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The attached is a report prepared by James J. McCue,
Managing Director /Operations, Indianapolis International
Airport and Vice Chairman of the AAE Safety, Security,
Technical Committee, after visiting the scene of the crash
of United Airlines Flight #232 at Sioux City, Iowa.
Additional information regarding the accident is included.
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Contact was made at approximately 1700 hours on Wednesday,
July 19th, by Spencer Dickerson of AAAE ascertaining if
travel could be made to Sioux City, Iowa to cover the United
Airlines DC -10 accident. It was determined the trip could
be made, Departure occurred at 0700 cn Thursday, July 2Cth.
Arrival in Sioux City, Iowa was at 12:00, noon. Arrival
time was actually one hour late, due .to St. Louis weather.
On arrival, contact was made with Mr. Randy Curtis, Director:
of Aviation for Sioux City, Iowa. Ironically, Mr. Curtis
was on the same aircraft out of St. Louis, as he had ,een
vacationing in Hawaii and had been called back to the
aiYpert due to the United'Flight #232 accident. Mr. Curtis
was most hospitable and provided transportation to the
Command Post and the accident site.
The Command Post was located in a lean -to adjacent to an FEO
hangar. All personnel were ';required to sign i.n and were
issued a ibright ''pink piece of 'Engineer's tape, which
authorized' them to enter the accident'site:. '
After a brief trip to the accident site, a visit was made to
the :morgue that had been set up in Iowa Air National
Guard hangar. From all outward - , all Air
National - Guard personnel were acting as litter bearers.
There were refrigerated trucks on the scene.'
After departing the morgue;' a re -visit to the accident site
was made. Since having been previously signed in, there was
unimpeded access to the site and no questions were asked
during a tour of the area. A walking tour began at the
initial touch -down point of the aircraft on R/W 22.
Besides, the three engines from the DC -10, only three
discernible items of wreckage could be identified; the tail
section of the aircraft.containing two rows of seats, the
mangled cockpit area and the inverted wing root and forward
section of the aircraft. At the scene, the following was
noted:
1. The aircraft touched down on the extreme left side
of R/W 22 (a closed runway). Actually, on an
intersecting taxiway, the left main gear
impacted the taxiway, and the left tires punctured
the taxiway surface. The taxiway was not stressed
for an aircraft of this weight, as it was only
about six inches or less of concrete built during
World War 11. It is apparent the aircraft veered
sharply to the right, and there was a fire ball a
short distance from touch -down. This fire ball
occurred due to the right wing impacting the run-
way surface.
2. Even though the aircraft veered to the right, much
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debris, including the number two engine continued
on a straight path.
3. Aircraft pieces, luggage, clothing, cargo, cargo
containers, etc. were strewn en R/W 22 beginning
approximately half -way between touch- docm point and
the - -final stopping point. The distance from the
initial touch -down to the final resting place
of the tail section and the wing area was
approximately 5,000 feet.
4. Aircraft seats began to leave aircraft just
prior to the R/W intersection of R/W 4/22 . and R/W
17/35. Many of the fatalities were found still
strapped in the seats on R/W 17/35.
5. The cockpit section was located _just _prior • to /,
R/w 17/35. 7Eye witnesses indicated; that at
first glance, no one .appeared to be, in that
particular; piece: of wreckage. But, later found
the three crew members and . ore'j umpseat` rider in -;
the mangled debris.` All had survived the accident.-
6. The main fuselage section continued on a path to
the right of the cockpit, crossing over R/W
17/35 and wound up inverted on the west side of
the runway. There was a major fire in this sec-
tion and over forty bodies were still in the
wreckage nearly twenty -four hours after the
crash.
The bodies could not be removed due to
the instability of'the wrecked portion and the
entire section had be shored with timbers
while being lifted by several cranes and wreckers.
(It has since` been learned that .no ; bodies were
removed from the scene until approximately 0900 ')
hours on July w 20th. )
7. The tail section was to the left of the main •
fuselage area at nearly the same distance,
being approximately 5,000 feet.
At approximately 1700 hours, on July 20th, room arrangements
were made at Briarcliff College as no hotel rooms were
available within eighty miles of the airport. United
Airlines had taken over an entire dormitory to house'
survivors and then victims' families. The dormitory was
well secured' and no news media were allowed in the 3
area. At 1900 hours, a National Transportation Safety Board
' Meeting was conducted at the Sioux City Convention Center.
The following information was gathered at that meeting:
1. Passenger count was 295. 284 passengers and
11 crew members. of that number, 7 deceased had
been identified. 54 survivors were still
hospitalized. 132 were treated and released
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and 102 were either missing or had not been
identified. This information was current as of
1820 hours Thursday, July 20th. (At 0900 hours,
July 21st, 2.passengers had not been accounted for)
2. weather information prior to the accident is as
follows: 1450 hours - 4,000' ceiling, broken,
25,000 broken with 15 miles visibility. Temperature
was 80 °. Winds were 010° at 14 knots.
• 1500 hours - 4,000' ceiling, broken, 25,000 broken,
with 15.•miies. .Temperature was 81 °.
Winds were 020° at 13 knots. At 1559 hours same
information as of 1550 with the exception
that winds had changed to 360° at 14 knots.
3. Fuel quantities used on the three engines indicated
number one engine had used approximately 11,000
pounds of fuel. Number two engine used
approximately 7,000 pounds of fuel. Number three
engine used approximately 13,000 pounds of fuel.
Information derived from cockpit debris indicated
that the shoulder harness of the Captain could
possibly have failed. This was not verified.
A Captain Fitch had been flying the jump seat and
was a DC -10 instructor pilot. Capt. Fitch had been
controlling the throttles to assist the flight
crew. Further information derived from the cock-
pit was the indicated airspeed for landing was 185
knots and calculated stopping distance for the
aircraft with no flaps, no reversers and no slates
would have been 6,700 feet. Ironically, the R/W
4/22 length was approximately 6,900 feet.
4. The investigator-- Iooking into the air traffic
control side of the accident indicated that
Minneapolis Center handed off the aircraft at 1523
to Sioux City approach control. At that time the
pilot indicated number two engine was out; he had
very little .control of the aircraft. When 44 miles
from the airport, he requested that aircraft rescue
and fire fighting equipment be standing by. At
that time, the tower alerted the Sioux City
Airport Fire Department of an Alert 2 and
indicated that the aircraft was descending at a
rate of 500 feet per minute. The Pilot informed
approach control he had very little control; he
could only make power turns using engine thrusts
and that right turns were about all he could
maneuver.
There were three 360 degree turns made
on the approach to the airport. At approximately
1537, the pilot radioed the tower that he was
doubtful as to whether or not he could make the
airport and would probably have to set down on a
highway. When 8 miles from the airport, the pilot
determined he would be able to make R/W 22 At
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1600 hours, the tape ended.
5. When number two engine was lost by an explosion in
the tail section, two flight attendants were
knocked to the floor of the aircraft due to that
explosion. The Captain immediately requested the
lead attendant to proceed to the cockpit for
a briefing. The flight attendant indicated that on
her arrival she noted the pilot and the co -pilot
struggling with the wheel to maintain control. She
. was instructed to brief the passengers and prepare
. for a crash landing. The flight attendant further
indicated that only two passengers within the
aircraft were of a hysterical nature but she was
able to calm those tFio individuals.
At the conclusion of this initial hearing, a news conference
was conducted by NTSB member, Jim Burnett.
Friday morning, July 21, 1989, contact was again made with
Mr. Randy Curtis and transportation was again provided to
the.. scene. From approximately 0900 hours until 1300 hours,
a complete walk was made of the entire scene. It was noted
that at approximately 8:30 the National _,Guard along with
members of the NTSB were retrieving personal items such as
wallets, purses, jewelry, etc. from the crash scene.
A layout of the airport is attached to this report with
notations appropriately made as to the locations of
different pieces of wreckage and debris.
It was apparent that the Sioux City Airport personnel were
quite prepared for a disaster of this nature. Mr. Curtis
indicated that less than two years prior to this time, a
disaster exercise was held at nearly the same location that
this airplane came to rest after the crash.
The cooperation, especially between the National Guard
personnel and the airport personnel was outstanding. The
Base Commander, Colonel Denny Nielson, made himself totally
a,ailable to airport personnel and it was so indicated by
the way that .99% of those personnel removing debris and
rodies from the main wreckage were National Guard personnel.
The ARFF personnel and National Guard fireman from Sioux
City Airport are to be commended for their outstanding work
at this accident. It was apparent that it was extremely.
difficult to maneuver equipment in and around the debris
trying to make entry to the main body of the wreckage which
was on fire. Debris, seats, aircraft parts and victims were
all mingled together and it took extreme caution in order
not to lose site of the fact that victims ware on the
ground. It should also be noted that the fire crews had
been set up for an arrival of this aircraft on R/W 31 but
at the last minute, had to make new arrangements to accept
this aircraft on R/W 22. There had been fire trucks
standing by on R/W 22- should the aircraft have touched
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down on R/W 31.
The following facts involving this accident were derived several
days later:
1. 500 gailQns of 3% AFFF and 15,000 gallons of water we e
used to extinguish the fires.
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2. The fire in the main body of the aircraft was exting ed it
45 minutes.
3. No communication problems were encountered.
4. Even though minor difficulties were experienced, nothing would
have been done differently.
3. Four minutes of protection was given to people for escape.
Time was very critical.
6. Two pieces of fire- fighting equipment were initially on the
scene (P -4 and P -19) with five ARFF personnel and one Chief.
7. To attack the fire, handlines were used. They were the best
defense on this particular fine.
8. No major problems were encountered while fighting the fire.
Magnesium was present and a few oxygen tanks exploded, but
neither posed major problems.
9. There - "was an Incident Command - System used; ,.,, _ However, internal
fighting was going on as to who was the Incident Commander. - "
10. There were some problems maneuvering to the scene. People
could be heard in the field but could not be seen, so
travel was slow to avoid running over someone.
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11. Airport Firefight ' v foight - the - fire, - City Firefighters f
handled the EMS and resupplied the tankers, Rescue people
attended to the tail section of 'the aircraft until the Air
National Guard arrived, then they moved_,forward to help with
firefighting. The City Fire Department handled most of the
EMS -work because they had.manyEMT's.
12. The ARFF personnel had trained for aircraft emergencies but
never trained for the emotional impact. -
• 13. The Disaster Committee is fighting over who was in charge of
the incident, so the committee may ,dissolve over their '
differences.
14. Many people who worked at the scene are not getting the recog-
nition they deserve.
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15. The airport experienced an inflight engine emergency a few
days after the United #232 incident. A few firefighters were
upset and ready to quit because they felt they could not handle
another disaster -.
16. Mental Health Officials began debriefing sessions the day
after the crash.
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Since it was quite apparent that the cause of the accident
was from . an..explosion within number 2 engine which severed
all hydraulic lines and left no hydraulic fluid within the
aircraft which in turn gave no control of wing, tail or
rudder services to the cockpit, it was determined that no
further investigation on the part of this individual would
be necessary at the scene. Departure was made from Sioux
City Airport at approximately 1730, Friday, July 21st.
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