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HomeMy WebLinkAboutAn Estimate of the World Situation Gen. Wheeler ADDRESS BY GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER, USA CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BEFORE THE TEXAS CIVIL DEFENSE CONFERENCE, AUSTIN, TEXAS Monday, February 21, 1966 AN ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION Governor Connally asked me here today to give you my estimate of the world situation at this point in time. I think that my remarks will bear indirectly, although perhaps not directly on the subject which you have gathered to discuss here, in other words Civil Defense. Actually, this could be a very easy assignment because my estimate can be condensed into three words -- confused and dangerous. However, I reckon you expect a bit more than that from me and, therefore, I would like to set the stage for my estimate by analyzing briefly the genesis of the current situation and, in that cena:-..t, examining the several challenges facing the United States today and our prcg.'ess and prospects in meeting these challenges. I shall, of course, emphasize the military aspects since that is my particular cup of tea. In my opinion, to understand fully the world situation today, particularly from the point of view of the United States, we must first recognize that since 1945 we have been engaged in the longest war in our history. I use the word "war" advisedly, basing it upon one of Webster's definitions of war is: "The state of fact of being actively in conflict with or opposed to each other." Later, he adds that this conflict should be between two or more nations, states, or "other politically organized bodies." We have certainly been in a state of active conflict with the communists since V -E Day, even though it took us a few years to appreciate this fact fully. The only change through the years has been that this once monolithic enemy has split like an amoeba into two; however, both still seek to establish communism throughout the world, albeit by different means and methods. This Longest War, then, provides the context in which I believe a realistic estimate of the situation must be examined. Historians normally record the conduct of a war by analyzing the various campaigns involved, and I shall do likewise. The Soviets have been our major communist antagonist during most of this conflict. As this audience well knows, their goal has been the establishment of a communist world. As you may not have noticed, their principal tactic has been the probe: try something and see what happens, always leaving the way open for retreat. The first phase or campaign of the war lasted from about 1945 to 1953 and was designed to take over as many nations or parts of nations as possible. The objective was actual physical aggrandizement of the communist world. Four different types of aggression were featured: political takeover from within, augmented if necessary by coups d'etat; subversive insurgency; annexation; and overt aggression. From the Soviet viewpoint, the campaign got off to a flying start in the areas where the Russians were in military occupation, and by 1947 Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were solidly in the communist orbit. In that year, however, the United Stated began to grasp that it was "at war." The subversive insurgency of the communists in Greece was probably the spark which set off positive United States opposition to the expansion of communism. You will recall that, when we took over the counterinsurgency action there frcm the British in 1947, we also promulgated the Truman Doctrine. This doctrine announced our willingness to assist nations threatened by communist violence should those nations so desire and, in effect, committed us to a policy of containing communist threats. It was followed shortly by the Marshall Plan, and these steps made clear to Stalin that we intended to oppose further Soviet efforts to spread communism by military or subversive means. Unfortunately, we did not at first back up this intent by generating military forces which could respond promptly to a aggression. As a result, the Soviets continued to probe. Czechoslovakia fell in early 1948 through an internal communist coup d'etat followed shortly in the same year by the blockade of Berlin. These two events marked the end of Stalin's active expansionist campaign in Europe. American bombers returned to Britain in 1948, NATO began to form in 1949, the Seventh Army was reactivated in Europe in 1950, and the Soviets estimated they had pushed as far as they could in that area at that time. In Asia, the Chinese Communists succeeded in driving out the Nationalists at about the same time -- 1949. Then came the attack on South Korea and the unexpected -- the communists -- positive United Nations reaction which terminated in the Armistice of 1953. This Armistice also marked the end of the first campaign of the Longest War. The next campaign, in my opinion, was conducted over the years 1953 through 1960. In retrospect, it was relatively a lull -- a lull forced on the Soviets primarily by the tremendous strategic nuclear force we had built during the Korean War, together with our military strategy of "Massive Retaliation" based on the threat of the use of this force to respond to any communist aggression. Recognizing the importance of balancing the United States' complete supe- riority in nuclear weapons and delivery means, the Soviets gave first priority during this second campaign to remedying their inferior nuclear weapons posture. They did not decide to try to create a "missile gap" as we suspected at the time but, rather, to allocate sufficient effort and funds to assure them guaranteed strategic nuclear retaliatory power. They have attained this objective today. 2 Khrushchev's now famous January 1961 speech promising Soviet support of "wars of national liberation" rang up the curtain on the third campaign -- a campaign which is still in progress. This speech has received much notice as the harbinger of the main communist tactic during this campaign -- subversive insurgency. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that the speech also outlined the five main Soviet objectives for the campaign. These were: - - First, the weakening or, at least immobilizing, of U. S. military power to a significant degree by maintaining the threat of general war. - - Second, the weakening and eventual dissolution of the several Western security alliances. -- Third, complementing the accomplishment of the first two objectives by a concurrent strengthening of the communist power complex. - - Fourth, using economic competition to weaken the United States and the other Free World countries. -- Finally, the most important, retaining communist initiative and enhancing actual expansion through the effective use of the main aggressive weapon, subversive insurgency -- backed by appropriate propaganda and featuring conflict by proxy. Khrushchev's speech concerned only the Soviet brand of communism. However, according to the now well- reported treatise released last September by Marshal Lin Piao, Red Chinese Minister of Defense and a Deputy Premier, the Chinese Communist brand is much the same, only considerably more virulent. In estimating the current world situation, therefore, we may safely take Khrushchev's five objectives as basic communist goals. Now, let us examine what we are doing to prevent them from achieving these goals. Analysis reveals both plusses and minuses. A big plus is the fact that U. S. military power has not been weakened or immobilized by the threat of nuclear war. In fact, our switch from "Massive Retaliation" to the current military strategy of "Flexible Response" or, if you prefer, "Multiple Options," was designed to and has accomplished just the opposite. We have retained an overwhelming preponderance of strategic nuclear power but have also created powerful, balanced forces which can be used in flexible combinations to provide numerous options to our decision makers in time of emergency. These options are immediately available for use as I think we have shown in Vietnam -- a most important factor in reducing the probe possibilities available to the communists. The value of this strategy was brought home during the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when Khrushchev retreated ignominiously from his attempt to tip the world strategic nuclear balance toward his favor by placing relatively short -range nuclear missiles near our shores. And I think I should say here also that the efforts the programs for Civil Defense in this country are of course part and parcel of our strategic posture. In other words, the efforts that are being made throughout the U. S., the efforts that you ladies and 3 gentlemen are devoting to Civi]. Defense and all of its many aspects is a part of the strategic nuclear deterrent which is the first charge on our military funds and our military effort. Our collective security system -- the second communist target -- has been under considerable stress and strain. However, I should like to emphasize that despite the very considerable talk about the prospective weakening of NATO and various difficulties with other collective security arrangements, the system as a whole is virtually intact. Three of our allies, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have come staunchly forward to provide troops to join us in our efforts to help another ally, South Vietnam, defeat aggression. Thirty -five other nations are providing or have agreed to provide non - military assistance. In other words, communist efforts to destroy the Free World collective security system have actually had only minimum success to date. The third and fourth communist objectives -- strengthening the communist power complex and weakening the Free World through economic competition -- have suffered severe setbacks. I need not dwell on these points as it is obvious that the Sino- Soviet split, the increasing individualism of some other communist regimes, the economic difficulties in both Russia and Red China, and many similar developments more than outweigh the plus of the Chicom's nuclear weapons progress -- at least at this point in time. In over -all terms, then, we are more than holding our own with respect to countering the first four communist objectives. However, the final objective -- expansion through subversive insurgency -- poses the biggest problem to us and appears to be the key to victory in this third campaign of the Longest War. The most perplexing and most dangerous insurgency problem today is, of course, Vietnam, and its many ramifications and our attempts to solve them must have priority in any estimate of the present world situation. I propose, therefore, to devote the remainder of my remarks to Vietnam -- how we are responding to the problem and our chances for success. I must stress at the outset that Vietnam is much more than a military conflict. I think this point was highlighted clearly and forcefully by President Johnson at the recent Honolulu Conference which I attended. I think that you will all recognize that the President in Honolulu, stressed the non - military aspects of the conflict although, of course, he recognized the importance of the military aspects. As in the case of any insurgency situation, it is not even primarily a military problem, although military aspects appear to be paramount at the moment. Rather, defeating subversive insurgency in Vietnam or elsewhere is an all - encompassing problem, involving bringing to bear an effectively coordinated mix of all of the elements of national power -- political, economic, and psychological as well as military. I should add at this point that Marshal Lin's treatise, already mentioned, makes clear that the communists are also well aware of the need to apply total power to an insurgency situation, and they are practicing what they preach in Vietnam. They have organized a coordinated, effective political and military infrastructure in the parts of the country which they control or partly control. 4 It is, of course, directed by Hanoi. Viet Cong political and military regions in SVN are identical and, significantly, are numbered in continuation of the same series as the political regions of North Vietnam. Some 40,000 individuals form the political and technical cadre for this machinery and the military muscle comes from more than 80,000 hard core troops -- including North Vietnamese fillers and complete units -- and about 120,000 part time guerrillas. In other words, a total force of some 240,000 communist personnel. We, the South Vietnamese, and our other Allies are also attempting to apply a powerful mix of appropriate measures, both in the military and non - military fields. The target of this power is the people of South Vietnam. They must ultimately be sold on their government if the insurgency is to be defeated. It is heartening to note that the Government of Vietnam has publicly recognized this point several times, for example in Premier Ky's "State of the Nation" address on January 15th and in the Declaration of Honolulu of February 8th. The objective for military power which derives from this task is two -fold -- the military defeat of the guerrilla main force units in open combat and the provision of security to the population against terrorism. One lesson we have learned about insurgency is that population security is essential before other power elements can be brought to bear to assist in selling the people on supporting the government. To attain these two military objectives a preponderance of friendly forces is necessary. This is so because troops must be available to provide the security I just mentioned while, concurrently, other troops must be available in sufficient numbers to find, fix, fight and destroy the hard core forces of the enemy. The Viet Cong, on the other hand, have only a minimal requirement for security forces. Therefore, almost all of their troops are available for offensive operations. We do not yet know just what preponderance of force is required in Vietnam. However, we do know that the ratio does not have to be as much in our favor as is often supposed. I say this because we are exploiting two weapons systems in Vietnam which help substantially in compensating for the fact that virtually all Viet Cong forces are available for offensive operations while a large proportion of the friendly forces are not. The first weapon is the helicopter which we use by the hundreds to transport troops to the scene of combat and, when necessary, to provide mobile fire support. The second is air power. This involves the unprecendentedly large number of tactical fighter bombers used to support Vietnamese and allied ground troops and -- equally important -- to bomb the enemy in his home country, thereby reducing the availability of men and supplies which could be moved to the south and reducing the capability to make such movement. It also includes the devas- tating B -52 strikes in South Vietnam with which I am sure you are familiar. These two weapons -- helicopters and air power -- provide friendly forces with an advantage in mobility and firepower greatly exceeding that available to counter- insurgency forces in any other guerrilla war in history. And, ladies and gentlemen, Mobility and firepower are the fundamentals of success in battle. 5 The South Vietnamese Armed Forces remain the basic military force fighting the Viet Cong. The basic plan to accomplish our two -fold military objective is to assign security operations responsibility primarily to the Vietnamese, assisted by Allied security operations in the vicinity of our several base complexes. Finding and destroying hard core Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units is being handled primarily by Vietnamese general reserve units and by the Allied forces. As I stressed earlier, however, final victory or defeat depends on the ability of the South Vietnamese, assisted by their Allies and friends, to assure the loyalties of the people, primarily through the application of non - military programs. Our capabilities to assist in this process are not being neglected. The U. S. is providing more than $800 million a year and more than 1,200 supervisory civilian officials in support of economic, political, and psychological projects, and the effort is expanding. For example, we are financing imports to help maintain the economy, to prevent serious inflation, and to curb the balance of payments deficit. We are providing capital projects assistance to broaden the economic base and to create and improve water supply systems, electrification, harbors, and transport facilities. We are helping improve human skills through education and training, and we are assisting in furnishing and maintaining basic services for the people via food and tools, and support for the countrywide police program. In addition, the U. S. military are playing a most significant role in the ton- military field. Not enough is known of our efforts in this area, which we group under the title, "Civic Action." We repair bridges, dig wells, clean canals, treat sick children, and rebuild schools and hospitals destroyed by the Viet Cong. I am sure that most people do not realize the great emphasis which our military forces place on civic action today in Vietnam. Our Armed Forces have been engaged in civic action in many parts of the world for many years, but Vietnam, where we fight on the one hand and work on civic actions on the other, approaches the unique. The normal, simple concept of letting the military fight the war and the civilians manipulate the peace does not suffice. Each must help and coordinate closely with the other. The civil agencies conduct field operations as if they were in combat -- as sometimes they are -- and the military take a heavy load of civic action because they are on the ground, know the problem, and have the manpower and means. The Ky Government's efforts to win over the Vietnamese are definitely making progress. I was most heartened last month that a convention of military leaders was called to examine and approve the Government's political and economic plans to build a genuine, viable democracy. Among other things this convention agreed to the formation of a "Democracy Building Council" which would function as a constituent assembly and, after taking soundings around the country, would produce a draft constitution which would then be presented to the electorate in the form of a referendum. These are constructive steps toward the establishment of a democratic regime. The convention also agreed to full military support of plans to achieve social justice, assist the needy, and to step up efforts to rebuild rural areas and pay special attention to the requirements of the peasantry. 6 Now, I am sure you are interested in how we are actually doing in Vietnam at the moment. I visited Vietnam last December and my reaction is that the Vietnamese, with our greatly increased help, are doing better, considerably better than a year ago when the situation was close to critical. For example, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have suffered what could be crippling losses; we estimate that more than 34,000 were killed and nearly 6,000 were captured during 1965. This high rate of enemy destruction is continuing in 1966. However, the best indicators of our over -all success are the increasing number of defectors coming over to the government side -- more than 1,600 in January, an all -time record -- and the continually increasing willingness of Vietnamese peasants in many areas to give information about the Viet Cong. When the average peasant becomes willing to risk Viet Cong terrorist attacks by giving information, the dictum of Mao Tse -tung that "Guerrillas hide among the people as fish hide in the sea," has been turned against the Viet Cong. The sea is beginning to throw the fish up on the beach. Despite all this, the picture is not yet rosy. The Viet Cong still comprise a strong, skillful, determined military force of over 200,000 men. Their organ- izational infrastructure is damaged but still operating. Their supply lines are interdicted but not blocked. On our side, the Vietnamese economy is shaky, political processes and machinery are still seriously disrupted , communications are interdicted, and the military expansion program is progressing slowly. Most important, the average peasant, although he may well be leaning further toward the Government, has certainly not yet taken the step of full commitment. In summary, my estimate of the world situation finds the United States in the midst of the third campaign of its Longest War with the outcome still in the balance. This outcome may well tip that balance one way or the other. I think it is essential that all of us recognize this fact and also realize that this particular battle of the campaign may well be long and costly. Victory, however, is a "must" because if we should fail to win this campaign, the next would be fought on less advantageous terms, at greater costs in blond and treasure, and with morale lowered in the Free World and enhanced in the Communist world. I was interested to note in the London Times of January 23d, this year, an excellent summary of what I have been saying. The writer said, and I quote, "It seems to me that those who say America should never have got drawn into an Asian land war have failed to grasp that the world can no longer be compart- mentalized. The wider struggle is omnipresent; stalemated and quiescent in Europe, fermenting gently in Africa and Latin America, boiling in Southeast Asia. But wherever it is waged, all mankind is involved and to my mind nowhere can this be seen more clearly than South Vietnam." 7