remain present -- as has been the case in the recent past." And [page II -3], "There is also the ever present possibility that a conventional conflict might escalate into a tactical or even strategic use of nuclear weapons." And finally [page I -12], "We should make no mistake about it: there is no conflict among detente, deterrence, and defense. They are inextricably bound up with one another in the main- tenance of an equilibrium of power." What is the place of civil defense in this strategic context, in which defense and deterrence are so closely bound up with detente? The Secretary's report could not put it more plainly [page II -54]: "Our Civil Defense Program is, and has alwa s been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture." And at another place in the 6 report [page I -15], The value of the current [civil defense] program is that it contributes to deterrence in a crisis and offers the prospect of saving American lives in the event that...attacks should actually occur." Please mark the Secretary's emphasis on civil defense's contribution to deterrence. This means that the better the civil defense posture of this country is, the less likely an attack becomes. And the civil defense posture of the United States is the sum total of CD in every county and every city in Texas and in each of the other States. So this means that each of you has a role to play and a contribution to make towards the total defense posture of this country -- and that the better your community does the job, the more effectively your local officials support the pro- gram, the greater is that contribution not only to defense in your own city or county, but to the defense posture of the United States. Certainly the mainstay of deterrence is made up of the missiles and bombers of the Air Force, and the ballistic missile submarines of the Navy, and these are forces that are supported by all of us, through Federal taxes. But remember too that as the Secretary of Defense stressed to the Congress, civil defense "is...an essential element of our overall strategic deterrent posture." And that it is an element that by its nature must be built where the people are, in each county and city of this and every other State. I hope that this concept of civil defense will commend itself to the elected and appointed officials of your juris- diction: That in supporting the development of civil defense in their own community, they are making a contribution to the national defense that no one else is able to make -- that by strengthening civil defense in their community they are helping strengthen the total defense posture of 7 the country, thereby contributing to deterrence, and thereby making an attack less likely. And that this contribution, moreover, has great proven value in case of tornado, hurricane, explosion, nuclear reactor accident, major air crash, or any of the other manifold hazards that hit some American community nearly every week (and sometimes a number of communities the same day). Let's get down to cases, now with respect to civil defense. At various times in the history of the program, there was a tendency to concentrate too single - mindedly on a single tactic. In the early 1950's, it was shelter. Then in the latter 1950's it was "tactical" evacuation -- getting people out of the cities, insofar as possible, in the three or five hours that could be anticipated between the detection of a manned - bomber attack and the actual arrival of bombers over US cities (and let me say that this approach made a great deal of sense, at least in most parts of the country, in view of the threat at that time). Then in the sixties we had the advent of the shelter program, concentrating on the fallout threat. Today, however, I believe the program has attained a perspective and balance that are well suited to the needs of the times. It contemplates a spectrum of possible contingencies, and it stresses flexibility of response. Thus the program is being designed to protect the American people in case of a variety of possible attacks delivered either rapidly or after a period of crisis. One possibility is a short- warning, allout attack. This would obviously leave no option for people in targeted cities but to take the best shelter they could reach in a matter of perhaps 15 to 20 minutes, 8 while people in non - targeted areas would have more time to seek fallout protection. The possibility Of such a short- warning attack is one of the reasons why DCPA has developed the new "all- effects" shelter survey. In cities, this survey identifies best - available protection against blast effects as well as fallout, while in rural areas it identifies best - available fallout protection. But a short - warning surprise attack "out of the blue" was said by the Secretary of Defense [page II -35] to be "...quite unlikely under the current circumstances....A nuclear attack on the United States...would most likely be preceded by a series of crises, and certainly by a sharp deterioration in our relations with the Soviet Union." Thus the civil defense program must also be designed against the possibility of such periods of crisis or confrontation. It is obvious of course, that one excellent way to protect people against a potential threat is to remove them from the hazard area. This is no news to Texans, certainly to those living on or near the coast, as precautionary evacua- tions are conducted from time to time when a hurricane threatens. Hurri- cane Carla in 1961, indeed, gave rise to the largest movement from hazardous areas that this country has seen, with between half and three - quarters of a million people leaving the threatened parts of the Louisiana and Texas coasts. We have seen evacuations since, though not on so large a scale, in the face of other hurricanes, of floods, and of potential hazards from chlorine barges and the like. Thus it clearly makes sense to develop a capability to help people move from what could be higher -risk areas, during periods of severe international crisis. What might such areas be? One obvious set of 9 "risk areas" is those communities near SAC bomber bases and missile fields, and ballistic missile submarine bases -- in a word, key military installations. In the event that there should be a threat of a "counter - force" attack on these key installations, we would need the ability to help people move from these areas and to protect them -- and of course the rest of the US population -- against fallout. Another option is also needed, and that is the ability to assist people to move from all of the major metropolitan areas of the US. One fundamental reason why we need this capability is because the USSR has given a great deal of attention to civil defense including, as the Secretary put it in his report [page II -54], "...not only the construction of shelters...but the pre- paration of plans for evacuation of the bulk of the popu- lation from its major cities in the event of a crisis.... "We believe the United States should have a similar option for two reasons: (1) to be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Union attempts to intimidate us in a time of crisis by evacuating the population from its cities; and (2) to reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appears imminent." So to recapitulate, the Department of Defense sees the US as needing civil defense options, for flexible response as the situation may require, which include: (1) Ability to protect the people in- place; or (2) Ability to help people to move from risk areas during a crisis -- either (a) on a selective basis, should key military instal- lations be threatened; or (b) from all metropolitan areas. 10 These flexible- response options are what the Secretary is referring to, when he talks of civil defense being "an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture." To get an idea of what the potential payoff of these options is, let's pause a minute to consider the following figures: (1) For a starting point, assume a "no -civil defense" case. DCPA studies show that fatalities from a large attack on both cities and military targets could total some 125 million, if essentially no civil defense countermeasures were taken. (2) Next, a civil defense posture based on protecting people in- place, in best - available existing protection, has potential to save up to some 30 million people (total fatalities falling to some 94 million -- which is still close to half of the popula- tion.) Note the words "up to" -- for 30 million lives actually to be saved, civil defense would have to "work well" in com- munities throughout the country. (3) Should time during a crisis permit relocating 70 percent of the metropolitan population to safer areas, and providing some degree of fallout protection there, some 65 to 70 million more lives could be saved (i.e., fatalities would total some 22 to 29 million). This is around 100 million lives saved, compared to the "no civil defense" case. I think you can see why crisis relocation planning is a matter of great interest to many of us. (4) If an attack were made only on key military installations, not on cities -- and if people had been moved away from these areas during a crisis period -- then nationwide fatalities from fallout would be expected to total well under one million. This is why an option for selective relocation of people could be of great importance. 11 Please note carefully that while the capabilities we need are clear, we do not have them all developed as of this time -- and this is where the pilot work being done in Texas is so important. It is one thing to assume that 70 percent of the US metropolitan population could be relocated to lower -risk areas, and maintained there for perhaps a week, and that fall- out protection could be developed for them. It is another thing to do the detailed planning that would be required in such areas as movement and traffic control, providing for reception and care of people who had left their homes, providing for feeding, and providing for fallout protection. Many of you know that large -scale movement of people can work, at least on the Gulf Coast, because you've helped to make it work when a hurricane threatened. However, movement of half or three quarters of a million people from the coast is not on the same scale as movement of tens or even scores of million from most larger US cities. Thus, we have been proceeding a step at a time, to identify and attempt to resolve the problems that could result from truly large -scale movement. Based on pilot work with San Antonio starting over two years ago we developed a manual for the first part of the crisis relocation planning problem. This includes developing plans to allocate the risk -area popula- tion to surrounding host areas, and development of standby information for the public on "where to go and what to do" should relocation be implemented. Using this planning manual as a basis, we trained Region/ State teams about a year ago, and they have completed the first phase of crisis relocation planning in nine additional pilot - project areas, one per DCPA Region (with an extra pilot project in Region One). 12 We continued right on in Texas, however, with the next phase of relocation planning. Members of your State office staff, plus Dr. Abner Sachs of the Institute for Defense Analyses, have been working with Texas communities on development of the operational plans needed to conduct a relocation. The cities involved have been San Antonio, Waco, and Beaumont/ Port Arthur /Orange. Work has also gone on with at least one host (or "reception ") county for each of the cities: Comal County for San Antonio; Hill and Falls Counties for Waco; and Jasper County for Beaumont /Port Arthur. Comal and Jasper Counties have developed overall operational plans that include the crisis relocation option, and these are being reviewed by local governing bodies. Other plans are moving forward, and we expect that operational plans for crisis relocation will be completed for all the cities and counties I mentioned. Just last week we sent copies of the Jasper and Comal County plans to the eight DCPA Regions, for use as examples in their continuing work on the pilot projects around the country. So you can see that the work done here in Texas these last several years is indeed pointing the way for the other States. Those of you who have not yet been involved in this kind of contingency planning, for relocating people from higher -risk areas during a several -day crisis, may be interested in a few of the lessons learned to date. One question that will come immediately to the mind of a civil defense professional is, how in the world could fallout protection be provided or developed for people from cities, when few non - metropolitan counties have enough shelter for their own people? This is obviously an especially acute problem in Texas and other southerly States because basements are few. 13 The answer, in general, is to find out what's the best protection available, and furthermore, what could be done during a crisis to improve this protection. Therefore, DCPA developed and last summer pilot- tested a so- called "host -area survey." This identifies protection of three main types, for use by State and local planners: First is "congregate care" space, which includes buildings that can be used for the temporary lodging of crisis evacuees. Schools, churches, and motels are some of the first choices, but the survey also looks at commercial structures in which people could be lodged. The other two types of space identified by the host -area survey are best - available existing fallout protection, and buildings where the fall- out protection factor (or PF) could be upgraded by work done during a crisis. Thus the host -area survey results in a one -sheet form, for each building examined, that shows not only the existing PF but also the amount of earth that would have to be added at the sides of the building and overhead, to improve its fallout protection to PF 20 and (where feasible) to PF 40. Results of the host area survey have been analyzed for the first 13,000 buildings examined -- in six areas from Springfield, Massachusetts to Macon, Georgia. The results are interesting, and give grounds for optimism that the problem of providing fallout protection could be solved during a period of several days of severe crisis. In brief, the survey found enough existing or upgradable space for more than the total of host area population plus city evacuees (in fact, the overall figure was 123 per- cent of the total requirement). Also, the amount of earth that would be needed to upgrade existing PF's to 20 was about half a cubic yard per 14 space upgraded. That's a considerable amount of earth to be moved but not an overwhelming amount. It would total something like 40 or 50 buckets full, on the average, for each PF 20+ space produced. One PS -- we have just got results of the survey for 31 counties surrounding San Antonio. This covered 5174 buildings, and the results were similar to those for the other six areas analyzed. In sum, there is a lot of potential protection in this country. The survey around San Antonio found over 120,000 PF 20+ spaces existing, plus about 500,000 more that could be upgraded to PF 20 during a crisis. Another question that may occur to you is, how did elected officials "buy" this idea of contingency planning for crisis relocation? I am glad to report that local officials without exception (so far as we have heard) agreed that crisis relocation planning did make sense, and that it's far better to have a plan and (hopefully) never need it than to need the plan and not have it. I understand that county officials in the Beaumont /Port Arthur area are particularly favorable to CRP because of their need to be ready to conduct hurricane evacuation operations. There are additional questions that you may have about crisis relocation planning -- such as, what about arrangements for feeding people in host areas? Or, is there any way to predict just how many people would actually leave major cities or other areas, during an intense crisis? Time does not permit discussing all of these matters today, but let me assure you that these and other aspects of crisis relocation planning are under active investigation, both in the Texas developmental projects and in some research projects elsewhere. Also, if you are interested in the area of crisis relocation planning, I would recommend your reading the article by Gov. Davis in the November /December 1974 15 issue of "Foresight," titled "Perspective on Crisis Relocation Planning." The Director also had an article on CRP in the November /December 1974 issue of "Survive" magazine, called "Where Do We Stand on CRP ?" In brief, we believe that crisis relocation capability is not only needed, but can be developed -- recognizing that specially- tailored solutions would be needed for the more densely- urbanized parts of the US, such as the Northeast. Accordingly, the FY 1976 Department of Defense budget includes provision for making a "modest start on the relocation planning effort," as noted in the Secretary's report to Congress [page II -57]. We will also be pressing on with research projects and the prototype work with Texas communities. So, to conclude, may I reiterate these points with respect to DCPA's responsibilities and programs: (1) Civil defense continues to be an essential element of our country's total defense posture, and an essential element of our overall deterrence posture. This means that the better you can make civil defense -- with support from the State office and DCPA -- the less likely an attack is to happen. Remember that detente, deterrence, and defense are not in conflict -- they are all aspects of maintaining an equilibrium of power. (2) The Defense Department recognizes and gives full support to the concept that civil defense must be dual- purpose with benefits in both peacetime and attack emergencies. We know and appre- ciate that peacetime utility is a statutory mandate on both State and local civil defense agencies, and that as a practical matter your local officials, for the most part, are more interested in peacetime payoff than in protection in a possible 16 attack. Dual -use makes sense to DCPA and we give it our fullest support -- provided that attack as well as peacetime preparedness is in fact developed, with even - handed development of genuinely "dual" capabilities. (3) The Defense Department sees the US as needing options in case of international crisis or attack -- options both for (a) in -place protection, and (b) either selective relocation or relocation from all metropolitan areas, if time permits and the decision is made to advise the people to relocate. Let me stress that in -place protection would be needed in all situa- tions. In a short- warning situation, most or all of the people would need nearby shelter, that is, "in- place" protection. In a longer crisis, the decision might not have been made to recommend relocation, in which case most people would still be in cities and need in -place protection. Or, relocation might have been recommended but the crisis could have escalated to attack rapidly, so that a substantial number of people could still be in cities. Finally, even an attack that came after effective operations for relocation of the population would still find a certain number of people in cities and needing "in- place" shelter, such as the on -duty shift of employees of key services or industries. I know that we can count on Texas remaining among the nation's leaders in civil defense. In particular, DCPA is deeply grateful to Parks Bowden, to the State staff, and to those local Directors who have been involved in the developmental work on crisis relocation planning. These efforts could be of critical importance should the day ever come when crisis relocation might be needed -- of importance to your sister jurisdictions in Texas, and to people throughout the United States.